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The thesis compares the discursive practices of the trade unions and political 
parties in the Ruhr and South Wales from 1890 to 1926. It begins from the hypothesis 
that generally, developments in South Wales were characterised by a process of 
homogenisation. On the other hand, developments in the Ruhr were characterised by 
increasing fragmentation.
In order to integrate the historiographies of the two coalfields, this work seeks 
to account for the different trajectories of union and political development using a 
tripartite approach. This framework depends on the interrelated concepts of lifeworld, 
constructed identity and civil society. The use of Jiirgen Habermas's concept of 
lifeworld allows a synthesis of milieux, structural factors and discourse. The lifeworld 
provides the backdrop against which the activists constructed the identities of their 
respective organisations. A more synchronous lifeworld in South Wales encouraged a 
more encompassing, inclusive discourse. The fragmentation of the lifeworld of the 
Ruhr miners into several milieux or sub-cultures, however, contributed to the 
development of more particularist discourses and sectionalist identities. These 
differences were encouraged by the nature of civil society in the two regions. German 
civil society was comparatively more rigid and segmented than its British counterpart. 
Trade unions and political parties in the Ruhr desired harmony and were intolerant of 
dissent. This stymied pluralist debate and encouraged rivals to break away to form 
their own associations, rather than work from within. In South Wales, by contrast, 
pluralist debate was tolerated and even encouraged. This helped contain tendencies 
that could have otherwise led to splinter groups.
Lifeworld and civil society provided the context in which the organisations 
sought to create their identities. In the Ruhr these identities were more doctrinal than 
those in South Wales and were often defined as much by what they were not as what 
they were. This meant that the discursive practices of the unions and parties served to 
reinforce social divisions and one ideal of the miner was placed in juxtaposition with 
another. In South Wales, on the other hand, the identity created was more inclusive. 
There the discursive dichotomy centred on labour vs. capital. This allowed the 
creation of a more encompassing identity, reinforcing the comparatively cohesive 
nature of the Welsh mining communities.
VIII
Introduction
This dissertation compares how working-class trade unions and political 
parties in the coal mining regions of South Wales and the Ruhr area of western 
Germany discursively constructed identities. In the period between 1871 and 1926, 
South Wales exhibited a working-class political development, whereby a single union, 
the South Wales Miners' Federation (SWMF) and one party, the Labour Party, were 
able gradually to overcome sectionalist loyalties, dominate worker politics and enable 
a broad based working-class identity to emerge. In the Ruhr region, by contrast, 
unions and parties representing working-class interests became increasingly 
fragmented. While all worker unions and political parties present in this region shared 
certain general beliefs regarding the dignity and rights of workers, the sectionalist 
worker identities of competing socialist, Christian and ethnic organisations prevented 
one dominant concept of working-class identity, and thus one governing form of 
working-class politics, from emerging. The work begins with the initial hypothesis 
that, on a comparative level, South Wales and the Ruhr were characterised during this 
period by divergent trends, the first by increasing homogeneity, the second by 
increasing fragmentation. The thesis is therefore concerned with explaining these two 
different trends.
Both South Wales and the Ruhr were major economic powerhouses of their 
respective nations, themselves the leading industrialised nations in Europe. 
Dominated by heavy industry the two regions had an unmistakable proletarian 
character. As such, both areas have enjoyed considerable attention from historians 
since the 1970s following the upsurge of interest in labour historiography. Indeed the 
seventies to the early eighties has been described as an almost 'golden-age' for at least 
Welsh labour historiography.' For both areas the amount of material produced, and 
still being produced, can only be described as voluminous.
While it has been recognised that Wales 'has been a plurality of cultures', 2 
much of the historical literature on South Wales produced in the 1970s and early 
1980s presented the South Wales miners' movement as a particularly homogeneous 
entity. Historians such as, Robin Page Arnot, Hywel Francis and Dai Smith focused 
upon the development of unionism in their histories of the South Wales Miners' 
Federation. The SWMF was regarded as so 'intimately associated with its society', 
that to write separate histories of the union and the mining communities was deemed 
almost a false dichotomy. 3 The account of Francis and Smith seemed especially to
suggest that the union was almost an organic extension of these communities. The 
force that bound the individual miners together in these accounts was the shared work 
experience. The danger the men faced underground from rock-falls, gas explosions 
and flooding and their subsequent need to co-operate to overcome such adversity 
engendered a sense of solidarity that did not stop when they left the pit. This feeling 
was transmuted into, and reinforced by, the myriad associations and organisations 
ranging from the industrial to the sporting to the political that mushroomed in the 
mining valleys. Migrants from the English border counties and further afield, who 
might initially be viewed with hostility, were assimilated with relative ease. Thus the 
initial disruption and disapproval caused by the arrival of Spanish immigrants in 
Abercrave gave way to respect for their working skills and their commitment to trade 
unionism. It has also been argued that this solidarity was not only expressed by the 
Fed, but also found assertion through the Labour Party from 1909 onwards as the 
union sent its most promising lights to the Central Labour College (CLC) to return as 
socialist campaigners. 5
From the late 1980s there has been a change in the trend of Welsh labour 
historiography. Admittedly, as argued by Croll, the Welsh variant has been somewhat 
sheltered from the debates and challenges in England that has accompanied the rise of 
the 'linguistic turn', a feature that Croll sees as having both advantages and 
disadvantages. These challenges have often questioned concepts that have been 
largely taken as given by labour historians, such as class. 6 Historians such as Gareth 
Stedman Jones, and Patrick Joyce have emphasised the role language and discourse 
played in creating identities like class.7 However, although Welsh labour 
historiography may have so far escaped the post-structural storm, there has been an 
identifiable move away from the encompassing, general histories of trade unionism 
with their relatively uncomplicated portrait of societal homogeneity. Increasingly 
smaller, individual communities have become the objects of historical research and 
study. Micro-studies have become very much in vogue. Chris Williams's study while 
not disregarding social and economic factors attempts to move away from simple 
reductionism in accounting for the rise of the Labour Party in the Rhondda valley and
n
its subsequent exercise of power thorough examination of political languages. Other 
works have moved away from the traditional areas of unionism and party politics. 
Michael Lieven's popular history, Senghennydd: The Universal Pit Village, gives a 
complex picture of the inter-play of social relations, especially gender relations. 9
Angela V. John, Dot Jones, and Carol White and Sian Rhiannon Williams have
2
pursued investigations into the role of women in South Wales, 10 while popular culture 
has also attracted increasing attention. 1l
The historiography of the miners' movement in the Ruhr has followed a 
different course. Presented with the existence of several miners' unions and various 
political parties and the lack of long, drawn-out strikes similar to those that 
characterised South Wales in the 1920s, the unity of the miners' movement in the 
Ruhr could not be over-romanticised. Instead the level of violence during the strikes 
of 1919 and the formation of the Ruhr Red Army in 1920 has been taken to 
demonstrate the radicalism of the miners. This view has been supported by Jiirgen 
Tampke in his The Ruhr and Revolution. In a Marxian account, he argues that prior to 
the Great War the 'immiseration' of masses of miners led to an increasing alienation 
from the moderate leadership of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 
(German Social Democratic Party, SPD) and the socialist Alter Verband. Discontent 
over the lack of improvement in their conditions following the November Revolution 
led the rank and file to attempt to impose socialisation of the mines. This was coupled 
with a defection of the workers' political loyalties from the SPD to the leftist 
Unabhdngige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Independent Social 
Democratic Party, USPD), leading to a severe electoral defeat, both in the Ruhr and 
elsewhere in Germany, in 1920. Following the reunification of the USPD and SPD the 
workers turned to the KPD to satisfy their radical goals. 12 For other historians the 
Ruhr Red Army represented 'the last revolt of a henceforth increasingly resigned 
working-class'. 13
However, despite these accounts the radical image of the Ruhr miner has 
never dominated that region's labour historiography in the same way as the idea of the 
solidaristic Welsh miner has in South Wales. Due to the more diverse occupational 
structure of the Ruhr, the exact role the miners played in the radical protest is difficult 
to determine. For example, a micro-study of one of the most radical areas, Mulheim, 
claims that the hard-core of industrial militants mostly came from the armament 
factories. 14 More recently Karin Hartewig in Das unberechenbare Jahrzehnt has 
placed the unrest and violence in the context of the deprivation the miners 
experienced during the War and the following period of economic instability. This 
material deterioration coupled with the expectation of improvement led to the 
articulation of grievances through a variety of social protests ranging from food riots 
and looting to strikes and seizure of the mines. 15 Other accounts have also
concentrated on the miners' lack of solidarity and militancy. Klaus Tenfelde, for
3
example, argues in his seminal work on the miners that changes in working practices, 
such as the transition to longwall working, led to a de-skilling of the workforce and a 
subsequent loss of autonomy and solidarity. 16 Finally, Stephen Mickey's structural 
account of the trade unionism and politics of Ruhr miners in Wilhelmine Germany 
concentrates on the disunity of the miners and sets out the various obstacles that stood 
in the way of the creation of a unified labour movement. 17
Such accounts, however, are faced with the difficulty of explaining the great 
strike waves that did occur in the Ruhr. Large-scale strikes afflicted the region in 
1889, 1905, 1917, and 1919. In an effort to explain the earlier incidences of industrial 
unrest, David Crew compares the predisposition of miners and metal workers in the 
city of Bochum to strike. Utilising the concept of occupational community developed
I Q
by Seymour M. Lipset, Robert Blauner and G. Salaman, Crew concludes that the 
miners' shared work experience created just such a community. Individual miners 
carried this sense of community as they moved from mine to mine and underpinned 
the episodic incidences of industrial action. On the other hand, the more 
heterogeneous work structure of the iron and steel factories prevented the formation 
of such a community, resulting in lower levels of industrial militancy. 19
Franz-Josef Bruggemeier adopts a different approach. He largely endorses 
Mickey's account of the difficulties that the activists faced in forming trade unions. 
However, he seeks to explain the various strikes by looking beyond institutions. 
Briiggemeier's work is representative of the interest in Alltagsgeschichte (the history 
of everyday life), as opposed to Strukturgeschichte (structural social history), that 
emerged in Germany in the 1980s. While Strukturgeschichte, which emerged in the 
1960s and 1970s, concentrated on institutions and impersonal forces, 
Alltagsgeschichte aimed to 'examine working-class "cultures" as well as social 
"structures", popular "experiences" as well as political "processes'". 20 Bruggemeier 
uses working-class cultures as the foundation of his argument. Criticising Crew for 
the lack of detailed investigation devoted to miners' work underground, he 
nevertheless stresses it as an important factor in the creation of solidarity. 21 For him 
the co-operative work of the Kameradschaft and their autonomy coupled to the pride 
the miners felt in their physically demanding world of work provided the basis for 
collective action.22 Bruggemeier also looks beyond the workplace to the improvised 
networks the miners formed as a means of self-help. Two particular manifestations of 
this informal support structure was the system of lodgers (Schlafganger) and drinking 
clubs (Schnappskasinos)^ These networks provided the necessary solidarity for the
various strike waves between 1889 and 1919. For Briiggemeier the trade unions and 
SPD, through their disapproval of these activities, imposed themselves between this 
informal network and miners, thereby hampering expressions of solidarity. 24
While the debate on the trade unions in the Ruhr has largely focused on trying 
to reconcile organisational disunity with the evident solidarity of the strike waves, 
studies of the political history of the region have been exclusively concerned with 
explaining fragmentation. In South Wales the Liberal party largely dominated on the 
parliamentary level in the mining valleys before the Great War, while after the 
conflict the region became a Labour stronghold. Several parties throughout this 
period, however, contested the Ruhr, yet none was able to achieve dominance. In 
seeking to explain the particular political formations in the Ruhr the concept of milieu 
has often been invoked. Although widely employed in Germany, the concept has not 
been used extensively in Britain. A key figure in its development has been Rainer 
Lepsius. Lepsius argues that the stability of the Wilhelmine electoral system was 
conditioned by the existence of socio-cultural milieux. Based on certain ethnic, 
religious or political groups, these milieux were made up of dense networks of 
organisations, including political parties and trade unions. The parties were overt 
political expression of these various milieux and politics became a ritualised exercise 
in which each group used its ancillary organisations to turn-out their supporters. 25
William Claggett et al. has developed a somewhat similar analysis, although 
the notion of milieux is not explicitly used.26 Examining political cleavages in 
Wilhelmine Germany, they conclude that, while divisions may come from political 
leadership, those that have a social base are receptive, 'take on a life of their own' and 
are prolonged beyond strategic actions. 27 Thus lasting re-orientations of the political 
system were created by top-down pressure from the state. One such example was the 
Kulturkampf (Struggle of Cultures). This term covered a series of laws that 
discriminated against the Catholic Church in Germany in the 1870s. In Claggett's 
analysis this helped consolidate the Catholic minority and provided a support base for 
the Catholic Centre party that endured long after the laws had lapsed. Similarly, the 
Anti-Socialist Law, which discriminated against the SPD from 1878 until 1889 helped 
create a lasting left-right split between the SPD and the other parties. 28
Both Wolfgang Ja'ger and Karl Rohe have applied the concept of milieux to 
politics in the Ruhr specifically. Ja'ger has argued that the concept of occupational 
community, used to explain collective action during strikes, does not correspond with 
voting behaviour. He moves beyond the work place to examine the political-cultures
of local communities. In doing so he identifies four distinct types of milieux, Catholic, 
social-democratic, communist and national. These could also be further sub-divided 
into those based upon cottage miners, certain ethnic groups and organisations.29 For 
Jager, like Lepsius, it was these milieux, rather than simple class allegiances, which 
were the decisive factor in determining how miners voted.
Karl Rohe has pursued a similar argument. Rohe differs slightly from Ja'ger in 
that he suggests that while the Centre represented the model of the milieu-type party, 
the Social Democrats, despite their numerous sporting and cultural associations, 
represented more of a Sammlungsbewegung, or protest movement. The entrenched 
nature of the Catholic milieu in the Ruhr meant that the SPD was at a disadvantage, 
despite the predominantly working-class character of the region. 30
The historiographies of South Wales and the Ruhr, therefore, share some 
similarities in outline, but are also characterised by some distinct differences in detail. 
From the 1970s interest on both coalfields concentrated on the labour movement. 
However, while in South Wales emphasis was placed on the unity of the movement, 
in the Ruhr it was concentrated on explaining its division and weakness. Moreover, 
the notion of milieux has not been widely used as an explanatory framework in South 
Wales. Since the late 1980s, however, interest has moved away from the institutions 
of the labour movement towards more cultural aspects of the two regions. In some 
respects, elements of Alltagsgeschichte, such as the concern with everyday culture, 
experiences and oral history, have already become well established in Welsh 
historiography, although without the debate that has accompanied its growth in 
Germany. On the other hand, the emphasis on language and discourse that Croll has 
identified since the 'linguistic turn' in England, seems not to have become widespread 
in either Welsh or German historiography.
None of the foregoing works has attempted to place the two coalfields into a 
comparative perspective. While comparative history affords historians the opportunity 
to test explanatory frameworks applied to one national context, it also throws up 
several difficulties. Some of these are of a logistical nature, such as language and 
differences in the sources. South Wales, for example, has a rich store of local lodge 
records, while in Germany they are limited to the annual reports produced by the 
central executives. On the other hand, the German employers' organisations and 
regional governments were diligent in their retention of records and reports on the 
labour movement, while a more haphazard approach seems to characterise the Welsh 
employers and local authorities.
On a theoretical level, there are difficulties in integrating two very different 
historiographical traditions. In some respects the present work breaks with recent 
trends in that it moves away from the local studies and returns to a more general view 
of the history of miners' movements. While these accounts quite rightly question the 
old certainties that surround previous works and provide a deeper understanding of 
the complexity of the mining communities, their usefulness for cross-regional 
comparisons that seek to find a more comprehensive theoretical framework to explain 
the development of such movements are more limited. This may disturb some 
practitioners of micro-history, but a cross-regional comparison requires a regional 
perspective for both its subjects. While the caveats and the qualifications raised by 
local studies should be respected, to attempt to account for every difference between 
every community would risk reducing any work to an atomised account of local 
peculiarities.
A third problem revolves around reconciling the various theoretical 
frameworks that have already been used for the South Wales and Ruhr coalfields. 
Superficially, the concept of milieux as applied to Germany might appear to provide a 
good explanatory framework for both the Ruhr and South Wales. Such an argument 
might suggest that socio-political fragmentation in the Ruhr was due to the existence 
of several milieux, while homogenisation in South Wales was based on a single, 
dominant milieu. However, as Claggett has emphasised, these political cleavages 
required state pressure. While Wilhelmine Germany provides a model of how these 
milieux could be formed, similar top-down pressures are not observable in South 
Wales in the same period. However, the concept is clearly important for the Ruhr and 
cannot be lightly abandoned.
On the other hand, the study of miners is replete with theories that can be 
applied to comparative history. Perhaps the best known is Clark Kerr's and Abraham 
Siegel's 'isolated mass' hypothesis. The authors explain miners' propensity for 
industrial militancy by emphasising the supposedly isolated and homogenous nature 
of mining communities. The lack of mediating forces and social mobility, therefore, 
predisposes the miners to industrial action. 31 This view has been criticised by G. V. 
Rimlinger for ignoring the cultural context in which the miners operated. Rimlinger 
himself agrees that miners tend towards labour solidarity and industrial 
aggressiveness because of their dangerous work. However, such tendencies are 
mediated by socio-cultural factors. Replacing the 'isolated mass' with the 'separatist 
group', he argues that strike propensity and social integration must be examined
within their historical context. 32 Finally, as already noted, the notion of occupational 
community has been used by several historians of the Ruhr. However, the 
occupational community theory does not allow for a clear picture differentiation of 
division within the mining community. 33 As will be shown mining communities in the 
Ruhr were deeply divided across lines of ethnicity and religion. After examining the 
advantages and disadvantages of these various approaches, M. I. Bulmer suggests an 
eight-point ideal-type for the 'traditional mining community', which combines 
elements of all three theories. Thus the ideal mining community was characterised by:
1) Physical isolation
2) Economic predominance of mining
3) The nature of the work as dangerous but also a source of pride
4) Occupational homogeneity and isolation
5) Communal leisure activities with workmates
6) Sharp gender segregation/division of labour in the family. Sons tend to follow 
	their fathers into the mines, while daughters marry miners
7) Economic/political conflicts of interest between owners and miners
8) A combination of all the above factors34
The above works have been theoretical. David Gilbert in his Class, 
Community and Collective Action: Social Change in Two British Coalfields, 1850- 
1926, however, has sought to apply some of these theories within a comparative 
framework. Using three sociological models of collective action, Gilbert examines the 
link between community and collective action in South Wales and Nottinghamshire. 
He reaches the conclusion that the 'the nature of collective action is heavily 
dependent upon the nature of the community'. 36 In the South Wales industrial villages 
the SWMF lodges effectively marginalised the supra-regional coal-companies in the 
local community, while in Nottinghamshire the smaller owners retained their power 
base. 37 Therefore, the development and structure of these local societies were of 
paramount importance for sustaining the collective action necessary to maintain the 
lengthy strikes of the 1920s. However, although he includes chapters on the South 
Wales and the Nottinghamshire coalfields in general, the work remains mainly a 
micro-study focusing on the communities of Ynysybwl and Hucknall.
The 'isolated mass' hypothesis has been revitalised in modified form by Roy 
Church and Quentin Outram.38 Church and Outram utilise Durkheim's concept of 
mechanical solidarity and the idea of a constructed solidarity to examine strike action 
in British coalfields. They argue that constructed solidarity was used at national and 
local levels to sustain strikes by threatening those who deviated from the aims of the 
union or community with exclusion. 39 However, although Church and Outram
exhaustively compare strike propensity between British regions, their cross-national 
comparison is limited to a survey chapter. In the case of Germany they, like Hickey, 
highlight the heterogeneity of the Ruhr mining workforce in terms of ethnicity and 
religion to explain the lack of partial strikes.
Robert Fagge and Werner Berg have both attempted explicitly cross-regional 
and cross-national comparatives. In his Power, Culture and Conflict in the Coalfields 
Fagge investigates patterns of protest in the mining communities of West Virginia and 
South Wales between 1900 and 1922. The work has some parallels with Gilbert's in 
that it stresses the importance of the 'nature of culture and community' and the power 
relations within them as explanations for patterns of protest. 41 He sees the West 
Virginia communities as culturally fragmented along lines of ethnicity and religion, a 
feature encouraged by coal owners.42 On the other hand the issues of ethnicity and 
religion were not so divisive in South Wales.43
Werner Berg, while noting the importance of social factors, focuses more 
upon the differing patterns of industrialisation as an explanation for the constellation 
of different interest groups, both of employers and workers. 44 Berg argues that the 
different industrial formations led to different proletarian formations. The creation of 
the industrial pit village in South Wales led to a 'purer type of working-class' as 
various aspects of workers' lives were under the control of the workers themselves, 
while the more urban communities of the Ruhr miners were subject to 'foreign social 
(and state) control'. This work shared similarities with Gilbert in that it stresses the 
control the miners had of the social arena in South Wales, while in the Ruhr they were 
subject to outside influences, under which the employers can presumably be placed. 
However, his work leaves less room for individual agency than Gilbert does. The 
relatively greater influence of the workers themselves in the Welsh pit villages was 
the result of the distinctive pattern of industrialisation that shaped those communities. 
In this light his work seems somewhat reductionist. However, it does recognise the 
influence that institutions that stood outside the labour movement could have upon 
workers' attempts at combination.
Both Roger Fagge and Berg's work remain, however, anchored in structural 
explanations of protest and trade union development. While the importance of these 
structural explanations is apparent, it is the contention of this work that they do not 
provide a complete picture. The social structures of the mining communities in 
another American coalfield, Pennsylvania, were as diverse (if not more so) than those 
of West Virginia and the Ruhr. Yet despite this, one dominant union in the form of the
United Mineworkers of America (UMA) was able to emerge.46 This suggests that 
theoretical frameworks that rely on social diversity alone as a means of explanation of 
trade union and political development do not give a fully rounded picture.
How then can we integrate these theories and the existing historiographies? 
This work attempts to bring these ideas together through three interrelated concepts: 
Jiirgen Habermas's concept of the lifeworld, constructed identity and civil society. 
Using the work of Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann,47 Habermas argues that the 
lifeworld is made up of 'more or less, diverse background convictions' 48 The 
lifeworld, therefore, represents a stock of interpretative patterns, a set of common 
assumptions, of taken-for-grantedness, that cannot be transcended.49 Moreover this 
'cultural tradition shared by a community is constitutive of the lifeworld, which the 
individual member finds already interpreted. This intersubjectively shared lifeworld 
forms the background for communicative action.' 50 Habermas sees the lifeworld as 
intersubjective since others inhabit it. The lifeworld provides the set of common 
assumptions, which provides the background for individuals when they engage in 
communicative action.
The links between milieux and the lifeworld might at first seem unclear. 
Habermas has insisted that the concept of lifeworld cannot be used to define social 
stratification. However, Stefan Berger, in his comparison of South Wales and the 
Ruhr, has synthesised both the ideas of milieux and lifeworld. He argues that the 
existence of various milieux in the Ruhr entailed a more fragmentary lifeworld. On 
the other hand, the more synchronous lifeworld of the Welsh miner encouraged a 
greater organisational unity. 51 However, this work is based mainly on secondary 
literature. This thesis seeks to build on Berger's analysis and deepen our 
understanding through the examination of primary material for both areas. By 
examining how trade unions and political parties engaged in communicative action as 
organisations offers a fruitful avenue through which to approach the divergent 
developmental tendencies in South Wales and the Ruhr. This approach has the 
advantage of accepting the importance of the structural context in which organisations 
were formed, but also emphasises the role union and party activists played in their 
creation and maintenance.
Leading on from the lifeworld, the present work seeks to approach the 
communicative action of the trade unions through an examination of their discursive 
construction of identity. Christopher Johnson has examined the link between lifeworld
and discourse. This notion of the constructed identity recognises the unions as active
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in creating such an identity, an ideal of the miner to which they aspired. Such 
identities were used as a banner for recruitment and an ideological weapon. In some 
respects, this concept has similarities to Church's and Outram's constructed solidarity, 
but while they were mainly concerned with explaining collective action during strikes 
constructed identity has wider ramifications. These constructed identities often held 
up an image of the miner as he should be and can be seen as stemming from the wider 
spheres of both work and community. The extent to which the miners actually 
identified with these ideological constructions determined the success of their appeal. 
By utilising the idea of constructed identity the thesis returns some agency to the 
activists of the political parties and the unions.
In its examination of the political discourses of the trade unions and the 
political parties in the coalfields, this thesis aims to respond to Croll's appeal for an 
engagement with the postmodern in Welsh labour historiography. 52 The postmodern 
historian Patrick Joyce, for example, has recognised the important role organisations 
played in shaping social identities. Joyce argues that the 'ideology and practice of the 
unions played a central role in creating popular conceptions of the social order, 
particularly class perceptions. Union discourse was more than the reflection of the 
workers' worlds. It actively shaped it.' 53 However, although the present work is 
concerned with discourses, it does not go as far as Joyce does in disassociating it from 
materialism. Indeed, Joyce accuses labour history of indulging in a 'fetishisation of 
"the material'". 54 More recent work has tried to find a medium between structure and 
discourse. 55 In fact, even before the publication of Joyce's Visions, Donald Reid 
argued for an integration of the 'linguistic turn' and the older social history. 
Meanwhile, Christopher Johnson, although writing from a materialist perspective, 
acknowledges criticisms of economic determinism. However, he also warns of the 
dangers of the 'linguistic turn'. He suggests that Habermas's concept of lifeworld 
provides a way of linking workers' culture and the structural forces that shape it. 57 In 
the thesis, therefore, discourse is seen as an on-going effort to understand and 
interpret the world. Attempts at 'making sense' raise the possibility of myriad, 
sometimes conflicting, sometimes complementary, interpretations. Thus, 
organisational fragmentation or homogenisation was not simply a reflection of the 
social divisions or the lack of them. In fact, there was a more complex relationship 
between societal structures and organisations.
Habermas also provides the link with the final explanatory factor used in this
thesis, that is the nature of civil society in Britain and Germany during this period.
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There is an overlap between the idea of civil society and Habermas' public sphere. 
Both describe the space in which voluntary associations exist. While Habermas used 
an idealised concept of the public sphere as a means of social critique, Geoff Eley 
argues that in modified form the idea provides a useful analytical tool for the 
historian. Instead of the ideal public sphere, where rational communication could be 
pursued on a free and equal participatory basis, Eley suggests that it was a contested 
site. Access was denied or restricted on grounds of class, ethnicity, religion and 
gender. For Eley this competition involved issues of power. 58 The various trade 
unions and political parties examined in this work can, therefore, be seen as engaged 
in competition to dominate this public sphere.
However, the trade unions and political parties in the two coalfields were not 
acting in a vacuum. The way they constructed and expressed identity was influenced 
by the nature of the civil society in which they operated. Nancy J. Rosenblum and 
Robert C. Post define civil society as the realm of pluralism, but argue that 'we can in 
fact range pluralist societies along a spectrum from the fluid to the rigidly segmented'. 
The crucial feature of a fluid civil society is that membership of more than one group 
is possible. On the other hand, in a segmented civil society 'groups are more inclined 
to see membership as mutually exclusive and to be hostile to the idea of plural 
identities and multiple, overlapping membership'. 59 Significantly, Rosenblum and 
Post also argue that 'within civil society identity is always specific. Identity springs 
from contingencies of socialization and from choice; it is not the product of a single 
and unified design. It comes from participation in particular groups and associations, 
and is not imposed uniformly upon all by the state.' 60 This emphasis on the role that 
voluntary group membership plays in forming identity is important in that it avoids 
the danger of sociological determinism that accompanies the idea of milieu. 
Rosenblum and Post, therefore, allow for both structural factors and for agency.
Frank Trentmann has applied work on civil society (and the public sphere) to 
both British and German history. In the introduction to Paradoxes of Civil Society: 
New Perspectives on Modern German and British History, Trentmann, like Eley, 
rejects the idea of an idealised sphere of rational communication. Instead, he focuses 
on issues of exclusion and inclusion in civil society. He also stresses, in contrast to 
much German historiography, that civil society was not the preserve of the 
Burgertum, or middle class. 61 Lack of space precludes a discussion of the different 
civil societies in Germany and Britain. However, the collection of essays in
Trentmann's edited volume suggests that Germany tended towards a more segmented
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civil society, while in Britain it was more fluid. Daniel A. Macmillan's study of 
gymnastic associations, for example, stresses how the boundary between civil society 
and the state were blurred. Parties and associations in Wilhelmine Germany acted 
under the assumption that the state and civil society should coexist in harmony and 
that civil society should be harmoniously united behind a single party. Each group's
AT
expectation of harmony made organisations intolerant of pluralist debate. 
Trentmann's examination of the Free Trade movement in Britain, on the other hand, 
focuses on its belief in the separation of civil society and the political system.63
The work aims to show how the discursive practices of the trade unions and 
political parties was crucial in reinforcing and perpetuating the processes of 
homogenisation in South Wales and fragmentation in the Ruhr. Using the three-fold 
explanation outlined here (lifeworld, constructed identity and the nature of civil 
society) the thesis seeks to integrate both concerns with structure and discourse. The 
lifeworld provides the cultural background to the discursive construction of identity 
by trade unions and political parties, while at the same accommodating the greater 
societal diversity in the Ruhr. The discourse of the trade unions and political parties 
was moreover mediated through the different nature of civil societies. Two of the 
subsequent chapters, therefore, concentrate on the issue of lifeworld and civil society. 
The remaining three chapters examine the discourse of the trade unions and parties. 
As such they focus mainly on materials published by the organisations, such as 
newspapers and leaflets, and the speeches made by activists. Since identities are more 
strongly drawn during periods of conflict, I have focused on literature produced 
during industrial disputes and elections. Generally, I have concentrated on literature 
produced within the regions. Unfortunately, the communist newspapers in the Ruhr 
were often banned, and those that do exist are fragmentary. Therefore, much of the 
examination of the KPD discourse relies on flyers and handbills. Finally, in the case 
of the Ruhr the work focuses on discourse of the two main German trade unions and 
largely excludes the Polish union. This is entirely due to the failings of the author. An 
examination of the Polish union's discourse awaits a better linguist.
Chapter one provides a brief history of the socio-economic development of the 
two coalfields up to 1914. It contrasts the synchronous nature of the Welsh miners' 
lifeworld with the fragmented lifeworld of the Ruhr miners. It also highlights how 
civil society was more fluid in South Wales, while in the Ruhr, with its various 
milieux, it was comparatively more segmented. Chapter two examines the
development of the various trade unions before 1914. The emphasis here is placed on
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how the SWMF was able to create a comparatively inclusive, flexible identity due to 
its acceptance of internal, pluralist debate. In the Ruhr, on the other hand, the attempts 
to enforce harmony within the trade unions resulted in the creation of exclusive, more 
doctrinal identities. Chapter three turns to the political sphere and, like the preceding 
chapter, focuses on the discursive construction of identities. Chapter four returns to 
the issue of lifeworld and structure and investigates how the war and post-war events 
impacted upon the it and civil society. It argues that in South Wales there was a 
greater continuity in the lifeworld, while in the Ruhr increased fragmentation through 
mechanisation and rationalisation. In general it also shows that the Welsh miners 
made some significant advances during the war, while the Ruhr miners were unable to 
capitalise on labour shortages. Chapter five combines an examination of both trade 
union and party political discourse. Nationalisation and socialisation were key issues 
in both coalfields after the war. However, while nationalisation received broad 
support among the Welsh miners, in the Ruhr the idea of socialisation was contested 
by different sections of the labour movement. The Conclusion brings together the 
main arguments of this thesis to provide a revised understanding of the nature of trade 
union and party political development in the two regions, one which accepts the 
important role of both structural factors and activists' discourse.
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Chapter One 
The Growth of the Coal Industries, 1850-1914
'you could look at every door, and you'd see a miner coming out. And that 
miner and his family would know every person that lived in the village. 
They went to the same chapels, or to the same pub, and they always met in 
the pub and in the chapel' 
Thomas Nicholas 1
'Everywhere one sees Slavic faces and hears [Slavic] voices beat against
one's ear.'
Lorenz Pieper in his examination of the mining communities in the Ruhr. 2
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the development of the coal industries in 
both the Ruhr and South Wales up to 1914. It aims to investigate the social structures 
that provided the backdrop against which the trade unions and political parties 
worked. By examining the social context in which activists operated it also seeks to 
throw light on the nature of the lifeworld in the two areas. First, it examines the 
growth of the industries through the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, where 
the necessary capital investment came from, the markets that production supplied and 
the organisation of the employers. Secondly, it investigates the miners' experiences of 
work and the potential that existed for conflict and for expressions of solidarity. 
Finally, the social structures of the mining communities and the types of civil 
societies are examined and compared with reference to the degree of cohesiveness 
they exhibited.
King Coal: The Expansion of Mining
The period after the revolutions of 1848 has been regarded as one of almost 
unrestrained capitalist growth. Even those obstacles that remained were to be 
overcome by the inexorable advance of economic and industrial growth. Among this 
frenetic activity the opening of the coalfields of South Wales and the Ruhr stand out 
as paragons of industrialisation. The latter formed part of Germany's generally swift 
industrialisation in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Meanwhile, although 
Britain as a whole experienced a far longer period of industrialisation, the growth of 
the South Wales coalfield was remarkable in that, from its beginnings in the 1850s, it 
was to achieve a dominant position in the world coal trade. Its exports alone 
constituted almost 33 percent of total world coal exports between 1890 and 1910.
Small-scale coal mining had been pursued in South Wales and the Ruhr prior 
to the massive investment of capital that the second half of the nineteenth century 
introduced. In South Wales, coal production in the first half of the nineteenth century 
largely fuelled the growth of the metal industries centred on Merthyr. 5 Similarly, early 
Ruhr coal production fuelled the small iron industries along the Ruhr and the growing 
industrial empire of the Krupp dynasty in Essen. 6
Advances in technologies prompted the growth of the coal industry as they 
allowed access to deeper seams through deep mines. In South Wales this precipitated 
a movement from the slopes of the valleys to concentration on the valley floors, while 
in the Ruhr capitalists were able to begin exploitation of the seams in the Emscher 
basin, north of the river Ruhr owing to advances in ventilation and drainage. 7 
Wilhelm Brephol divides the Ruhr into several zones, the oldest running along the 
banks of the river Ruhr itself. From the 1840s, as new mines were opened, the
o
coalfield advanced northwards to embrace the Hellweg, Emscher and Vest. In the 
1850s there were several pits sunk around the town of Bochum following initial 
sinking of the President pit in 1841. 9 In South Wales the sale-coal industry initially 
developed in Aberdare between 1837 to 1862, but it was really from the 1860s 
onwards that it really took off with sinkings in the Rhondda, followed by the Ogwr in 
the late sixties and the Garw in the seventies. 1900 saw the Sirhowy, Bargoed, 
Rhymney and Maesteg areas as the frontiers of the industry. 10 By 1913 the number of 
mines in South Wales had reached 485 and the workforce numbered 233,134. In the 
Ruhr there were 167 mines with a workforce of 394,569 in the same year." 
Comparison of the regions' total output of coal demonstrates the expansion of the 
industry. 
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University Press, 1985, p. 362; Walters, Economic, p. 6.
The figures reveal that South Wales led the Ruhr in coal production through most of 
the nineteenth century, but gradually the latter region challenged and overtook this 
lead. By 1912 Britain and Germany together overwhelmingly dominated European 
production of coal. 12
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In both areas the expansion of the industry was left in private hands. In Britain 
the doctrine of laissez faire economic activity was firmly established by the time the 
South Wales coalfield was opened. On the other hand, in the Ruhr government control 
over the coalmines was only relinquished in 1865. Previously, the mines had been run 
under the principle of the Direktionsprinzip, whereby the state officials controlled 
conditions and wages. Liberalisation, however, should not suggest that the new 
generation of capitalists were left with an entirely free hand in the running of their 
industries. In Britain, Acts of Parliaments limited the use of child and female labour in 
the mines. 13 Furthermore, the Mine workers' Federation of Great Britain (MFGB), to 
which the South Wales Miners' Federation (SWMF) had affiliated in 1899, 
successfully pursued a campaign for an eight hour day, which was introduced on 21 
December 1908, despite the resistance of employers. 14 Similarly, in the Ruhr in 1905, 
the German Government accepted appeals made by striking miners to amend the 
mining laws so as to limit the length of shifts and introduce compulsory workers' 
committees. However, despite instances of interference by the state the coalowners 
were generally left to be 'masters in their own house', or 'Herr im Haus', a position 
that they were to guard jealously against any incursion by trade unions throughout this 
period.
The capital investment necessary for the sinking of new pits came from a 
variety of sources. In South Wales solo enterprises where individuals invested 
resources accumulated in other operations were relatively rare. Samuel Thomas's 
mining concerns represents an example of this type of capital formation as he raised 
his money from shopkeeping interests. More common were consortia or partnerships 
of wealthy individuals, one example being the Ocean Coal Company. Meanwhile, in 
the Ruhr, capital was largely raised during the first half of the nineteenth century from 
small, local investors. The abolition of the Direktionsprinzip and the new technologies 
required to exploit the deeper seams led to increasing capital demands. This led to a 
shift away from the resident Mittelstand to the banks as a source of investment and a 
consequent growth of banking influence in the industry. In both areas increasing 
costs led joint-stock companies (Aktiengesellschaft) gradually to displace family 
concerns although some, such as Krupp, retained large coal interests. 16 The 
establishment of these companies has been regarded as vitally important for the 
emergence of Germany as a major European economic force during the nineteenth 
century, as they facilitated the modernisation of certain sectors, including coal and
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iron production. 17 However, the sale of shares to create these joint-stock companies 
should not be regarded as creating some form of share-holding 'democracy'. 'Public 
subscription', that is the purchasing of shares by the public at large, was rare, as 
shares were sold and bought in large denominations beyond the reach of small
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investors. Both Welsh and German industrialists also generated investment by 
ploughing back profits into their enterprises. 19
Despite the parallels in their growth the coal produced by these two industries 
generally found its way to different markets. The expansion of the industry in South 
Wales marked a departure from previous production as coal came to be regarded as an 
export commodity in itself. When John Nixon, a man who later became a major coal 
owner in his own right, arrived in Nantyglo in 1839 seeking an appointment at the 
combined ironworks and colliery of Mr Crawshay Bailey, he found that the output of 
the mine was a mere 250 tons a day. 20 On his second visit to South Wales Nixon came 
specifically seeking coal, 'a supply of black diamonds' for which he was convinced 
he had found a market in France. 21 Thus the mines increasingly moved away from 
production for the local ironworks to enterprises based on sale-coal, although some 
firms, such Guest, Keen and Nettleford of Dowlais, continued to operate mines to 
serve the fuel requirements of their iron and steel works. As an exporting region the 
South Wales industry benefited from its proximity to the Bristol Channel and 
favourable freight rates. While Welsh coal needed only to be transported 25 miles to 
reach the point of export, Ruhr coal had to travel some 150 miles. 22 The Ruhr coal 
companies had access to river transport, but shipments of coal on the River Ruhr
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actually decreased from the 1860s onwards. Furthermore, although both geological 
areas contained different types of coal, much of South Wales' production was 'steam' 
coal. The industry capitalised upon the increasing use of steam power and was given a 
further boost when it became the favoured fuel of the British Admiralty.
The export of Welsh coal was facilitated by the growth of Newport, Cardiff 
and Barry docks. 24 The construction of these docks provides an example of how the 
coal industry in Wales ushered in and supported a host of ancillary industries such as 
shipping and railways. Table 1.2 demonstrates the dependence of the South Wales 
coal industry upon exports.
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Source: Asteris, 'Rise', p. 27.
By 1913 some 41.8 percent of total British exports originated from Bristol Channel 
ports. 25
By contrast the Ruhr coal industry was far less export-oriented. Overseas 
export amounted to only about half a million tons by 1913, largely due to fierce 
British competition, although there was trade with neighbouring countries such as 
France and Belgium.26 Instead production largely served other German heavy 
industries. More than 85 percent of production was destined for internal markets.27 
For the industrialists of the Ruhr the export market only really became significant 
when domestic prices slumped.28 The growth of the iron and steel industries in the 
Ruhr paralleled that of the coal industry from the middle of the nineteenth century. 
Initially, companies constructed forges next to mines that produced both coal and iron 
ore. Later ore was imported from Sweden. By 1914, iron and steel production had 
risen to 8.2 and 10 million tons respectively.29 These mines owned by metal producers 
were referred to as Hiittenzechen. The close relationship between the two industries in 
the Ruhr can be illustrated through the example of Bochum, a town that became 
heavily reliant upon the fortunes of heavy industry. A crisis was precipitated in the 
coal industry by a fall in the price of coal in the 1850s and again in the 1870s. On both 
occasions it was revitalised by an upturn in the iron trade. Furthermore, the Bochumer 
Verein acquired its first coal mine in 1868 and went on to purchase several more 
between 1882 and 1900. Similarly, the Krupp firm had bought several small mines in 
the eighteenth century. After the company passed into the hands of energetic 
entrepreneur Alfred Krupp it expanded rapidly and extended its coal interests in order 
to fuel its production of railroad parts, machinery, shipping and armaments. 30 In the 
Ruhr, therefore, iron and coal production was closely associated and many of the 
region's great industrialists presided over both industries.
In both areas there was an increasing tendency throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries towards concentration and integration of the industry. In South 
Wales one outstanding example of vertical concentration was that of the Cambrian 
Combine headed by D. A. Thomas, which through the acquisition of other enterprises
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came to control by 1918 nine other colliery companies, apart from its own.31 
Meanwhile the Powell Duffryn and Ocean Coal Companies also pursued a course of 
expansion through new sinkings and the purchasing of smaller companies. The former 
was producing just over 3 million tons in 1910, while the latter consistently produced 
between 2.3 and 2.6 million tons per annum between 1894 and 1913. 32 However, the 
tendency towards both vertical and horizontal concentration of industry was even 
more evident in the Ruhr. In 1885 seven companies owned more than one mine, by 
1910 nine were producing almost two-thirds of the region's total output of coal. Table 
1.4 reveals the much larger scale of mining operations in the Ruhr compared with 
South Wales. Three of the largest, the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks AG, the Harpener 
Bergbau AG and Bergwerksgesellschaft Hibernia, had an output of 5 million tons 
each. 33 In both areas the number of small owners was shrinking number, but with 
greater rapidity in the Ruhr as shown in Table 1.3. 
Table 1.3: Output and Number of Employers in South Wales and the Ruhr, 1886-1916









































Table 1.4: Output in tons and size of the workforce of the four largest colliery companies in 








Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Ltd
Consolidated Cambrian Ltd
Ocean Coal and Wilsons Ltd



















Source: Berg, Wirtschaft, pp. 81 and 135.
Furthermore, as the examples of the Bochumer Verein and Krupp firms 
illustrate, there was a high degree of vertical integration of industry in the Ruhr. The 
growth of the joint-stock company in Germany coupled with the industry's links to 
the banks encouraged both vertical and horizontal concentration. Firms like the
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Dortmunder Union, which could 'build railways both at home and abroad entirely 
from its own resources, from the mining of the coal to the manufacture of track and 
the financing of the entire project' were typical. 34
The degree of cartelisation and syndication was also higher in the Ruhr than in 
South Wales. The German employers seemed to enter into associations far more 
readily than their Welsh counterparts. Even before the liberalisation of the economy 
there existed associations of employers in the west of the region such as the 
Magerkohlenverband in 1854.35 Employers combined in 1858 to form the Verein fur 
die Bergbaulichen Interessen im Oberbergamtsbezirk Dortmund (Association for 
Mining Interests in Dortmund Mining District). Generally known as the Bergbau 
Verein, it acted as the spokes-body for the industry and was recognised as such by the 
government in 1893. The Bergbau Verein was followed, in 1893, by the formation of 
the Rheinisch-Westfalische Kohlensyndikat (RWKS) or Coal Syndicate. Members 
agreed to sell their coal to the RWKS who then handled the marketing of the product. 
It also imposed coal production quotas upon its members in an attempt to keep prices 
up and moderate fluctuations in the market. These constraints encouraged larger firms 
to buy up smaller enterprises so that they could increase their own quotas for 
production, thereby contributing to the trend towards concentration. A total of twelve 
mines had bought up by 1904 for this reason, eleven in the older, southern portion of 
the coalfield and one in Oberhausen.36 The power of the RWKS is revealed by the fact 
that between 1893 and 1913 its members were responsible for almost 90 percent of 
total output between them.37 However, its operation was not without problems as the 
Huttenzechen were not covered by the quotas and could sell their surplus upon the 
market, uncontrolled by the RWKS. It was only in 1903 that they agreed to limit the
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output of coal destined for the market to the RWKS quotas. Finally, the Zechen- 
Verband was founded in 1908, after the experience of the 1905 miners' strike, in an 
attempt to gain greater control over the labour market. It drew up blacklists of 
troublesome employees, tried to ensure that a miner could not change collieries 
without the required notice and introduced company controlled labour exchanges. 39
In comparison the organisation of the employers of South Wales was rather 
weak. In 1913, South Wales did have the third longest surviving owners' association 
in the form of the Monmouthshire and South Wales Coalowners' Association 
(MSWCOA). It had begun life in 1864 as the Aberdare Steam Collieries Association 
and was reformed as the latter body in 1873. Initially its members were responsible
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for 70 percent of the region's coal production, but its membership suffered badly from 
fluctuations. Membership fell by 45 percent when coal prices fell after 1876, only to 
rise again prior to the 1893 Hauliers' Strike. 40 Furthermore there was no equivalent in 
South Wales to the RWKS although there were schemes suggested that would have 
established such an organisation. John Nixon had attempted between 1860 and 1885 
to establish some sort of quota system for steam coal. An independent engineer 
produced a report on the amount each colliery should produce, while a second scheme 
aimed at the formation of an association for fixing minimum prices. These attempts 
failed due to the resistance of other employers. 41 In 1893 Sir George Elliot, in a plan 
that foreshadowed the National Coal Board created decades later, proposed the 
creation of a coal trust headed by nine men.42 Later D. A. Thomas suggested a scheme 
reminiscent of the RWKS in that it advocated the allocation of quotas to colliery 
companies. However, neither scheme came to fruition. L. J. Williams has suggested 
that the failure of cartelisation was due to the fact that it offered little advantage to the 
Welsh coalowners rather than their individualistic attitudes or attachment to laissez- 
faire economics. The price of their exports was determined by the price of coal from 
other coalfields despite internal competition. The MSWCOA, therefore, concerned 
itself mainly with labour relations, which largely meant resistance to any cost rises. 43 
In this respect the MSWCOA can be regarded as broadly fulfilling the same functions 
as the Zechen-Verband.
Management and Work
In both areas early management was mainly the work of one or more major 
shareholders. With the expansion of the industry and the growth in size of individual 
mining operations there was a trend for these owners to become increasingly involved 
with the general management of the company, while a stratum of salaried professional 
managers dealt with production at the pithead.44 In this respect developments in South 
Wales and the Ruhr paralleled each other, although in the latter region a high 
proportion of mine managers came from the civil service. 45 Despite the economic 
liberalisation laws of the 1860s there remained close personal links between industry 
and government. Aristocrats, bureaucrats and politicians could, and did, have active 
roles within the industrial sphere. 46 The authoritarian stance of management, noted 
above, was often coupled with a paternalistic attitude. For example, Otto Faust, an
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official at Neumiihl, recalled that the company built its own club for managers since 
all the local pubs catered for miners. 47
There were also comparatively more supervisory personnel in the Ruhr mines. 
In 1891 Her Majesty's Inspector of Mines for the South Wales District reported that 
there existed in 1890 205 managers and 177 undermanagers for 299 out of 354 
mines,48 while by 1893 the number of managers (Betriebsfuhref) and undermanagers 
(Obersteiger und Fahrsteiger) in the Ruhr numbered 214 and 94 respectively. 49 
However, by 1913 the Ruhr coal industry was employing an average of 233 officials 
per employer, an average of one technical official (Angestellte) per 28 workers, while 
by 1914 the average in South Wales was roughly one per 40. 50 Furthermore, as 
suggested by comparison of the output of the leading mining concerns in both areas, 
the German mines tended to be deeper and have a larger workforce. Between 1875 
and 1912/14 the average depth of mines in South Wales and the Ruhr increased to 
roughly 350 and 577 metres respectively. In 1913 the average number of men 
working at one installation was 383 and 1,815, while the size of total workforce per 
employer averaged at 560 for South Wales and 4,365 for the Ruhr. 51
Although advances in technology had facilitated the exploitation of deeper 
seams of coal in both South Wales and the Ruhr, corresponding advances in the actual 
process of coal 'getting' were much slower. The mining industry of both areas 
remained very labour intensive. Mechanisation was slow to have any significant 
impact upon either region. By 1908 there were 27 coal-cutting machines in use in 
collieries in the Cardiff and Newport District and 24 in the Swansea District. 
However, it had to be admitted that they 'had not made much headway' in the Cardiff 
area, 52 while only four were recorded as having produced an appreciable output in the 
Swansea District. 53 In fact, in South Wales a meagre one percent of total coal 
produced was cut by machine in 1913. In comparison there were 237 machines 
(Schrammaschineri) in 49 mines in the Ruhr by 1905.54 There the power hand drill 
was introduced in 1906, but by 1914 there were fewer than 600 in use and, although 
the number of coal-cutting machines had risen to 449 by the previous year, they 
accounted for only 2.2 percent of total production. 55 Uwe Burghardt has suggested 
that this low level of mechanised production in the Ruhr was due to uncoordinated 
investment and that the employers' reaction to adverse economic conditions was 
cartelisation rather than mechanisation. 56 Meanwhile, in South Wales, geological 
conditions also militated against the use of machinery. 57 Bert Coombes, who moved
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from Herefordshire to South Wales in search of work, first encountered coal-cutting 
machinery during the First World War and wrote that they were 'rare in South Wales 
then, and there were none working in our valley or anywhere quite near.' 58 Therefore, 
while production in the Ruhr was clearly more mechanised than in South Wales, in 
neither area was mechanisation a major feature of coal winning prior to the Great 
War.
This should not suggest that employers and managers in both areas were 
insensible to the benefits of machinery. Articles advocating the benefits of machinery 
often appeared in the industry journal Gluckauf. 59 It was even suggested that the 
greater use of machinery would obviate the need for so many Polish workers. This 
viewpoint was, however, rejected. 60 The new manager of the Lockets Merthyr 
Collieries reported that 'from the amount of face opened out, the output should be 
larger than present; to attain the desired increase, more colliers are needed, and coal 
cutting machines should be used in the new Seam where the coal is thin but 
apparently suitable for cutting the dirt band about 4 inch thick above the bottom 
coal.' 61 However, it is symptomatic that the expansion of the workforce took priority 
over the introduction of machinery and two years later the issue was still under 
discussion, despite the fact that visits to other mines had revealed the benefits of 
machine production.62 The production of coal, therefore, relied heavily upon the 
physical capabilities of the workers, on the muscle power of men and horses. Of the 
latter there were 8,008 in the Ruhr and 16,744 in South Wales in 1913.63 In 1906 the 
Lockets Merthyr Collieries still had 150 horses working in its three pits.64 A year 
later, although they were making preparations to install machinery in the No. 3 pit, 
they still aimed to increase output by signing on a further 50 to 80 men and 6 to 8 
horses. 65 As this example shows the principal means of increasing output was to 
increase the workforce. To compete companies had to expand their individual 
workforces. Table 1.5 indicates the increase in the mining labour force throughout the 
nineteenth century and into the twentieth. 



















Source: Church, History, p. 189, and Hickey, Workers, p. 13.
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The actual underground work generally followed the same lines in both 
regions. The miner would rise in the early morning and proceed to the mine with his 
packed lunch. There he would receive his lamp, wait for his turn to enter the cage and 
descend the shaft. From the shaft bottom he would proceed to his working-place 
(Arbeitsstelle) once the firemen (Wettermdnner) had checked that the area was free 
from gas. In each working place the miners would work in small groups 
(Kamerads chaff) of between three and five individuals. Generally, the miner would 
begin by undercutting the coal, an activity that was overwhelmingly performed by 
hand with a pick or a mandril. Where necessary the overhanging coal would be 
supported by wooden sprags. When ready they would be withdrawn allowing the 
undercut coal to fall. In some areas the coal was particularly prone to sticking to the 
top and had to be freed by the use of explosives. The coal would then by loaded in to 
the trams, ready to be transported by the hauliers. For this work the hewers were paid 
on a piecework (Gedinge) system dependant on the amount of coal they produced.66
This brief description of the hewer's work obscures several differences. The 
hewer of the South Wales coalfield was more involved in deadwork, that is throwing 
the stone debris into the 'gob' and setting the supports as the roadway extended as a 
result of his labours. In the Ruhr, on the other hand, another class of older workers 
(Zimmer- and Reparaturhauer) was responsible for this work and they were paid a 
fixed wage. 67 There were also differences in the structure of the miners' working 
lives. In the Ruhr only youths over the age of sixteen were permitted to work 
underground. This rule had survived the economic liberalisation of the industry and 
the Oberbergamt, the body responsible for ensuring that the mining regulations were 
observed by the private companies, continued to resist employers' arguments for a 
reduction of the age limit. Younger boys could only be employed on surface jobs. 
After their sixteenth birthday the youths, and older immigrants new to the work, 
would enter the pit as hauliers (Schlepper). After an unspecified length of time that 
usually depended on economic conditions the haulier could become an apprentice 
hewer. He would then work under an experienced man in order to learn the skills 
necessary for coal getting. A full hewer had to be at least twenty-one years old and
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have had three years experience underground, including one as an apprentice hewer.
In South Wales youths generally entered the pit at a younger age. Most seem 
to have had their first experience of underground work at around fourteen. The 
number of youths between 14 and 16 employed in the Welsh industry formed a
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substantially greater proportion of the total workforce than in the Ruhr. In 1914 this 
age group composed 11 percent of the workforce in South Wales, while in 1913 in the 
Ruhr they formed only 3.7 percent.69 Furthermore, rather than progressing through 
systematic stages, Welsh miners often began their working lives as either trainee 
hauliers or hewers. Therefore, the occupational grade of haulier was not composed of 
a distinctive adolescent age group as in the Ruhr. In 1906 only 3.4 percent of hauliers 
were aged under-sixteen, compared with 14.5 percent of face workers in South 
Wales. 70 Often the apprentice and his mentor would be related to each other. In both 
areas the task of the haulier was considered to be the inferior to that of the hewer. In 
tangible terms the superiority of the latter was demonstrated by higher wages. In the 
Ruhr the haulier earned around 60 percent of the hewer's wage, while in South Wales 
it was around 69 percent. 71
Three methods were used in the process of coal getting, the pillar and bord, the 
pillar and stall and the longwall system. The pillar and bord involved driving the 
headings to the boundary of extraction and cutting the coal into rectangular blocks or 
pillars. Once the boundary had been reached the pillars were worked back or 
'robbed'. The pillar and stall system was similar in that the coal was again cut to the 
boundary, but the extraction of the coal left as pillars was worked before the whole 
area had been worked out. The longwall system, as its name suggests, entailed one 
continuous face with headways driven from the shaft bottom into the coal. 72 In the 
Ruhr the former system was the dominant method of production accounting for 
almost half of total output in 1901, but by the 1890s both the longwall and pillar and 
stall systems were being increasingly used. 73 Employers in South Wales, on the other 
hand, had moved away from the two earlier systems to longwall mining much earlier 
and by the 1890s it was already the predominant method used. This earlier change 
may have been due to the specific geology of the South Wales coalfield. The pressure 
the pillars supported tended to render the coal friable. When worked the pillars 
therefore produced less profitable small coal. This led employers such as John Nixon
74to adopt the longwall system to prevent wastage.
Working conditions could be extremely unpleasant. Miners often had to work 
in cramped positions, sometimes being forced to lie on their sides to cut under the 
seam. Temperatures could rise above 30 degrees and under these conditions miners 
often worked wearing as few clothes as possible. If not soaked in sweat, the miner 
might also have to contend with water in the mines. Dust also threatened the their
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health by entering their lungs. Apart from these nuisances mining was a dangerous 
occupation and South Wales and the Ruhr were no exceptions. Falls from the roof or 
sides, flooding and explosions of gas could all cause great loss of life. On 10 March 
1889 87 men were killed at an explosion at the Morfa colliery,75 in 1893 290 men 
died at the Albion mine,76 while 439 lost their lives in the most famous Welsh disaster 
at Senghennydd in 1913. The Ruhr too had its major disasters. In 1898 116 died in an 
explosion at the Carolinengliick, while 114 were killed at Lotheringen in 1912. The 
worst explosion occurred at the Radbod mine in November 1908 where 348 workers 
lost their lives. 77
These large-scale disasters, while temporarily awakening to the wider world 
the danger of the job, only contributed a small proportion of all those killed. Far more 
common were the small accidents that crippled or killed one or two men. Bert 
Coombes in his memoirs remembered several incidents that cost the life of work 
colleagues or very nearly killed him.78 In 1910 there was a total of 1,390 accidents 
reported to the Inspector of Mines. Of these 302 resulted in 313 deaths, while a total 
of 1,170 men were injured. 79 The most common injury sustained in non-fatal 
accidents were bone fractures, with general lacerations and contusions coming 
second. Even seemingly trivial incidents could lead to death. Falls were also a 
problem in the Ruhr with 45 percent of accidents thought to be due to falls in 1885/6, 
decreasing to a third by 1901.82 Similar causes were identified for the high number of 
accidents. Both HM Inspector of Mines and a Coal Commission established by the 
German Government in 1897 identified the insufficient use of props as a major
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danger. However, these complaints largely fell on deaf ears. An attempt by the 
Oberbergamt to persuade the mine managers to introduce a more systematic approach 
was countered by arguments that the variable conditions underground militated 
against such a system and that it should be left to the hewer to set props 'where it 
appears necessary for security.' 84 Later the Ministry of Trade and Commerce 
(Ministerium fur Handel und Gewerbe} tried to enforce this systematic approach but 
without much success.
Chris Williams has suggested that more consideration needs to be given by 
historians to the nature of mine work itself. How, for example, did the miners regard 
issues of craftsmanship and the introduction of machinery? 85 Unfortunately, for South 
Wales there seems a paucity of primary evidence, although Coombes' autobiography 
conveys a sense that, by the time he was employed in the mines, there had been an
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intensification of the work process, to the detriment of the miners' skills. 
Interestingly, for the Ruhr we are given some insight to these questions by Adolf 
Levenstein's 1912 survey. When asked if they enjoyed their work 507 miners claimed
O f_
they did not, compared to 171 who did. When asked what work they would do 
should they be able to do anything, only 68 out of 596 respondents answered
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mining. Moreover, it appears that in South Wales mining was often a hereditary 
occupation. Sons followed their fathers down the pit, even when parents would have
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preferred them to continue their education. Lorenz Pieper, however, noted that since 
1893 the hereditary nature of mining in the Ruhr had been broken by the influx of
80 ^^immigrant labour. This tendency was no doubt accentuated by the various other 
industrial jobs available in the Ruhr. Klaus Tenfelde has argued that the increasing 
number of officials, coupled with the introduction of longwall working, entailed a loss 
of autonomy for the Ruhr miners. 90 Continuing this theme, Irmgard Steinisch and 
Tenfelde have argued that the miners of the Ruhr felt themselves de-skilled and 
encouraged their children into other sectors. 91 Although many Welsh miners 
undoubtedly also encouraged their children to seek better work, it is revealing that 
many miners who obtained the qualifications to become an official, refused to accept 
such posts. 92 In South Wales then mining seems to have retained a higher status than 
in the Ruhr, if only due to a lack of alternatives.
There existed many possible points of conflict between the management and 
the workforce. One of the most obvious was the piece-rate for hewing. It was 
obviously in the miners' interests to obtain as favourable a rate as possible. To this 
end miners in both areas would point to the specific geological conditions of the 
working places which affected the quantity of coal that could be won when 
negotiating with management. In the Ruhr bargaining would be held at the start of 
every month between the leader of the Kameradschaften (Ortaltesteri) and the 
undermanager, while in South Wales a price list would be set for a particular seam 
and subject to re-negotiation for 'abnormal' places. 93 Since labour formed the greatest 
proportion of the cost of production in the industry it was in the management's 
interests to keep rates as low as possible, placing themselves and the workforce in 
direct opposition, offering much scope for conflict. For example, in South Wales the 
industrial unrest of 1910 originated in a dispute over the rate of pay for the Bute seam 
at Ely, part of the Cambrian Combine. Failure to reach agreement between the 
management and workforce led the former to post lockout notices precipitating a
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bitter, drawn-out struggle. 94 The Ruhr miners were also very conscious of their 
earnings. A report from the district of East Dortmund to the Oberbergamt claimed that 
'the worker himself knows exactly how much work in his stall or pillar is needed to 
fill a wagon...Should the mine management introduce larger wagons, the worker 
would immediately demand a rise in his wages.' The report claimed that the workers 
could also judge the veins and the size of coal produced.95 Meanwhile, Welsh miners 
compared their earnings with those at neighbouring mines working the same seams. 
Miners at the Plymouth works sought an advance in May 1883 on the basis that 
workers at the Powell Duffryn works were getting more for working the same lode. 96
Another related point of conflict was deductions from wages. In both areas 
there existed a system whereby trams deemed by officials to contain too much small 
coal or rubbish were deducted from the hewer's earnings. Known as 'cropping' in 
South Wales this system was ultimately replaced by the use of screens that sorted the 
small coal from the large. 97 Furthermore, concerns that companies were underpaying 
for large coal led to the institution of checkweighers who saw to it that the correct 
weight of large coal was recorded and paid for. In the Ruhr, on the other hand, the 
system of deductions, or Nullen, survived until 1905 and proved a major source of 
discontent, its abolition being among the miners' demands in the strike of the same 
year.
The use of piecework and the system of deduction and coal screening can be 
regarded as means by which the employers could exercise some element of control 
over their workforce. Piecework ensured a reasonable output in a physical 
environment that precluded total supervision of the work. Within this system the 
miners were left with a great deal of autonomy over their own work. This issue of 
control at work was a further potential point of conflict within the mining industry. It 
was most obviously illustrated when disputes arose over long-established customs. 
Francis and Smith have argued that this lay at the root of the unrest of 1910 as, almost 
simultaneous with the Cambrian Combine dispute, a strike broke out in the Aberdare 
valley over the company's attempt to abolish the miners' customary right to take 
home spare pit wood. 98 Challenges could also be more direct. On 21 January 1886 
colliers working on the 9 foot seam at the Plymouth colliery refused to enter the mine 
citing the presence of gas as the reason, although the General Managers believed the 
real issue was the unpopularity of another workman. 99 A strike began despite the fact 
that an investigation of the mine had revealed that it was clear. A few days later
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Bailey recorded in his diary, 'David Morgan (the local miners' agent) came to see 
me...with three resolutions which he said I must comply with and this I flatly 
declined to do telling him that I should not allow him or anyone else to interfere with 
my management.' 10°
The protection of customary rights also drove the Ruhr miners to action as 
illustrated by the 1876 strike at the Borussia mine. According to the works contract 
the workers should have performed eight hours work at the face. However, over time 
the winding time had come to be included in those hours, thereby reducing the actual 
time spent winning coal. The management decided to enforce the provisions of the 
contract and put up a poster to this effect. Finding their proclamation ignored by the 
workers the management tried a more forceful approach, precipitating a strike. 101 The 
director behind this strike, Grau, was involved in an almost identical dispute seven 
years later at the Germania mine. Here the previous manager, Kracher, had 'possessed 
the trust of the workers to the greatest degree' and his departure was 'much regretted 
by the whole workforce.' Grau did not command such sympathy and his attempt 
strictly to enforce working time again caused a strike. 102
Strikes, however, were only one way by which the miners could register their 
discontent. More often miners in the Ruhr sought amelioration of their grievances by 
moving to another mine. In fact labour turnover was exceptionally high in the area. 
Roughly forty percent of miners changed their working places every year in the 
Ruhr. 103 Often the move to a different mine was simply motivated by the promise of 
increased wages, although conflict with the officials could be a reason. One miners' 
wife recalled that her father was 'a free spirit (Wandervogel). When he had a bust up 
with the undermanager he demanded his papers. That happened every once in a while, 
then he'd move on and, after fourteen days, write to my mother, "come"'. 104
As these examples show, miners in both areas were very protective of what 
they regarded as their customary rights. The view that the Ruhr miners in particular 
had lost their solidarity and autonomy as a result of the liberalisation of the industry 
was noted. 105 However, the examples given here would seem to qualify that view. The 
experience of underground work and the great potential for conflict with management 
generated a great degree of solidarity among the working groups. Such a view has 
been expressed before, but however much underground work might 'naturally' incline 
individuals to solidarity, there is no guarantee that such feelings retained their force 
after the miners had passed through the works' gates.
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The Miners and their Communities
The massive expansion of the coal industry had a comparable effect upon the 
demographics of both regions. The promise of good wages combined with the desire 
to escape the drudgery of farm work acted as a suitable lure for many men. Such was 
the attraction for Bert Coombes who sought 'good clothes, money to spend'. 106 
Higher wages also attracted migrants from other industries, such as H. Marchwitza. 
Having already worked underground in Upper Siliesia he left for the Ruhr after 
hearing that the pay was better and the hours shorter. 107 Other migrants left their home 
regions wanting to see more of life. J. L. Williams, for example, had a sense of a 
'wider life' than on the North Wales farm he grew up on, 108 while, in a similar vein, a 
Polish miner in the Ruhr claimed to have left his agricultural background for work in 
the mines because of'higher aspirations.' 109
The population of Wales increased by 400,000 between 1901 and 1911. 110 To 
place this within a national perspective the increase in the Rhondda was 34.3 percent, 
while the average increase in England and Wales was 10.9 percent. 111 In the Ruhr the 
population increase was even larger. It increased by 75 and 102 percent in the 
Rhineland and Westphalia respectively, while the average for Germany was 44 
percent. 112 The region was one of five areas in Germany that showed the most rapid 
growth towards the end of the nineteenth century. 113
The pattern of migration into the two regions was the same. The industry first 
drew workers from the neighbouring areas (Nahwanderer). Later, when these regions 
could no longer satisfy demand, migrants from further afield were employed. That the 
industry tapped the human resources of the more rural regions can be illustrated by 
the decrease in the numbers engaged in agricultural work. In South Wales those 
involved in agricultural work fell from 35 percent in 1851 to 12 percent by 1911, 114 
while many left agriculture for the growing industry in the Ruhr owing to poor 
harvests in the 1840s. 115 In communities such as Steinfeld there was a change in the 
traditional occupational structure as the young men entered the pit rather than taking 
up the agricultural work of previous generations. 116 Towards the end of the nineteenth 
century migrants from further afield (Fernwanderer) were increasingly employed in 
the mines. In the Ruhr, while the Ruhr and Hellweg zones drew most of their labour 
from the existing population, the Emscher area was more thinly populated and, 
therefore, attracted the most immigrants." 7 These immigrants were often from the
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Junker estates of East Germany. In the Rhineland and Westphalia immigrants from 
this region formed 12.4 and 15.1 percent of total immigrants respectively, by 1907 
they constituted 27.3 and 44.9 percent. 118 On a microscopic level, in 1907 49 percent 
of the Essen's population had been born there," 9 while in Bochum only 23 percent of 
the workforce were native to the city. 120 That many of these migrants found their way 
to work in the mines of the Ruhr is made clear in Table 1.6. 












Source: Berg, Wirtschaft, p. 241.
In some areas the migrants and their descendants came to form a majority as villages 
exploded into towns. By 1893 foreign speaking migrants accounted for 45 percent of 
the mining workforce of Bottrop and by 1920 they formed 75 percent of the 
population of the town of Bottrop, the largest single group being the Poles, who 
mostly originated from Upper Silesia and Posen. 121
Similarly, while the first waves of migration to industrial South Wales came 
from the Principality's rural counties, a trend that may have actually strengthened the 
Welsh language, subsequent waves came increasingly from England. 122 The number 
of Rhondda inhabitants who had been born in England rose from 7,328 to 10,728 
between 1891 and 1911. 123 Coombes, when he attended a lodge meeting, noted the 
mix of regional dialects and languages, 'Yorkshire and Durham men, Londoners, men 
form the Forest of Dean, North Welshmen...two Australians, four Frenchmen, and 
several coloured gentlemen' were represented. 124 However, despite this mix of 
dialects and languages, it is clear that there was a lower degree of diversity between 
the migrants in South Wales than in the Ruhr. The vast majority of migrants entered 
the Glamorgan coalfield from either Wales or England, as shown in Table 1.7. 





























Source: Brinley Thomas, The Migration of Labour into the Glamorganshire Coalfield, 1861-1911' in 
W. E. Minchinton (ed.) Industrial South Wales 1750-1914: Essays in Welsh Economic History, 
London, Frank Cass and Company Ltd, 1968, p. 293.
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The industrial communities of the Ruhr, where it was believed 'some twenty 
languages and idioms' were spoken, 125 had a greater degree of diversity. Among the 
migrants the Poles stood out as the largest and most cohesive group. In 1903 Pieper 
identified 19 'Polish' mines, at which more than half the workforce was made up of 
Polish workers. At the Pluto mine in Gelsenkirchen they made up almost three- 
quarters of the workforce. 126 While the early Polish immigrants to the area had been 
largely assimilated into the existing Catholic community through common religious 
bonds, this integration became increasingly difficult from the 1890s as the number of 
migrants mushroomed. Low level discrimination by the indigenous population and the 
Government's 'Germanisation' policy forced this second wave of immigrants to 
establish their own distinct sub-culture. A Polish language newspaper, Warius 
Polskie, founded in 1890, served this milieu. Initially intended to integrate the Poles, 
the paper actually played a significant role in consolidating the Poles as a distinct 
section of the community. 127 This sub-culture was made of a plethora of Polish 
associations. 128 In Bochum there were nine Polish associations with a total 
membership of 754 in 1893, plus another two organisations in the city itself. 129 
Meanwhile, the District President for Arnsberg reported 191 such organisations for 
the area as a whole in 1906. 130 These associations ranged from the educational to 
workers' associations.
Among the latter was the Polish miners' union, Zjednoczenie Zawodowe 
Polskie (ZZP). Established in 1902, the founders believed that the interests of Polish 
workers were not being adequately protected by the existing trade unions, the Alter 
Verband (Old Association) and the Gewerkverein christlicher Bergarbeiter (Trade 
Association of Christian Miners). This view was strengthened by the old unions' 
support for the Mining Language Ordinance. An example of the Government's 
'Germanisation' policy, the ordinance effectively restricted immigrants' mobility 
within the workplace. 131
Although the Poles were the largest single group, other migrants also formed 
subcultures. The Masurians, for example, who also came from East Prussia, differed 
from the Poles in dialect and religion. The police reported that the Masurians were 
proud to be called Old Prussians. They regarded any confusion of themselves with the 
Poles as an insult, 132 although the two groups were often lumped together in official 
statistics. 133 There are also examples of even smaller groups, such as migrants from 
Hesse, forming various kinds of association.
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Apart from the greater ethnic diversity of the migrants to the Ruhr, the 
settlement of the migrants also differed. The Ruhr underwent a much greater degree 
of urbanisation than South Wales. Older centres like Essen and Bochum expanded 
rapidly, while others, such as Gelsenkirchen, which only came into being in 1903, can 
be regarded as literal creations of the German industrial revolution. 135 It has been 
suggested that the growth of urban centres in Germany was due to its federal political 
structure, which encouraged development of the seats of government of the various 
states, as well as its industrial evolution. 136 Furthermore, owing to the greater 
industrial diversity of the region, the towns and cities would accommodate different 
occupational groups. Miners, although they may have congregated in certain 
residential areas, 137 would be able to rub shoulders with iron and factory workers. For
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example the Krupp steel and armaments factories dominated the town of Essen. 
However, the industrial pit village also existed in the Ruhr, especially in the northern 
region. Examples of the latter type of settlements included communities such as 
Gladbeck, Buer and Herten. 139
The geography of South Wales, on the other hand, was prejudicial to the 
development of large towns and cities. Building tended to be high-density terraced 
housing in ribbons along the valley sides and the emergence of the pit villages was 
more common than the large conurbation. 140 The latter tended to develop beyond the 
coalfield at the points of export, examples being Barry and Cardiff. The Welsh mining 
communities were, unlike those of the Ruhr, more geographically isolated. As the 
valleys were virtually mono-industrial the South Wales miners also had less 
opportunity to mix with other types of worker.
A further difference between the growth of the mining communities was the 
amount of company housing built by the industrialists. This form of building had been 
present in South Wales, but had gradually decreased towards the end of the nineteenth 
century. Simultaneously there was a growing trend towards home ownership 
facilitated by building clubs. 141 It has been estimated that these building clubs were 
responsible for twenty-three percent of all house construction in the Rhondda in the 
1890s. 142 In 1895 in the month of June alone the Aberdare Urban District Council 
(UDC) approved plans for a total of 96 houses from the Cwmdare Fechan and the 
Glancynon building clubs, followed by another 17 from the Trecynon club the 
following month. 143 Between 1900 and 1911 they produced fifteen and thirty-six 
percent of all building plans sent for approval by the Urban District Council in the
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Rhondda Fach and Fawr respectively. 144 In his memoirs Walter Haydn Davies records 
that his family was a member of such a club and, through their 'frugal, hardworking 1 , 
lifestyle, they were able to acquire two properties, one of which they rented out. 145
Welsh employers were not insensible to the benefits of company housing. The 
manager of the Lockets Merthyr Collieries reported that houses in Mardy were often 
very overcrowded. Families as large as eleven occupied three bedroom houses. He 
linked these conditions to the quality of the workers:
It will be clearly understood from this how we are unable to keep the best 
class of workmen: in fact, I may say that we have lost a considerable 
number of our best workmen during the last six months owing to the fact 
that we are unable to supply them and their families with houses to live in. 
It is a very common saying here that the beds have not time to cool. 146
The Powell Duffryn Company also recognised the 'urgent necessity which exists for 
providing further Cottage accommodation for the Company's workmen and...the 
benefit which would result to the Company there from.' 147 The directors planned the 
construction of several houses and seemed to have been involved in some of the 
building clubs themselves. 148 However, such housing did not always guarantee a 
stable and loyal workforce. The manager of Lockets Merthyr bemoaned the fact that 
'the hold we had upon the Mardy Cottage Co.'s houses is now lost, and the result is 
that several tenants are now working at Ferndale, to the detriment of our 
Collieries.' 149 Furthermore, some thirty company houses were found abandoned in 
1894 after a dispute at the South Dunraven colliery, Blaenrhondda. 150
Welsh coal owners were, however, largely disinclined to build housing as they 
usually held only short leases for mineral rights. The high proportion of workers' 
home ownership suggests that the Welsh mining labour force was more stable than 
that in the Ruhr. Speculative builders carried out much of the rest of the house 
building, aided by the low costs of such construction. Berg estimates that in 1900 a 
family house in the Ruhr cost between 5,000 and 6,000 M compared with 2,400 to 
2,800 M in South Wales. 152
On the other hand, company housing (Kolonie) was a major feature of the 
Ruhr coal industry and was seen as a means of offering the industrialists some social 
control over their workforce. Dick Geary has convincingly argued that such 
paternalistic practices were not a sign of the 'feudal' character of the German 
employers, but a rational response to specific problems. 153 The mining industry in the 
Ruhr had a particularly high turnover of labour and housing was seen as one method
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of establishing a stable workforce. By 1913 there were only three coal owners without 
any works accommodation. 154 The Helene and Amalie mines alone owned 347 houses 
and 1,199 flats. Often accommodating Fernwanderer, colonies could undermine the 
formation of community solidarity and ties by isolating their residents from the other 
workers. 156 In fact, some housing was advertised on the basis that only certain ethnic 
groups would be included. One of the selling points of a Kolonie linked to the Victor 
mine in Rauxel was that the Masurian immigrants could remain together and 'have 
nothing to do with Poles and East Prussians.' 157 Such housing was often much sought 
after as it was larger than that available on the open market and the rent was roughly 
50 percent cheaper. As a result the proportion of miners who found lodgings in this 
type of accommodation grew from 4 percent in 1872 to between 35 and 38 percent in 
1914. 158
Alongside the Kolonie resident, who was often an immigrant, another type of 
miner has been distinguished. In the older mining areas of the Ruhr there existed 
families in which the occupation of miner had been handed down through 
generations. These families often had their origins in the pre-capitalist period. 
Referred to as Kotterbergleute (cottage miners) these miners were often small home 
and landowners, combining agricultural work with their work in the pit. 159 Heinrich 
Imbusch, who rose to become leader of the Christian Gewerkverein, seems to have 
come from such a background, as his family owned some livestock and even 
employed a housemaid. 160 Often Kolonie accommodation also came with gardens and 
allotments by which the miners could supplement their diet and many mining families 
owned some form of small livestock such as pigs, sheep and goats. 161 Such livestock 
rearing was less common in South Wales, although in the anthracite region of the 
coalfield, an area characterised by small mines of between 100 to 500 men, miners 
often engaged in both industrial and agricultural work. 162
Relations between the older, established miners and the immigrant Kolonie 
residents varied from hostility to solidarity. The indigenous inhabitants of Steinfeld 
regarded the Kolonie inhabitants as lower class citizens. Tensions were intensified by 
religious differences. Inhabitants of the Kolonie were largely Protestant while 
villagers were Catholic. The former regarded the latter as 'black to the heart', the 
colour being associated with Catholicism. 163 Meanwhile, the community of Gladbeck 
exhibited a greater degree of solidarity between the locals and Kolonists, a feature 
reinforced by the shared Catholicism of both groups. 164
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Despite the variety of accommodation there was simply not enough to cope 
with the massive migration into the two areas in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century. To some extent this problem was overcome by the system of lodging, a 
feature that was common to both areas. Briiggemeier has distinguished a 'half-open 
family structure' among the Ruhr miners, an arrangement whereby lodgers were 
accepted into the family home. He argues that it was an attempt to organise everyday 
life and underlay the solidarity of the Ruhr miners during the strikes of 1889 and 
1905. 165 In these terms the concept seems equally applicable to the South Wales 
coalfield. Lodging could be mutually beneficial, supplying the family with an extra 
source of income and the newly arrived immigrants with necessary social support. 
Immigrants to the Ruhr, for example, often found lodgings with families from the 
same region who spoke the same language. 166 This served to strengthen ethnic 
identities in the region and whole quarters of towns could become dominated by one 
ethnic group. 167
The taking in of lodgers could also mean an increased burden of work for the 
miner's wife. This would seem to be especially the case in the South Wales valleys as, 
besides the normal round of washing and food preparation, they were also responsible 
for heating the bath water for the returning men. If the household included several 
lodgers on different shifts the process would have to be repeated several times a day. 
The German miners' wives enjoyed the comparative luxury of pithead baths, an 
innovation that was only introduced in South Wales after the Great War. The role of 
women in both regions was largely restricted to the home. The dominance of heavy 
industry meant that there were few opportunities for paid female employment outside 
the home, although women could supplement the familys' income through some form 
of 'penny capitalism' such as making treats or taking in washing. 168 Outside the home 
both mining regions were very much masculine worlds.
The preceding description of the growth of the mining communities reveals 
that the two areas differed greatly in their degree of ethnic diversity. The ethnic 
composition of the Ruhr was much more variegated than South Wales. These 
differences in the diversity of in-migration and the degree of urbanisation affected the 
cohesiveness of the miners' communities. The relative lack of ethnic diversity 
coupled with their isolation, both geographically and industrially, meant that the 
mining communities of South Wales were more cohesive than those of the Ruhr. 
Brinley Thomas has suggested that the early English migrants into the region were
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assimilated without great difficulty. However, the greater number of English migrants 
towards the end of the nineteenth century made this more difficult. 169 Moreover, Tim 
Williams claims that this increasing in-migration from England undermined the 
Welsh language, but also suggests that the Welsh mining communities chose English 
as the medium through which to conduct their growing conflict with capitalism. 
Moreover the Welsh turned increasingly to English as a means of social mobility. 170
The South Wales mining valleys were not, however, immune to ethnic 
tensions. In 1882, for example, the houses of Irish workers were burnt in Tredegar. 171 
Four years later extra police had to be drafted into Blaenau Gwent because of fighting 
between the native Welsh and English immigrants from the Forest of Dean. 172 In 1911 
rioters turned on Jewish owned shops. 173 Referring to a court case involving an Italian 
miner, the Forth Gazette reported in 1902 that 'the employment of foreigners in the 
Rhondda coal mines has been strenuously objected to by the local colliers.' 174 Yet, 
unlike the Ruhr, there was no translation of ethnic tensions into organisational rivalry. 
When the issue of foreign workers was raised at a meeting of the Rhondda miners, 
their agent William Abraham commented 'that a man was a Frenchman or an Italian 
was no reason why he should not work at the pits, but if they were unskilled workmen 
he advised the skilled workmen not to work with them.' He claimed it was hardly fair 
to punish foreigners for breaking rules when they did not understand. Instead, it was 
the duty of the management to post the rules in a language they could understand. 175 
This is a marked contrast to the official support the Alter Verband and the 
Gewerkverein gave to the Mining Language Ordinance, which placed the onus on the 
immigrants to learn German.
In South Wales occupational and community solidarity was fostered by the 
dominance of coal mining as the sole occupation coupled with the comparative 
isolation of the pit villages. In the Ruhr assimilation was more problematic. Local 
inhabitants often looked down on immigrants, who often spoke little or no German. 
The immigrants were also often physically segregated from the indigenous population 
through company housing. These two pictures, one of comparative integration and 
cohesiveness, the other of fragmentation, was reflected and reinforced by a further 
factor, religion.
The dominant religious creed in South Wales was Nonconformity. Although 
the actual power of the chapels should not be overestimated 176 and while they could 
be conservative in their views on cultural and scientific developments, they did
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provide a form of social cement by contributing to the communal life of the mining 
communities. 177 For example, one ex-miner commented that 'the chapel was very 
powerful in the Rhondda Valley for the simple reason there was no other
1 *7fientertainment,' although by the twentieth century there were alternatives in the 
form of organised sport, music halls and, somewhat later, cinemas. Despite this the 
chapels provided a form of social cement in towns and villages that had sprung up 
with an astonishing rapidity, often from nothing, the chapel provided the community 
with a centre. The Temple Baptist Chapel at Graig, Pontypridd, for example, was 
established to serve the mining communities that grew up around the Maritime 
Collieries. In an illustrative example of the changes that swept the coalfield during 
this period it changed its sermons from Welsh to English in order to minister to the 
large influx of English in-migrants. 179 Other in-migrants found it necessary to 
establish their own centres of worship such as the Primitive Methodist chapel 
Ebenezer in Gilfach Goch. Its trustees were all employed in the local mines. 180 In fact 
it appears that the chapels had a difficult time keeping up with the pace of change. As 
early as 1877 a delegate at the annual meeting of the Society for Establishing and 
Supporting English Congregational Churches in South Wales moved a resolution:
that the present state of the population of the towns and manufacturing 
districts of Wales urgently demands the serious attention of the 
Congregational Churches and that the establishing of English Interests in 
those localities whose number of the English speaking population requires 
it is essentially necessary to prevent the utter extinction of the 
Denomination in the course of a few years in such places. 181
Events held by the chapels encompassed the intellectual and the physical. The 
Calvinistic Methodist chapel Penuel in Ebbw Vale hosted meetings of the Young 
People's Temperance and Literary Societies ranging from simple musical evenings 
with recitations to discussions on topics such as 'is ritualism consistent with the
1 QOChristianity of the New Testament?' Meanwhile the English Congregational
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Church at Pontypridd held a gym class for the young men of the community.
Religion in the Ruhr was a more divisive issue. The area contained significant 
numbers of both Protestant and Catholic denominations. The distribution of Catholics 
and Protestants varied between localities. For example, in 1912 the city (Stadf) of 
Bochum had an almost equal proportion of both denominations, while the surrounding 
area (Landkreis} Protestants accounted for 61 percent of the population, Catholics for 
37 percent. A closer look at the coal mining areas, which lay mainly in the Landkreis, 
reveal that some were dominated by Catholics (Riemke), others by Protestants
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(Harpen and Bergen), while some were roughly equal divided (Hordel). 184 Although 
the Ruhr like other industrial regions, including South Wales, was undergoing a slow 
process of secularisation, religious identity remained an important defining feature 
among the miners. Religious divisions between Catholicism and Protestantism 
manifested themselves in social provisions such as schools and hospitals. 185 In 1900, 
Bochum's four Catholic churches and eight Catholic schools were matched by four 
Protestant churches and seven Protestant schools. There was also a synagogue, a 
Jewish school and a small Baptist community. 186
The Catholic Church was hierarchically organised - a trend that increased
1 B*7from the formation of the Empire. The Catholic adherents themselves were over- 
represented in the working and lower middle classes of German society. The coal 
owners of the Ruhr were largely Protestant, Thyssen being a notable exception. 188 The 
proportion of Catholics among the miners was increased by the arrival of the 
immigrants as the Poles especially tended to be Catholic. The Catholic population of 
Bottrop, for example, rose to 91 percent by 1900.
This Catholic community was consolidated during the 1870s by the state- 
initiated Kulturkampf (Struggle of Cultures), which discriminated against the Catholic
IRQChurch. This consolidation produced a distinctive Catholic milieu, and the Ruhr, 
with its unique confessional structure provided one of its strongholds. 190 Most 
obviously this milieu was symbolised by the Catholic Centre Party. 191 However, it 
was also made up of a dense network of ancillary organisations. For example, in 
response to the liberalisation of the industry Knappenvereine and Arbeitervereine 
(Workers' Associations) were established. Often led by priests, these organisations 
sought to provide their members with sickness and burial benefits, while also 
maintaining the sense of privileged status the miners had enjoyed under state 
control. 192 By 1897 there were 91 Catholic Arbeitervereine in the bishopric of 
Essen. 193 At the end of 1912 the Verbands katholischer Arbeitervereine 
Westdeutschlands (Association of Catholic West German Workers' Associations) 
reported that 44.4 percent of its membership in the Ruhr were miners. 194 From 1894 
the Gewerkverein joined the Arbeitervereine, but the Catholic sub-culture was also 
made up of various other religious and educational societies. This dense network was 
to provide an integrative function for many of the early immigrants to the region.
However, shared religion was no guarantee of assimilation. As noted above, 
discrimination or a lack of facilities meant that the growing number of Polish
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immigrants found it necessary to found their own organisations. For example, the 
Polish immigrants to Bottrop found that their spiritual needs were not well served. 
There was only one church and no services in the Polish language. The Poles held 
meetings and signed a petition demanding better provision for their needs in 1885, but 
it was only in 1902 that a priest fluent in Polish arrived to administer to the Herz Jesu 
church. 196 Such complaints became more common as the Polish communities became 
more established. In the 1890s the reports of the District Presidents 
(Regierungsprasidenteri) for the Diisseldorf, Mimster and Arnsberg areas, all of which 
included parts of the Ruhr began to include sections on Polish organisations in their 
reports to the Minster of the Interior. In 1904 the Regierungsprasident for Diisseldorf 
saw as noteworthy 'the increasingly audacious demands for greater consideration of 
the Polish language in Church and School.' He also commented on complaints made 
to the Bishops of Miinster and Paderborn that nowhere in their dioceses were there 
Polish services more than twice a month and that confession was exclusively in 
German. 197 In fact many Poles believed that they were regarded by the German 
Catholics as somehow inferior Catholics, a view that sometimes led the Poles to a 
rejection of German control:
We live worse than a sect here, although we're eager Catholics. Most of 
the blame has to be attributed to the priests, there's no way that a worker 
can kneel before the altar and hold mass, that's what the priests are here 
for and they're obliged to do this. I recommend and request you not to go
108to Church until we have a Polish priest here.
More often the Poles established organisations to support candidates seeking 
election to Church boards. In Bottrop the Poles had succeeded in capturing nine out of 
ten seats on the Church executive, but rather than encouraging closer co-operation this 
seemed to heighten the mistrust between the German locals and Polish migrants. 1 
Furthermore the state's Germanisation policy of the late nineteenth century, much like 
the Kulturkampf of the 1870s, served to consolidate the Polish sub-culture, rather than 
aid assimilation. 200
Social democratic organisations co-existed alongside these Catholic and Polish 
associations. Like the Catholics, the Social Democrats had been the victims of a state- 
led policy of repression. However, following the lapsing of the Anti-Socialist Law 
and the miners' strike of 1889, social-democratic party organisations, which had often 
been disguised as choral groups in the 1880s, 201 quickly reappeared in the Ruhr. 
The SPD also sought to create its own network of clubs. Philip Sommerlad, a SPD
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activist in Bochum, recalled that the first cells of the local movement were made up of 
educational societies, while in Riemke there was a choral group Morgenrot 203 Among 
these clubs were the social-democratic Konsumvereine (Co-operatives) and 
Schnapskasinos (members drinking clubs). 204 The District President for Diisseldorf 
reported that the Citizens and Workers Co-operative founded in Essen in 1902 
swelled to 1,724 members by 1904. 205 Meanwhile, the Oberbergamt estimated that 
there were 117 Schnapskasinos in its area of jurisdiction, although the definition of 
what constituted a Schnapskasino often varied.206 Not all the Konsumvereine and 
Schnapskasinos were social-democratic organisations and the party's attitude to the 
latter was especially complicated. Often they were condemned as a distraction and a 
drain on wages, but they also offered a place to hold political meetings. 207 Former 
members of SPD sporting associations also recalled them as having a strong working- 
class ethos.208
Vernon L. Lidtke has described these associations as representing an attempt 
to create an alternative culture.209 However, Karl Rohe, in applying the concept of the 
milieu to the Ruhr, argues that, although it is difficult to quantify the degree to which 
the SPD were able to build a social-democratic milieu through the foundation of 
Vereine, this construction was generally weak. While the Centre represented 'the 
milieu party par excellence', the SPD was more of a Sammlungsbewegung (protest 
movement). Yet Rohe does believe that it possessed a certain milieu foundation. 
Significantly, he sees it as based mainly upon the Protestant cottage miners. 210 In 
1890 the District President for Arnsberg noted that some 46 percent of the SPD 
activists in his area were, or had been, miners. 211
This picture of milieux and sub-cultures can be overdrawn. Lynn Abrams has 
argued the working-class leisure organisations did become divided into socio-cultural 
milieux. Yet these associations helped the workers to integrate into industrial society
7 1 7and create a broader working-class culture. Moreover, an increasing 
commercialisation of leisure from the 1900s tended to break down barriers based on 
religion and ethnicity. 213 Generally, however, South Wales represents a contrast to 
this picture of milieux and sub-cultures. There were, of course, countervailing forces 
in the South Wales mining communities. Nonconformity was divided into various 
sects, while Conservative workingmen's clubs jostled with classes held by former 
Ruskin, and later Central Labour College, students. 214 However, there were two key 
differences between associational life in South Wales and the Ruhr. First, the political
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and religious organisations in South Wales did not equal the attempts made by 
Catholics, Poles and Social Democrats to create a club-life that could virtually cater 
for an individual's every need. Secondly, in South Wales plural group membership 
was accepted, whereas in the Ruhr it was often exclusive. This difference is illustrated 
by the relationship between the SWMF and Labour. Although the SWMF eventually 
affiliated to the Labour party, its members were free to join other political parties. For 
a Catholic to join the SPD, however, entailed a rejection of the Catholic milieu and 
possible excommunication. Moreover, in South Wales both rugby and football 
provided a focus for the community as a whole, rather than a particular political or 
ethnic group. 215 Although apolitical sporting clubs, such as Schalke 04, also existed in 
the Ruhr, many clubs demonstrated their political loyalties by affiliating to the social- 
democratic Arbeiter-Turn und Sportbund (Workers' Gynastic and Sports Union) or 
the middle-class, Protestant Deutsche Turnschaft (German Gymnastic 
Assoiciation). 216 Similarly, although Welsh employers often provided funds for 
workmen's halls and libraries they seem to have rarely have used them as a means of 
social control. The committees of many libraries and halls later fell into the hands of 
the labour movement, but meeting rooms remained open to various causes and books 
ranged from non-political fiction to socialist works. By contrast, the trade unions in 
the Ruhr built meeting halls and libraries specifically for their own members. 
Therefore, civil society in South Wales, although pluralistic, was not so rigidly 
segmented by ethnicity, religion and politics. On the other hand, the establishment of 
distinct milieux in the Ruhr meant civil society was more rigidly divided.
Summary
This 'snapshot' of the two coalfields has attempted to illustrate some of the 
long-term structures and trends within the development of the two coalfields prior to 
the outbreak of the Great War. There were clear differences between the two regions, 
which suggests that the lifeworld of the Welsh miners was more synchronous than 
those in the Ruhr. For example, South Wales experienced a longer, less rapid process 
of industrialisation, which was already well established in some areas, such as 
Merthyr. Industrial communities were therefore already well established in some 
areas before the expansion of the coal industry. On the other hand, industrialisation in 
the Ruhr was a much more rapid phenomenon and was accompanied by a sense of 
dislocation as miners lost their old privileges and village communities were
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transformed into towns. In both coalfields, a major impetus for this expansion came 
from the advances in technology, which allowed access to deeper seams of coal. The 
production of coal in the Ruhr was closely linked to the growth of domestic iron and 
steel industries, while much Welsh coal was destined for export.
The comparison also reveals that the South Wales coalfield more closely fitted 
Bulmer's eight-point ideal-type of the 'traditional mining community' than the 
Ruhr.219 In terms of economic predominance, the Ruhr developed a more diversified 
industrial structure and there was a strong trend towards both horizontal and vertical 
integration. This meant that the Ruhr was more occupationally heterogeneous than 
South Wales. Although South Wales also had its metal industries they were on a 
much smaller scale. Mining was economically predominant and the pit seemed to 
impinge on every aspect of life, providing a common feature in the lifeworld of the 
Welsh miners. Physically, it loomed over the villages, while its dust entered the 
houses at the end of every shift. Occupationally, it was the largest employer. 
Organisationally, it provided the basic unit for miners' unionism. In the Ruhr, on the 
other hand, the pit did not dominate the lifeworld of the workers to the same extent. 
The winding gears shared the skyline with the factory smoke-stakes, and the unions 
based themselves on ethnicity, religion and politics rather then the pit.
Generally, the nature of work underground was similar in both areas. The 
longwall method of working was extensively used. However, the extent of 
supervision was greater in the Ruhr, suggesting that the German miners had 
somewhat less autonomy in the workplace. Moreover, Levenstein's study revealed 
widespread discontent with the job among Ruhr miners. In South Wales, on the other 
hand, mining was an occupation likely to passed on from father to son, if only 
because of lack of other opportunities. Many South Wales miners rejected the chance 
of promotion even when they had passed the necessary exams. On the other hand, the 
'hereditary' nature of mining was declining in the Ruhr during this period. Miners 
there felt that the liberalisation of the industry and the introduction of new methods of 
working had undermined their status. This feeling, coupled with greater opportunities 
for factory work and rapid expansion of the coalfield, meant that the mining 
workforce became increasingly made up of immigrants. Initially the population in the 
local areas fed this demand. Later migrants from more distant areas formed an 
increasing proportion of the workforce. Of the two regions, the Ruhr was the most 
ethnically diverse, with Polish migrants forming a substantial section of the labour
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force. Migrants to South Wales were assimilated far more easily, making linguistic 
and ethnic divisions far less evident.
The settlement of these migrants in the two areas also differed. There was a far 
greater degree of urbanisation in the Ruhr. The geography of that region was more 
favourable for the development of cities and towns than the valleys of South Wales. 
Former market towns, such as Essen and Bochum, found their populations massively 
expanded by the influx of migrants, while others, such as Gelsenkirchen, were formed 
by the amalgamation of villages. The narrow Welsh valleys, on the other hand, 
promoted the emergence of the pit village as the predominant mode of settlement. 
Furthermore, while a trend towards home ownership has been identified among the 
Welsh miners, the Ruhr saw more extensive company housing. While company 
housing was a decreasing phenomenon in Wales as the nineteenth century reached its 
end, in the Ruhr the opposite seems true. It offered the German industrialists a degree 
of social control over the mining communities that their Welsh counterparts did not 
enjoy. Residents of the company Kolonie were often isolated from the rest of the 
workforce and had to abide by a set of regulations or face eviction. To the cleavages 
of ethnicity and residence in the Ruhr can be added religion. While Nonconformity 
dominated the South Wales valleys, the Ruhr miners were divided between 
Catholicism and Protestantism. Further complications arose with the Polish 
community's demand for its own Catholic priests and clubs.
Divisions on ethnic, religious and political grounds influenced, and were in 
turn reinforced by, the various associations the miners of the Ruhr established. 
Pressure from the state in the form of the Kulturkampf, the Anti-Socialist Law and the 
'Germanisation' policy served to consolidate particular groups. A distinctive Catholic 
milieu was formed, which was at first able to integrate the newly arrived Poles 
through the bond of common religion. However, from the 1890s the Poles 
increasingly formed their own separate associations as a reaction to a combination of 
discrimination and indifference. Able to act more freely after 1890, the SPD also 
sought to establish its own network of clubs, although the party was unable to 
establish the same deep roots the Catholics had.
It would not seem possible to apply the same concept of the milieu to South 
Wales. The theoretical literature on milieu stresses that its formation is dependent on 
some 'top-down' pressure. The Ruhr provides a prime example on how milieux could 
be formed, but similar examples are difficult to find for South Wales in the same
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period. As will be shown, issues such as Disestablishment, the Welsh language and 
Home Rule, could be effectively used to rally support. But the organisations created 
to pursue these aims represented the impulse to reform, rather than the defensive 
consolidation of an existing group in the face of state repression. Moreover, many 
associations, especially sporting bodies, provided a focus for the community as a 
whole, rather than a particular group. Lacking this 'top-down 1 pressure and building 
on a comparatively more homogeneous social base, there developed in South Wales a 
comparatively more diffuse, flexible civil society, which was better able to assimilate 
new arrivals than the fragmented environment of the Ruhr. The subsequent two 
chapters will show how the different nature of the civil society in the Ruhr and South 
Wales influenced their attempts to form organisations to articulate their interests.
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Chapter Two 
Trade Union Discourses, 1890-1914
' 'But you can't be in theirs and ours at the same time!'' Schneider, Alter 
Verband member, to Hans Marchwitza on his dual membership of the 
Alter Verband and the Gewerkverein.' 1
'It was both an industrial and a social institution...It differed from the 
normal functions of trade unions because of its more intimate involvement 
in the domestic and social life of the people'. Will Paynter on the SWMF. 2
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the trade unions sought to construct 
miners' identities through discourse Between 1889 and 1902, the miners in both 
regions were successful in forming trade unions that were to survive up to the Great 
War and beyond. Yet, despite a similar trend towards successful combination, it soon 
became apparent that trade unionism was to take very different courses in the two 
regions. While the South Wales Miners' Federation (SWMF) assumed a hegemonic 
position in terms of miners' organisation before the Great War, the movement in the 
Ruhr was progressively split along religious, political and ethnic lines. So while trade 
unionism in South Wales was characterised by homogenisation, in the Ruhr the 
overall impression is of fragmentation.
This chapter seeks to shed some light on the reasons for these divergent trends. 
The focus will be upon the discursive practices of the trade unions. As will become 
apparent three strands, Christian-socialism, socialism (or social democracy) and 
syndicalism, played important roles in the discourses of the trade unions covered here. 
However, the intention is not totally to disassociate discourse from material 
structures. Instead, incidences of unemployment, wage reduction or intensification of 
work practices were all subject to interpretation by trade union activists. These 
interpretative frameworks then formed the basis of both the discursive practices of the 
trade unions and their actions. At the same time, actions were conditioned by the 
unions' own organisational resources. However, the way in which they conceived and 
developed their own discursive identities was to have an important impact upon their 
success in organising the workforce.
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Ideological Conflicts: Christian-socials and Social Democrats, 
'Federationists' and 'Scalites'
Both the South Wales and the Ruhr coalfields had a history of miners' 
organisation that predated the 1890s. Attempts had been made to organise the Welsh 
miners in permanent associations since the 1830s. 3 Thomas Halliday and the 
Amalgamated Association of Miners (AAM) made the most successful attempt in the 
first half of the 1870s. Ultimately, this organisation fell victim to employer 
intransigence, unfavourable economic conditions and defeat in a large strike in 1875. 4 
In the Ruhr, the initial spur to organisation came somewhat later. The liberalisation of 
the mining industry entailed the loss of privileges that the miners had previously 
enjoyed under the system of state control. The Knappenvereine aimed at salvaging 
something of the miners' status by providing benefits for their members, while also 
seeking to maintain the professional pride of the miners. In the 1870s there were two 
attempts to establish trade union organisations in the Ruhr. The first followed the 
1872 Essen strike and took the form of the Grubenarbeiterverband, the second, the 
Rosenkranzverband, came six years later. As an augur of subsequent events, the latter 
organisation foundered on differences between the Social Democrats and the 
christian-social miners. 5
The 1880s represented a lull in trade union organisation in both regions. 
However, organisation was not at a complete standstill. Knappenvereine continued to 
be established and reached their high point in this decade. In South Wales, the 
establishment of a Sliding Scale followed the dissolution of the AAM. This system 
linked wages directly to prices. Price fluctuations were to be followed by a 
corresponding rise or reduction in wages. 6 Organisation of a sort survived in the form 
of local unions, such as the Cambrian Miners' Association. 7 However, since the Scale 
obviated the need for genuine negotiation over wages, these associations have been 
termed 'quasi'-unions, whose principal function was to raise the funds necessary to 
support the miners' representatives on the Sliding Scale Committee. 8
These organisational efforts formed the background to the eventual 
establishment of permanent trade unions in the 1890s. What is striking about the Ruhr 
is the role Christian thought played, first, in providing legitimisation for the activists' 
efforts at organisation, and, secondly, in forming an interpretative framework through 
which to criticise the employers. The Bishop of Mainz gave the movement an
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intellectual and moral basis in a pamphlet entitled 'The Worker Question and 
Christianity.' 9 Furthermore the early Knappenvereine were predominantly priest-led, 
Catholic organisations. Their statutes often called upon a member to be a 'genuine 
Christian' and lead a life of propriety. 10
Christian-social thought was spurred to further action by the 1889 strike. 
During the 1880s discontent over wages and conditions had been simmering. In 
March and April 1889 meetings in Essen had formulated a list of demands regarding 
wages, the introduction of the eight hour shift and restriction of over-time. The strike 
itself, however, was a spontaneous movement. Beginning at the President mine in 
Bochum on 25 April, it quickly spread to other areas. A central strike committee was 
eventually established on 10 May and, five days later, a delegation presented the 
miners' case to the Kaiser. Without a strike fund and in the face of the Vbl's 
intransigent attitude, the miners had already began to drift back to work. On 19 May 
the strike was officially ended.''
The Catholic press regarded the strike as the result of the lack of dialogue 
between the owners and the workers. Tremonia, edited by Lambert Lensing, 
emphatically rejected claims the strike was caused by a mixture of laziness and social 
democratic agitation. Instead, it argued that the employers had a false image of the 
worker as a 'human machine', that needed only to work, eat and sleep. Religion was 
placed at the centre of the Christian-social critique. If 'one has the religious 
requirement to visit the Church on Sunday and Monday, that is already, in the eyes of 
many employers, a disagreeable, disruptive luxury, which hinders the organisation of 
the works and the worker in his work.' 12 The implication was that if the employers 
accepted that their workers required leisure time for their full spiritual needs, then a 
better understanding would develop between them. Lensing further set out this 
conviction that religion was the key to mediating conflict between employers and 
employees in a pamphlet. He claimed:
only on the basis of Christianity will the social question be solved or it 
will not be solved...Employer and worker must be led to a better 
relationship by the principle of Christian charity...The employer should 
not be the tyrant of the workers, who exploits their strength like a 
machine, he should rather appear as a caring owner (Fursorger) and 
regard the workers as human and an equal partner, who is sooner 
approachable through a friendly word, than crude reprimands...The 
worker on the other hand should consider the employer as his provider 
(Brodherrn), respect him, he should joyfully do his duty, whilst not 
stealing the day from the Lord (wegstehlen) n
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Mediation of conflict between capital and labour would only be achieved 
through the establishment of this dialogue. Following the 1889 strike the employers 
attempted to introduce a system that would prevent the workers from changing 
workplace (Sperre). Along with the fines that accompanied the end of the strike, this 
action caused great discontent. A further strike was only avoided by the intervention 
of District President Berlepsch, who held talks with both miners and owners, finally 
persuading the latter to drop the system. 14 Tremonia seized upon this as a positive 
example of better communication. 'It has been repeatedly emphasised by experts, that 
with respect to an excited workforce, a friendly word is often more effective than 
factual concessions from the employers. That the workforce is a factor with which one 
must reckon has actually been recognised by the employers in their sacrifice of the 
Sperre. Why do they uphold the empty appearance of inflexibility, when they have 
nothing to lose, but much to gain, through the acceptance of direct negotiations?' 15 
The ultimate goal of the Christian-social movement was recognition of the workers as 
partners in the mining industry. Strikes like that of May 1889 could be avoided 
through communication predicated on a shared understanding of Christian values and 
recognition of the importance of both employers and miners to the running of the 
industry.
Christian thought played a less clear role in industrial relations in South 
Wales, although religious allusions certainly formed a part of trade union rhetoric. 
Thomas Halliday was fond of referring to the 'good old Book' in his speeches, 16 
while the Workman's Advocate lambasted the employers as 'Pharasaical hypocrites' 
during the lockout of 1875. 17 However, to talk of a Christian-social movement along 
the same lines as that of the Ruhr before the 1890s is erroneous. In comparison to the 
Ruhr, South Wales lacked such a self-conscious Christian-social movement with a 
sound intellectual and organisational base. Instead, religious references by trade union 
activists in South Wales reflected a general desire for legitimacy in a religious society, 
rather than the product of a thought-out ideology. In fact, Keith Burgess has argued 
that Methodism, with its emphasis on self rather than collective help, was a hindrance 
to trade union development. 18 In this interpretation secularisation encouraged 
organisation.
However, nonconformist theology did provide legitimacy for the Sliding 
Scale. Many of the miners' leaders who supported the Scale, such as William
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Abraham and David Morgan, were also actively involved in the religious life of the 
valleys and had participated in the AAM. Abraham, the staunchest supporter of the 
Scale and famous for his ability to quell unruly meetings through song, was especially 
deeply embedded in the Nonconformist ethos of South Wales. 19 E. Evans has argued 
that Mabon saw the Scale as holding 'the promise that there should be no more strife 
in the coalfield, and clearly envisaged an era of peace and justice.' 20 His support for 
the Scale was, in fact, an attempt to apply his Christian precepts to industrial 
relations. 21
In fact, the idea of the Scale dovetailed well with Methodist ideas of self-help, 
as it, in theory at least, ensured that the worker was able to earn as just a wage as 
possible under the prevailing economic market conditions. In effect the employers and 
the employees would share the fortunes of the industry. Both would suffer the 
hardships of a downturn, or the prosperity of a boom. Mabon shared with the 
Christian-social movement in the Ruhr a desire to cultivate an understanding between 
capital and labour. This in no way entailed a complete subordination of the workers' 
interests. Nonconformity's emphasis on compassion and social responsibility 
provided a basis for criticism of employers. 22 The workers were the responsible co­ 
partners of the employers, sharing in the losses and success. When the latter erred, the 
miners were justified in taking action. Thus Mabon's support for the eight-hour 
movement was predicated on the idea that restriction of output would raise prices, 
thereby improving the lot of the men. It was in this vein that he addressed a meeting 
in Forth in 1894. He claimed that 'capital and labour, when in intelligent co-operation, 
should have identical interests, but unfortunately they were not always in harmony, 
because as a rule capital was not willing to give to labour a fair share of the results of
01their joint production.'
This preoccupation with a fair share of production was common to both the 
Christian-socials in the Ruhr and the Sliding 'Scalites' of South Wales. Within the 
discursive practice of both the 'fair share' formed the basis for accommodation 
between employers and employees. Each side complemented the other. Thus the 
position of the capitalists was secure. Neither Mabon nor the Christian-socialists 
challenged the mineowners' right to the profits of the industry, but merely sought a 
more just distribution of that wealth between miners and employers. At the same 
meeting at which he advocated restricted production, Mabon also stressed that the 
profits should not be so reduced so as to leave the capitalists with no inducement for
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investment. In both regions, notions of Christian justice and fairness underpinned 
ideas of co-operation and compromise in industrial relations.
In the 1890s, however, both these co-operative discourses faced challenges 
from more confrontational interpretations of industrial relations. In fact, in the Ruhr 
there already existed a long-standing conflict between the Christian-social and social- 
democratic movements. As already noted, tensions between the two ideological 
orientations had undermined a previous attempt at organisation in the 1870s. Klaus 
Tenfelde traces the struggle back to differences between the Allgemeiner Deutscher 
Arbeiterverein (ADAV) and the Catholic Knappenvereine in the 1860s. 25 In 1889 this 
conflict was submerged by the strike wave that engulfed the Ruhr. The experience of 
the strike had clearly demonstrated the need for a permanent organisation to represent 
the miners. Miners' meetings in May resolved that 'the unity of the workers has 
disappeared and it is now necessary for an organisation to strive for the same'. 26 A 
delegate conference in Dorstfeld, attended by both Christian-social and social- 
democratic representatives founded the Verband zur Wahrung und Forderung der 
bergmannisches Interessen in Rheinland und Westfalen, later known as the Alter 
Verband, on 18 August 1889. In an effort to maintain unity, the new association 
explicitly excluded political and religious matters. By March 1890 the Alter Verband 
had 5,000 members in the Bochum area alone.27
This attempt to transpose strike solidarity into organisational unity ultimately 
proved short-lived. The miners' movement again split into Christian-social and Social 
democratic camps. The split between the two had less to do with their concrete goals, 
than with the specific discourses they applied to industrial relations. For while the 
Christian-socials continued to seek accommodation between the interests of the 
owners and the workers, the Social Democrats propagated a more confrontational 
identity that challenged the authority of management. Instead of being seen as co­ 
operative partners, the miners and the owners were depicted in social-democratic 
discourse as locked in a struggle for control of the industry.
The ideological strife between these two discourses was soon demonstrated by 
a dispute over the political inclination of the Verband's organ, the Bergarbeiter 
Zeitung 2 * The mouthpiece of the association, the newspaper was an especially 
important means of constructing and disseminating an organisational identity. This 
made it an in-built point of conflict for the two orientations. The newspaper, 
dominated by the Social Democrats, promoted a Marxist reading of industrial
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relations and insisted on the importance of the class struggle (Klassenkampj). 
Improvement for the workers would only come 'through the elimination of the 
hitherto existing lordship of the mine owners' (bergwerkliches Herrentum). 29
As early as January 1890 complaints over the direction of the organ were 
raised. A letter in the Rheinisch-Westfdlischer Volksfreund complained "that the 
executive attempts to impose on us, at our own cost, an organ, which in every issue 
betrays its social democratic character."30 At a delegate meeting of the Alter Verband 
in March 1890 the Christian-social deputies from Buer, Hamme and Wattenscheid 
'declared themselves decisively against the political viewpoint of the association's 
organ' and threatened to cede from the Verband. A further conference was promised 
to consider the problem. 31 However, this failed to erase the perception that the Alter 
Verband was dominated by Social Democrats. A meeting of Christian delegates in 
Bochum demanded that the statutes of the Verband be changed so as to exclude Social 
Democrats from the organisation. The prevailing attitude was 'we want to be a united 
people in brotherhood, but not under social-democratic leadership...Our solution must 
be Front against the Verband.' 32 On 4 May 1890 a Christian, counter association, 
Rheinisch-Westfdlischer Bergarbeiter Verein Gluckauf zur Wahrung und Forderung 
der bergmannischen Interessen was founded.
Although Gluckauf remained comparatively weak, the secession of the 
Christian-social activists and the ensuing organisational rivalry sharpened the 
discursive conflict. The Marxist tone of the organ became ever more explicit and 
attacked the principles upon which its rival was based. Here is an article from May 
1890:
There exists among the working class, and especially among the miners, a 
mass of people, who sing maniacally of the sorrowful nature of their own 
work and that of their comrades, without reference to economic and 
political mechanisms, and yet, despite the ever more vehement conflict of 
interest between them and the antagonistic employer (capitalist) class, 
they dream of a peaceful existence. That might be possible, but then these 
dreamers (sleepers) are nothing more than the anvil upon which the 
hammer strikes often and heavily. 'The struggle for existence' will in time 
be conducted by the industrial circles with greater severity and 
ruthlessness, and whoever does not devote himself to the same, whoever 
withholds his energy from his class, perpetrates the class sin of omission, 
whose consequence will be borne first by himself and his comrades and 
later by their descendants... The value of labour will be depressed little by 
little by capitalist production and will not stop until financial ruin.
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This ruin could be countered by organisation, but first 'every miner must grasp the 
knowledge...that he belongs to a class, which is ruthlessly exploited by capital, and 
out of whose clutches the individual cannot escape. In other words: class- 
consciousness must be supported, must be fostered, otherwise the energetic and 
successful advocacy of interests will lack the true and only socially relevant 
mainspring: class camaraderie is a must, a categorical imperative.' 33
This Marxist reading of capitalism excluded the possibility of co-operation 
between the miners and the owners leading to an enduring improvement in the living 
standards of the former. The mechanism of capitalist economics would inevitably 
cause conflict. Far better to accept this and prepare for the clash of interests. 
Therefore, while the Christian-socials sought a commonality of interests, the Alter 
Verband perceived them as mutually exclusive. As Walter Neumann argues, 'each of 
them had found a crystallisation point, which was already ideological, in the one case 
in the sense of Christian-Catholic confession, in the other in the sense of an 
intellectually free, socialist world view, which they could apply to the further 
development of their organisation.' 34 It was these crystallisation points that formed 
the basis of legitimacy for action. An example of how these interpretations 
contributed to action is revealed by the January 1893 strike in the Ruhr. Meetings of 
the Alter Verband called to discuss its response to a strike in the Saar coalfield were 
overwhelmingly in favour of a sympathy strike. This was despite warnings from their 
leader Fritz Bunte that the economic conditions were unfavourable and that they 
risked punishment for breach of contract. Feelings of class solidarity and empathy 
were running high. Recommendations regarding financial support were swept aside 
by cries of 'we have no money' and 'strike'. It was claimed that 'if the comrades in 
the Saar had the right to strike, then we have the duty to support then' 35 and 'if the 
local miners do nothing for the Saarbrucker, then one would rightly complain of a 
lack of solidarity among the miners.' 36 The conviction that 'between capital and 
labour no harmony is possible' was reiterated. 37 Despite Bunte's scepticism a 
sympathy strike was announced. 38
The Christian-socials were extremely critical. Tremonia claimed 'we find it 
absolutely outrageous, that comparatively well paid workers with secure jobs should 
pick a quarrel during a time of economic decline, without knowing what they actually 
want, without exactly establishing their demands and without exhausting all other 
means for their realisation.' 39 It saw the sympathy strike as merely a cynical attempt
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by the Social Democrats to cause unrest among the miners and their families, which 
could then be turned to political purposes. The incident merely further revealed the 
need for an organisation based on a 'Christian basis' to counter the 'agitators and 
screamers' (Hetzer und Schreier). 40 The Catholic organ was also concerned that the 
strike would cost the miners the sympathy of the middle class, thereby stalling efforts 
at social reform. 41 In contrast, the Rheinisch-Westfalische Arbeiter Zeitung, a social- 
democratic organ, claimed that the workers were more than ready to accept reform, 
but it must be genuine, rather than mere window dressing. Genuine reform, however, 
could not be expected from the class state.42 As it was the strike proved to be a total 
failure and cost the Alter Verband dearly. Only 21,000 out of a total workforce of 
145,000 participated. Many of the Verband's activists were arrested and the strikers 
punished for breach of contract. 43 For the Verband's organ this merely unmasked the 
naked class struggle between capital and labour. Protestations of the inevitable victory 
of the proletariat did little however to ameliorate existing circumstances. 44 By 1894 
membership had sunk to 5,144.45
In contrast the Christian-social movement made a renewed attempt at 
organisation the following year. On 28 October 1894 the Gewerkverein christlicher 
Bergarbeiter fur den Oberbergamtsbezirk Dortmund was founded under the 
leadership of August Brust. The son of a miner, Brust was deeply rooted in the 
Catholic milieu. Following his move to Altenessen in search of work he joined the 
Catholic Knappenverein Bergmannsgluck. He used the association's library to educate 
himself and also joined the local branch of the Vinzenzverein, a Catholic charity 
organisation.46 His Catholic socialisation contributed to his vision for the 
Gewerkverein. Ideologically it was committed to maintaining 'peaceful agreement 
between employers and workers', and, like its predecessor Gliickauf, a member 
professed 'himself an opponent of social-democratic principles and aims.' In fact, 
Brust regarded the organisation as a bulwark against Social Democracy. 4 The 
Christian-social ideal of harmonic co-operation between socio-economic groups that 
lay behind the ideological position of the Gewerkverein was expressed through its 
organ, Der Bergknappe. Through the newspaper it also promoted a united stance 
against the rise of socialism. 'It is the task of all well-disposed workers, but also not 
least - and this we greatly emphasise - the task of all other well-meaning citizens 
(Burger), especially the industrialists, to see to it that socialist tendencies are ever 
more repressed and indeed that the Christian workforce is united and their unification
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protected, elevated and allowed for.' 49 The socialists were then the 'other' to be 
countered by joint action from employers and Christian miners. By 1894 the unity of 
the 1889 strike had completely vanished. The trade union movement among the Ruhr 
miners had split into two camps each armed with an effective means to disseminate 
their conflicting discourses. This served to reinforce the heterogeneity and milieux in 
the Ruhr.
While discontent fermented in the Ruhr and the trade union movement began 
to fragment, South Wales seemed in comparison a paragon of industrial peace. Her 
Majesty's Inspector of Mines for South Wales commented in 1890 that 'a noteworthy 
feature appears to be the harmony and community at large, it is sincerely to be hoped 
that this good feeling will long continue, for it would be an evil day for South Wales 
that ushered in a general and protracted struggle in the coal trade, which now exceeds 
one-ninth of that for the United Kingdom.' 50 These might have been famous last 
words for in the early 1890s cracks were to appear in the dominance of the Sliding 
Scale. However, the divisions beginning to emerge in South Wales did not run along 
religious/social-democratic fault lines. Instead, differences focused on the approach to 
industrial relations. Ideas regarding collective agreements promoted by the 
Minerworkers' Federation of Great Britain (MFGB) had begun to penetrate the 
coalfield, and were able to make headway due to growing dissatisfaction with the 
Scale since the abandonment of the minimum rate in 1880. 51 In the early 1890s the 
Monmouthshire and South Wales Miners' Association was formed under the 
leadership of William Brace, which actively criticised the Scale and advocated 
affiliation to the MFGB. In 1892 a lodge of the MFGB was established in Mabon's 
own stronghold, the Rhondda. 52
The first major challenge to the Scale came in August 1893 with an 
unexpected hauliers' strike. Michael and Richard Keen characterise the strike as a 
conflict between 'two rival unions, two union leaders and two diametrically opposed 
attitudes.' 53 The strike starkly revealed the divisions, both occupational and ethnic, 
that had lain hidden behind the apparent unity of the Scale. Occupational divisions 
were revealed by the hauliers' exclusion of other types of workers from their 
meetings. Furthermore, in an effort to protect the legitimacy of the Scale and isolate 
his opponents Mabon characterised the strikers as trouble-making English in-migrants 
and placed these in juxtaposition to the moderate, diligent, native Welsh miners. At a 
tumultuous meeting in the Rhondda on 11 August 1893 Mabon was interrupted and
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insulted by the crowd. In reply he claimed that 'such conduct was something new in a 
Welsh audience. Welshmen gave fair play (loud cheers). They had never known an 
Englishman being refused a hearing in Wales but their friend Daronwy had been 
refused a hearing on the previous day at Tonypandy.' 54 The implication was that an 
English element with foreign ideas had tainted the normally moderate Welsh miners. 
Less obliquely, Mabon issued a threat, when he claimed that 'the present strike is not 
due to Welsh colliers, but a minority of Englishmen at the collieries who have coerced 
the majority, and the owners should consider the position of these afterwards.' 55
The strike did, however, stimulate debate over the effectiveness of the Scale in 
protecting the miners' interests. Mabon, David Morgan and other older miners' 
leaders were forced to defend the Scale. At a meeting of miners at Merthyr, Mabon 
and Morgan presented their case to the miners. The presentation played upon the idea 
of the uniqueness of the Welsh coalfield. Morgan claimed that the view of the MFGB 
was 'sit down Morgans, close your eyes and accept what's good for you.' Notions of 
Welsh nationalism and pride were also pandered to. Morgan believed, for example, 
that the English leaders were actually jealous of the success of the Welsh trade and, 
therefore, sought to control it. The main concern was with bread and butter issues and 
the Welsh leaders 'could not agree with the foundations of the Federation', for the 
Welsh coalfield was primarily export rather than domestically driven. But underlying 
these economic differences were two different approaches towards industrial 
relations. Mabon argued along 'with the members who supported the Sliding Scale, 
that principle of measuring wages to the price of coal was a fair and just 
principle.. .The opposition, or the members of the Federation of Great Britain believed 
wages should control the price of coal...they differed over the question of principle 
that was an essential foundation for a common union.' This difference of principle 
also extended to industrial disputes, for Mabon argued that in Wales they sought to 
solve quarrels, whereas in England they adhered to the notion of 'paralysing trade' in 
order to force the employer to give them what they believed was right. Such an 
attitude was self-defeating as it was not concerned with the justice of a demand but 
was merely a trial of strength and all would suffer the consequences of lost trade. 56
Mabon perceived Brace's interpretation of industrial relations as having a 
more confrontational basis. By putting wages before prices the 'Federationists' were 
impinging on the employers' right to profit. Rather than both owners and miners co­ 
operating to ensure the health of the industry, as in Mabon's philosophy, in Federation
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discourse they were now in competition. By referring to these ideas as 'foreign' and 
'English', Mabon was implicitly depicting them as somehow alien to the Welsh ethos, 
which was conversely portrayed as conciliatory and co-operative. This dichotomy lay 
at the centre of his discursive defence of the Scale. Unlike the MFGB, 'the Welsh 
leaders did not believe in everything for me and the rest for my brothers. They 
believed in John Stuart Mill's saying that capital and labour should be balanced.' 57
The MFGB case in South Wales was perhaps most cogently expressed in the 
pamphlet The Miners' Evangel. Written by M. Severn, a Social Democratic 
Federation (SDF) organiser in Pontypridd and later SWMF activist, the pamphlet was 
published two years after the hauliers' strike. It is a particularly good example of the 
mixture of both socialist and Christian thought that underpinned the ideological stance 
of the MFGB towards industrial issues.
The first chapter of the tract introduced the ideas of socialism through a 
conversation between father and son. In chronicling the development of socialism, 
Severn moved effortlessly from Jesus and the disciples as the first socialists through 
St Simon to Lassalle and Marx. 58 Perhaps more importantly, and in direct contrast to 
Mabon, Severn explicitly rejected Mill's theory of wages. Instead labour was 
regarded as the sole creator of wealth. From this basic principle Severn criticised the 
Sliding Scale as wrong as it 'inculcates that miners' wages must be wholly at the 
mercy of supply and demand, and places Labour under the heel of Capital. That 
principle which is wrong, fully sets forth that miners' wages must be entirely 
governed by selling prices, instead of that selling prices of coal must be governed by 
miners' wages.' 60 As in MFGB policy, wages should come first. Dependency between 
the miner and coalowner was also rejected. 61 In fact, Severn believed that organisation 
of both the employers and employees would eventually lead to unification of both. 
However, this union involved the gradual elimination of capital for 'when labour is 
nationally organised then will labour be competent to compel the instruments of work 
not to be the monopoly of capitalists, but the common property of society.' 62
Severn, along with Brace and other Federationists, was, therefore, attacking 
the key theme within Mabon's discourse. Common interest between owners and 
miners was rejected in favour of competition over the fruits of the industry. Although 
this discourse had some similarities with that of the Alter Verband, more striking are 
the differences. For while in the Ruhr religious and Marxist conceptions of industrial 
relations remained relatively hermetically sealed, in South Wales there was a less
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doctrinaire blending of the two. This was both encouraged and reinforced by a more 
open discursive structure, while in the Ruhr boundaries between ideological currents 
were comparatively closed.
New Unionism and New Course, 1895-1909
The year 1895 represented something of a caesura for the Alter Verband. As a 
result of its failed strikes its membership had declined precipitously and it was facing 
increased competition from the Gewerkverein. The District President of Arnsberg 
reported in 1896 that 'while the social democratic association shows a decrease in 
membership, the Christian Gewerkverein has steadily and significantly increased.' 63 
The Alter Verband was dealt a further blow by the Essen perjury case (Essener 
Meineidsprozess), which resulted in the imprisonment of many of its leaders, such as 
Johann Meyer and Ludwig Schroder. 64
From 1895 the Alter Verband embarked on a period of reconstruction under 
the new leadership of Heinrich Moller. This new course also included a modification 
of the organisation's ideological standpoint. The earlier confrontational tone of the 
association was diluted and a greater emphasis placed upon working towards practical 
reform. The most prominent and, from his position as editor of the Verband organ, 
influential proponent of this new discourse was Otto Hue. Through articles and 
pamphlets Hue continually promoted the idea of neutral trade unions. The most 
cogent expression of this discourse was his booklet, Neutrale oder parteiische 
Gewerkschaften? The central theme was the exclusion of party politics and religious 
questions from the association. Through this strict adherence to purely economic 
goals, Hue hoped to provide a common basis upon which the trade union movement 
could unite. Although he repeatedly accused the Christian-socials of fanaticism, Hue 
freely admitted that earlier the Bergarbeiter Zeitung had been avowedly socialist, 
even anarchist. Therefore, he claimed that the historian 'must hold the leadership of 
the Verband newspaper responsible for some of the confusion in the organisation and 
its decline.' 65 Reconstruction, however, coupled with a deeper study of economics had 
placed the Alter Verband firmly in the bounds of neutrality. 66 To strengthen his case 
for co-operation, Hue indicated that the practical demands of the two unions were 
virtually the same. Both aimed at a decent standard of wages, an eight-hour shift 
including winding time, workers' safety inspections, workers' committees, the 
prohibition of female work and changes to the Knappschaft. 67 By focusing on the
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economic interests of the miners Hue attempted to create an identity of the miner as 
just that, rather than as a social-democratic or Christian variant.
The new emphasis on practical gains and co-operation bore some fruit in the 
late 1890s. In April 1899 the Bergknappe reported on the Alter Verband's general 
meeting in a positive manner. 'In general we must admit that, this time, the tone of 
discussion was rather quieter, the usual insults directed at our organisation were 
omitted and every effort made to deal with pure trade unionist issues.' 68 During the 
Knappschaft elections later the same year both unions stood successfully on a joint 
platform of reform. 69
Underpinning this example of co-operation was not only a change in attitude 
within Alter Verband discourse, but also a development of a more confrontational 
stance in Gewerkverein thought. The Gewerkverein aimed, in keeping with Christian- 
social thought, at constructing a co-operative and peaceful relationship with 
employers. In the eyes of the Gewerkverein leadership this distinguished it from the 
Alter Verband. The Essener Volkszeitung, another Catholic organ, deplored the fact 
that, 'one now knows that unfortunately in many areas the Christian and the 'red' 
miners are still being thrown into the same pot. This is, in our opinion, also the 
mistake of the Executive of the Mining Association. The Executive can be assured, 
that in the present case, it deals with, in the Executive of the Gewerkverein, peaceful, 
level-headed, and moderate men with whom it is not difficult to manage.' 70
The employers, however, were largely unmoved by this attempt to create a 
dichotomous relationship between the dangerous "reds" and the practical 
Gewerkverein leadership. From the beginning the employers regarded the two 
movements in much the same light and would not allow themselves to be misled 'by 
the word "Christian", which glosses over Socialism here.' 71 This attitude towards the 
Gewerkverein was made plain by the Piesberger strike of 1898 over the issue of 
Catholic holidays. Just as radical class discourse had contributed to the Alter 
Verband's support for the Saar miners five years earlier, the Gewerkverein now found 
itself compelled by its religious sentiments to come to the aid of the Piesberger 
workers, which it did through financial aid. 72 The uncompromising attitude of the 
management demonstrated to the Gewerkverein leadership the obstacles their 
conception of industrial co-operation faced. Brust commented:
The strike and its history shows us a picture of audacity and ruthlessness, 
with which certain employers seek to destroy the legally guaranteed rights
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of the workers. The idealistic property of humanity, Christian feeling and 
Christian conviction is sacrificed to the capitalist god, Mammon. On the 
one hand it is said: 'one should preserve the religion of the people', and in 
consideration of the signs of the time, 'people of Europe, protect your 
holiest interests', while on the other hand, the religious sentiment of the 
worker is destroyed through Sunday and holiday work, for the sake of the 
ever fuller moneybag.
Brust also argued that the strike showed the need for the sympathy of the middle class 
and the need for a stronger organisation.
Hue, in line with most contemporary historians, regarded the strike, as have 
more recent historians, as a stage post in the development of the Gewerkverein from a 
'non-fighting' to a strike association (Nichtkampfverein zum Streikverein). 14 
Undoubtedly, the Gewerkverein was beginning to realise that appeals to Christian 
sentiments alone were not enough to bring the employers to the table. Heinrich 
Imbusch, editor of the Gewerkverein organ, rejected the idea that the Gewerkverein 
had ever been a 'Nichtkampfverein'. 'It recognised that the employers and the 
workers have in fact parallel interests, but also that their interests not infrequently 
stand in opposition...The strike was for it the last resort...' 75 Religion, however, 
remained the centrepiece of the Gewerkverein identity, as did the desire to establish 
dialogue. Brust claimed that 'it is an important lesson, which the employers should 
draw; that it is much better to negotiate with peace-loving workers or their 
organisations, than to direct them from above.' 76
The unions were forced into closer co-operation by the 1905 strike. 77 A 
spontaneous action it began, like the 1889 strike, at an individual mine, this time the 
BruchstraBe pit, and quickly spread to other mines. Since initial attempts to contain 
the strike failed, the union leadership eventually established a 'Commission of Seven' 
to direct the movement and pooled their strike funds. 78 Sympathy also was 
forthcoming from other sections of society. The District President of Diisseldorf 
reported on 'so-called Burgerversammlungen' and noted that in Miilheim an 
evangelical priest even spoke at a social-democratic meeting. 79 This sympathy 
coupled with the disciplined conduct of the miners meant that employers' calls for the 
military were rejected, 80 and contributed to the introduction of reform. The 
subsequent mining law of 14 July 1905 abolished Nullen and introduced compulsory 
workers' committees to the mines, although the discussion of wages was expressly 
excluded from their functions. 81 Hopes for unity were maintained by the continued
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existence of the 'Commission of Seven' and the Prussian miners delegate conferences 
of 1905 and 1906.
In South Wales ideas of peaceful co-operation were also put to the test in 1898 
by a six month long strike. The causes lay in discontent over the level of wages under 
the Sliding Scale. For the owners the men were the 'aggressors'. 83 The Colliery 
Guardian commented that 'the obstinacy of the workmen in refusing to come to any 
terms that the coalowners can possibly accept with any pretensions to self-respect, 
and without entirely giving away the control of their own collieries - always a very 
prominent feature of strikes in Wales - was never more exemplified than on the 
present occasion.' In this atmosphere of mutual antagonism Mabon's language of 
co-operation seemed untenable. Furthermore, the refusal of the strikers to grant 
Mabon and his colleagues plenary powers to negotiate a settlement suggested that his 
perspective on industrial relations had lost currency among the workers. In fact some 
of Mabon's peers had become convinced of the need for a new form of organisation, 
among them David Morgan. Signs of his conversion came as early as 1894 when he 
co-operated with Brace in the Society of Colliery Workmen of the South Wales
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Coalfield. Morgan became more critical of the notion of a co-operative relationship 
between different classes in society, suggesting that others supported the Scale to the 
detriment of the miners. The 'landowners, colliery owners and managers, 
shopkeepers, publicans and 75 percent of the preachers wished to keep the Sliding 
Scale for the sake of peace, but had it brought peace to the workmen in the past? 
(Cries of No, no!).' 86
Mabon recognised that there was a new feeling abroad among the men, 
although he still tried to draw a distinction between the natives and the 'foreigners'. 
At Penygraig he claimed 'a new generation had arisen, and strangers had come among 
them prejudiced against it (the Scale).' 87 But the experience of defeat convinced 
Mabon himself of the need for a new organisation. The loss of Mabon's Day, which 
the employers regarded as a 'valuable point', 88 represented a symbolic defeat for his 
discourse. He wrote that:
the settlement is, to my mind, the most unsatisfactory one that has ever 
been concluded in the district. I don't mean in its intrinsic monetary value, 
but it fails in the one essential thing for this district - it will not bring the 
peace necessary for this district to bring it to its full state of prosperity. It 
is not based on either justice or goodwill. It fails in this important element 
because the employers insisted upon demanding their 'pound of flesh.'
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Let down by his 'partners', Mabon accepted the 'foreign' principles and became the 
first president of the SWMF, while his erstwhile opponent Brace became vice- 
president.
Mabon's abandonment of his attempts to 'other' the 'English' element was a 
large step. Undoubtedly, on one level, Mabon simply sensed the way the wind was 
blowing and adapted accordingly in an effort to protect his position. More subtly, 
however, the viability of his initial strategy was limited owing to the extent of in- 
migration into South Wales. As noted in the preceding chapter, English migrants to 
South Wales were comparatively easily assimilated into the mining communities and 
consequently influenced their development. Unlike the Ruhr, where milieux and trade 
union discourse were mutually reinforcing, the more cohesive structure of the South 
Wales mining communities made it difficult to construct a specific identity based on 
ethnicity or religion through discourse. South Wales was certainly not free from 
ethnic tensions, but they were less divisive than in the Ruhr. Mabon himself 
represents this more successful assimilation. Well known for his ability to quell angry 
crowds through Welsh hymns, he was also just as eloquent in English. On the other 
hand, few of the leading officials in the Gewerkverein and Alter Verband were able to 
speak Polish. Finally, the duration of the strike and the intransigent attitude of the 
owners emphasised differences between workers and employers. Ultimately, it was 
the idea of the 'miner' and his relationship to the owners that took precedence over 
any perceived cultural differences. Whereas trade union discourse in the Ruhr 
remained milieu-fixated, in South Wales it sought to represent the whole community 
of miners.
During the late 1890s and early 1900s there seemed, therefore, to be a 
convergence of the various discourses on trade unionism in South Wales and the 
Ruhr. However, while the SWMF successfully united both the supporters of the 
Sliding Scale and the MFGB, co-operation between the Alter Verband and the 
Gewerkverein remained the exception rather than the norm. Periods of joint action 
were invariably followed by a break down in relations and more intense efforts to 
distinguish one from the other through discourse. This conflict reached a high point 
during the 1904 Knappschaft elections. The Alter Verband made its bid for 
representation of the 'free' miners by terming the Gewerkverein a 
Zechengewerkverein, effectively a yellow union. The slogan was 'down with the 
friends of management and their helpers.' Furthermore the Alter Verband argued that
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it now represented the old Christian-social demands (i.e. reform of the 
Knappschaft). 90 A booklet on the Knappschaft elections published six years later 
recalled the 1904 elections as 'a decisive turning point in the struggle of the miners 
over their Knappschaft rights. The field of battle was cleared, there was no longer 
three parties on the Knappschaft, but only two: the real opposition under the 
leadership of the [Alter] Verband and the mines' party under the leadership of 
Brust.' 91 The Gewerkverein, meanwhile, focused on the links between the Alter 
Verband and the SPD, a task made easier by Hue's election to the Reichstag as a SPD 
deputy for Bochum in 1903. 92 Their counter-slogan was 'down with the Social 
Democrats across the board.' They claimed the election of Alter Verband candidates 
would merely make the employers more 'obstinate' with regards to reform (i.e. of the 
Knappschaft). 93 Similarly, while there was agreement on most issues at the first 
delegate conference of Prussian miners in 1905, at the second the following year 
political differences between Alter Verband and Gewerkverein representatives began 
to surface. The unions were focused on the same goal, but approached it from 
different directions predicated on their own ideological reading of industrial relations, 
which underpinned their discursive practices.
In 1902 the establishment of a Polish organisation, the Zjednoczenie 
Zawodowe Polskie (ZZP), further fragmented the trade union movement in the Ruhr. 
Both the Alter Verband and the Gewerkverein attempted to organise the Polish 
immigrants, which by the 1900s made up a significant proportion of the mining 
workforce. However, the Poles believed that their interests received inadequate 
attention from the existing trade unions. The Gewerkverein, for example, resisted 
pressure to produce Polish language literature until 1902. The Alter Verband, due to 
its more internationalist outlook, was less adverse to such methods, but it also 
exhibited a patronising attitude towards the Polish migrants. In 1899 a strike occurred 
in Herne accompanied by violence and rioting. The main protagonists were young, 
migrant workers. 95 Commenting on the strike, Otto Hue referred to the migrants as a 
'flood-tide of refuse'. 96 The Alter Verband organ portrayed them as the unwitting 
defence troops of capitalism, while at the same time claiming them as the brothers of 
the German workers. 97 Furthermore, both trade unions supported the Mining 
Language Ordinance of 1899, which effectively restricted immigrants access to higher 
positions in the mine. The Gewerkverein position on the ordinance was that the Poles
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'will have to accommodate themselves to existing conditions, whether they want to or
+ >98not.
Such attitudes underpinned the decision to form a separate Polish union. The 
initial call to organisation came from Wiarus Polski. The call to organisation played 
upon the issue of nationalism, requesting Poles not to join any German associations 
for fear of Germanisation." The union formed part of the Polish subculture in the 
Ruhr as much as the Gewerkverein formed part of the Catholic one. 100 Its statutes 
excluded religious questions and social-democratic agitation. 101 Its activists claimed 
that 'the Poles in foreign parts also have the duty to organise. Everyone should 
affiliate to the union organisation and not let themselves be misled by the old Social- 
democratic association. You can neither join the Christian Gewerkverein. The Polish 
working class can not belong to such unions, which cannot tolerate each other and 
conduct a mutual war'. 102 A former leader, Mankowski, recalled that 'when we left 
our fatherland we took two great pearls with us, the language and the beliefs of the 
fathers.' These pearls were endangered by both the socialist and religious trade unions 
both of which 'would like to draw the Polish worker in - not to protect them, but to 
take their money and to tear out from them the ideas of the fathers. That was the 
essential inducement to the foundation of our trade union organisation.' 103 Another 
competing identity had emerged to challenge those of the Alter Verband and the 
Gewerkverein. Unlike the latter it was predicated on a distinct Polish nationalism, 
rather than on a political or religious ideology.
John Kulczycki, however, argues that focus upon the role of the paper and its 
editor, Jan Brejski, in the formation of the ZZP emphasises its nationalist tendencies 
at the expense of its class character. 104 Certainly, the ZZP soon began to develop a 
more confrontational identity. Imbusch darkly warned after the 1912 strike, in which 
the ZZP co-operated with the Alter Verband, that 'only the inflamed nationalism 
holds them apart. As soon as the nationalist tension eases, they will fall inescapably 
into the arms of the Social Democrats...The Polish association and also the Polish 
Party stand at a turning point. That has again been shown by the strike. Either they 
will turn back, or they will go under the red flood in the Ruhr.' 105
The solidarity the 1905 strike generated between the Alter Verband and the 
Gewerkverein proved short-lived. Soon after the strike Heinrich Imbusch warned the 
miners 'against Social Democrats, since they only wanted to spread hate among the 
masses.' He also focused on the co-operative element in Gewerkverein discourse,
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claiming that, 'had the Social Democrats had the upper hand in the strike, the 
Government would not have conceded anything and the middle classes (Burger) 
would not have stood on the workers' side.' 106 The Gewerkverein also called a closed 
meeting to impress upon its members that 'they belong to a separate trade union and 
should not allow themselves to be influenced by members of other organisations 
under the cloak of unity.' 107
The Alter Verband also sought to distinguish itself from the Gewerkverein by 
emphasising its oppositional role vis-a-vis the employers. The Bergarbeiter Zeitung 
happily reported Emil Kirdorff s statement, 'I do not recognise the Christian trade 
unions as representatives of the workers, I do not negotiate with them.' However, to 
his claim that the Christian unions were more dangerous than the Social Democrats, 
the paper retorted that 'obviously Herr Kirdorff does not mean to say the Christian 
trade union endanger the employers' profit. We have often seen that management and 
Gewerkverein candidates go hand in hand against the Verband's candidates during the 
Knappschaft, mining courts and similar elections...From this it is apparent which 
organisation the owners actually consider more dangerous.' This attempt to maintain 
the integrity of its identity as the sole opponent of the employers was coupled with an 
explanation of the differing interpretations of industrial relations. The Alter Verband, 
it was claimed, did not hold the employers personally responsible for social problems, 
as did the Gewerkverein. Rather they saw them as the effect of a false system
1 OR(verkehrtes System).
That their doctrinaire ideological viewpoints were the obstacles to co­ 
operation was fully recognised by the unions themselves. The leadership of the 
Gewerkverein claimed that the organisation had, since its founding, struggled 'not 
only against the employers but also against the Social Democrats and their trade union 
movement, especially the social-democratic miners' association. This struggle 
between the two orientations corresponds not so much to actual economic goals, than 
the difference of ideology which each represent.' 109 For Imbusch amalgamation of the 
unions was impossible as the Alter Verband stood on a materialistic basis, the 
Gewerkverein on a religious one. 11
Despite Hue's emphasis on neutrality and reform, his conception of industrial 
relations was still framed in Marxist terms, the very materialism that Imbusch was so 
critical of. He saw it as a natural consequence of the capitalist system that two 
antagonistic classes would emerge," 1 and ridiculed the idea of common interest
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predicated on Christian feeling. 112 In this respect, Hue's discourse failed to transcend 
that of the earlier editions of the Bergarbeiter Zeitung. Furthermore, Hue had a blind 
spot concerning the role that religion played within Gewerkverein ideology. He was 
deeply critical of the capacity of religion to provide solutions to social problems. 113 
Religion, however, was the keystone of Gewerkverein thinking. Georg Werner, 
during his attempt to establish a fireman's union (Steigerverband), participated in 
classes held by the Christian union. 'In this way I got to know the religious bonds and 
reasons, which formed the basis of the.. .Christian trade union movement.'' 14
The importance of trade union classes and other organisational factors should 
not be overlooked. The Alter Verband introduced courses on opposition trade unions, 
in which the Gewerkverein was listed alongside the company unions. 115 Although 
figures are not available for other areas, and bearing in mind the economic incentive 
of strike pay, in Recklinghausen at least it seemed that the Gewerkverein did have 
cause to worry after the 1905 strike. During the strike the local membership of the 
Alter Verband increased from 250 to 1000, while that of the Gewerkverein had 
stagnated at around 400. Similarly, out of 29 meetings between 14 January and 4 
February, 45 speakers had been Social Democrats compared to 14 Christian- 
socialists. 116 No doubt fears of being overwhelmed by the Alter Verband spurred the 
Gewerkverein to remind its members of their obligations to its own association. The 
Gewerkverein was placed in the difficult position of avoiding the label of being a 
yellow union, while at the same time maintaining its independence from the Alter 
Verband. 117
The specific form of trade union organisation also contributed to the Ruhr 
unions' inability to overcome their ideological rivalry. The basic unit of organisation, 
the Zahlstelle, was based in the residential districts and members could come from up 
to 40 different mines. 118 Both the Gewerkverein and the Alter Verband were also 
committed to becoming centralised organisations early on. 119 An increasing 
bureaucratisation paralleled this centralisation. The number of Alter Verband officials 
rose from four in 1894 to 94 by 1914. 120 The individual Zahlstellen were given little 
latitude and the need to educate the members in trade union practices was constantly 
reiterated. 121 The SWMF, on the other hand, was a federal organisation and proposals 
for centralisation were resisted. 122 This allowed the districts a great degree of freedom 
and provided a fertile ground for the development of new ideas. Furthermore, the pit 
lodge system based organisation around individual pits, placing activists in a better
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position to exert pressure on non-unionists. One means was the show-card day. This 
method clearly identified non-unionists to their organised colleagues in the mines, 
although the former could even be visited at home. 123 Within both the workplace and 
the community then pressure could be placed upon individuals to join the union. The 
siting of the Zahlstelle in the residential districts, on the other hand, strengthened ties 
to the individual milieux, be they Catholic, Polish or Social Democratic. They became 
strands in the dense web that made up those milieux. In South Wales the 
concentration of organisation on the workplace helped strengthen the SWMF's claim 
to be representing the miners as a whole, rather than a particular religious or ethnic 
group. It was therefore possible to forge a more direct and organic link between 
workplace and organisational solidarity.
The position of checkweigher in South Wales also provided a natural point of 
leadership for a workforce. Directly elected by the workforce and paid for from their 
wages, the checkweigher was, at least in theory, largely independent from managerial 
control. The importance of this office was fully recognised by employers. 124 The 
manager of Locket's Merthyr Collieries reported approvingly of one checkweigher, 
'he is not a...demagogue or busybody'. Later he deplored the election of T. Isaac 
Jones to the No. 3 pit because he was 'an ex-student of Ruskin College, Oxford - a 
great opponent of Mabon; a gentleman who, I fear, will cause considerable uneasiness 
amongst the men and annoyance to the company and its officers.' 125 The mines of the 
Ruhr lacked an equivalent position. Admittedly, the workers' committees and elected 
safetymen (Grubenkontolleure), introduced in 1905 and 1909 respectively, could have 
provided an organisational focus. 126 Initially, however, the Alter Verband was critical 
of both. In fact, the Alter Verband boycotted the first committee elections, 
complaining that they had no power to discuss wages. Later it participated on the 
committees, although doubts about their effectiveness as a means of representing the 
worker's interests remained. Only a strong union organisation could make them truly 
effective. 127 Furthermore, the office of safetyman was criticised as mere palliative 
(weisse Salbe), subject to pressure from the management to find 'everything in 
order.' 128 The Gewerkverein, on the other hand, approached them more positively. 
The safetymen were regarded as a genuine 'step forward to the improvement of 
miners' protection' rather than weisse Salbe. ]29 While aware of the limitations of the 
committees and the fact that employers regarded them 'with mistrust, if not 
bitterness', the Gewerkverein hoped that they would provide a basis for better
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relations. 'The lost feeling will be re-established. The workers and the employers will 
again get to know and understand each other. Then the employers will have to realise 
that the workers are better and more moderate than they have until now imagined and 
the workers will come to see that the owners are not so consistently unreasonable 
(grundschlechf) as they often believe...The result is a mitigation of class antagonism'. 
It was precisely because of this that the Social Democrats were said to oppose the 
committees. 130 For the Alter Verband the committees and safetymen were merely 
decoration that left intact the power of the owners, while for the Gewerkverein they 
were the potential means of establishing a co-operative relationship between the 
workers and the employers.
Ultimately, rather than providing foci for mine-based organisation the 
committee and safetymen elections became another level of competition between the 
trade unions. The Alter Verband claimed that only the election of its members could 
prevent the safetymen from becoming weisse Salbe ni It even produced a booklet 
instructing the safetymen of their duties. It was hoped that through inspections they 
could influence wages. 132 The Bergamter also received complaints of preferential 
treatment meted out by safetymen of one union to fellow members. 133 Interest in this 
position soon began to wane however, as it carried the double risk of both ostracism 
from their colleagues and pressure from management. 134 Furthermore, the two unions' 
attitude towards the works' councils and safetymen were directly linked to their 
discursive interpretations of industrial relations. While the Alter Verband eventually 
came to see these offices as a chance to exert some form of influence on the 
management of the mines, the Gewerkverein regarded them as a step towards genuine 
co-operation between miners and owners. While the first union hoped to use them in a 
combative manner, the latter believed they could be used to encourage dialogue. 
Unsurprisingly, during the works committee elections each union took the opportunity 
to campaign for its own members and denigrate its opponents.
Organisational differences alone, however, cannot account for the differences 
between the two trade union movements. Ultimately, the discursive identity created 
by the SWMF proved more flexible than that constructed by the unions in the Ruhr. 
This flexibility was evident from its very inception. By giving the presidency and 
vice-presidency to 'Mabon, as the most successful of the older regime of leadership, 
and... to Mr Brace, the leader of the Federation campaign,' 136 the miners were not so 
much breaking with the past as signifying the coexistence of different identities within
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the organisation. Mabon himself continued to describe himself as a 'conciliatory'
1 "\*1
spirit, but his religious metaphors were now employed in the service of the SWMF. 
Fears that the Revival which swept South Wales in 1904 would damage the SWMF, 
were refuted by Mabon, who claimed:
that the men that are as a rule prepared to stand out for labour rights are 
the men in our churches who stand out for religious rights...godly men - 
good men - are convinced that although God in a sense provides for all, 
that ungodly men take more than their fair share of what He has provided, 
and we believe that God Himself really blesses those who provide for 
themselves...we [must] have good and godly men as mainstays to our 
organisation.
Through his study of strike statistics, Deian Hopkin has identified an increasing 
militancy among the South Wales miners from 1898, 139 and this was reflected by the 
development of a harder edge to Mabon's language. Co-operation might have 
remained his preferred policy, but the intransigent attitude of the owners during the 
1898 had also convinced him of the need for force. During agitation for the Eight 
Hours Bill Mabon claimed that 'we (the miners) can appeal, if necessary, to our 
Father, Who is in Heaven, to defend the right, and we ask you, the public, to defend 
His children while they are seeking this measure of right and justice.' Meanwhile, 
Brace struck a more prosaic, yet nonetheless confrontational tone.
Now that we have carried this agitation to this point, we are not going to 
allow the enormous power of vested interest to drive us back. If the 
coalowners of Britain, backed by interested consumers who do not 
recognise that, after all, underlying this great reform there is a great 
principle of high humanity - if they allow us to be defeated on this 
occasion, so far as I am concerned - and I think I am speaking on behalf of 
my colleagues - we shall dedicate no more portion of out time to get it 
from Parliament, but we shall be parties in using the power of our great 
combination (loud cheers) to force the recognition of this much too long 
delayed reform. 140
Both religiosity and humanism acted as a justification for the Eight Hours' Act, even 
to the point of a strike, although the union did not resort to industrial action. This 
double legitimacy provided it with the widest possible appeal. In the Ruhr, on the 
other hand, the unions were based on ideological 'crystallisation points'. Each 
crystallisation point, be it Christian-socialism, social democracy or ethnicity, was 
linked to specific milieux or sub-cultures. Since membership of these milieux was 
generally mutually exclusive (i.e. membership of one precluded membership of 
another), it was difficult for trade union activists to combine different discourses. By
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adopting a certain discourse they were seeking to mobilise a specific group of miners. 
Unions in the Ruhr focused on the Christian, or Polish, or social-democratic miner. To 
blend discourses risked alienating their original members and the unions attempted to 
impose harmony in their organisations by restricting pluralistic debate. Therefore, in 
terms of discourse, it became a case of one or the other. Meanwhile, the lack of rival 
milieux in South Wales meant that activists could attempt to unite various discourses 
without fear of potentially alienating a significant section of the workforce. The 
leadership's acceptance of pluralistic debate allowed the creation of a more inclusive, 
elastic discourse that sought to represent the miners as a whole.
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Syndicalists and Anarchists, 1909-1914
Towards the end of the first decade of the twentieth century syndicalist 
thought began to make an impact on the industrial policy of the union movement in 
both the Ruhr and in South Wales. Contemporaries regarded strikes around 1910/11 
in both regions as influenced, if not caused by, syndicalist ideas. Syndicalist 
influences and currents have been identified within both the British and German 
labour movement from the 1890s. 141 The precise role that syndicalists and their ideas 
played in industrial relations is, however, notoriously difficult to pin down. In 
Germany the movement had a more concrete organisational base in the Freie
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Vereinigung deutscher Gewerkschaften (Free Association of German Trade Unions, 
FVdG), which explicitly adopted the general strike doctrine in the 1904, 142 around 
about the same time the mass strike debate was involving the social-democratic 
movement. 14 Syndicalism's role in Britain is comparatively more nebulous and 
undefined. Although syndicalist bodies were certainly formed, for example the 
Industrial Syndicalist Educational League, they tended to exercise influence through 
the existing trade union structures rather than acting as an organisational challenge. 144 
That they were able to do so again illustrates the comparative elasticity of trade union 
discourse in Britain.
These national patterns were replicated in both South Wales and the Ruhr. The 
Cambrian Combine dispute formed the background to the emergence of the Unofficial 
Reform Committee (URC), a loose body of individuals representing different political 
and industrial ideologies. 145 Significantly the URC was not an organisational 
alternative to the SWMF, but rather a platform for reform. At its earliest meetings 
older members of the SWMF such as Vernon Hartshorn and James Winstone were 
present. 146 Furthermore, William F. Hay, one of the staunchest syndicalists, advised 
men at several Rliondda collieries who had ceded from the SWMF due to discontent 
over the 1910 Conciliation Agreement to rejoin the organisation, while at the same 
time acknowledging that it could be criticised. 147 On the other hand, the Freie 
Vereinigung der Bergarbeiter (FVB), founded in 1910, was an independent trade 
union with its own statutes. It was also affiliated to the FVdG and subscribed to its 
organ, Die Einigkeit. As such it represented an alternative to the Alter Verband and 
Gewerkverein, albeit a numerically unimportant one. 148
In South Wales the issue at stake in 1911 was the minimum wage rate. 
Marxist, syndicalist and industrial unionist thought influenced many graduates of 
Ruskin College, and later the Central Labour College (CLC). Upon their return to the 
valleys they sought to spread these ideas through evening classes on industrial history 
and economics. 149 Charlie Gibbons, a protege of Noah Ablett, wrote of his time at the 
CLC, 'I was taught...that the interests of the workers are absolutely opposed to the 
interests of the employers...[and] a fight must be waged until the employers are 
eventually wiped out.' 150 While the older MFGB supporters had placed the workers 
and owners into competition, they did not necessarily foresee the actually elimination 
of the employers. The URC went a step further in challenging not only the employers'
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share of profit, but also their control of the workplace and of the industry as a 
whole. 151
In the Ruhr syndicalist and anarchist traditions more decisively influenced the 
left-radical (linksradikal) current. Marxist discourse was still monopolised by the 
Alter Verband and the SPD, although there were affinities between left-wing 
supporters of the mass strike and the anarchosyndicalists. Unlike the URC, the FVdG 
rejected politics, although not individual membership of parties, in favour of the 
economic struggle conducted through the general strike, direct action, sabotage and 
passive resistance. 152 Also, while the Welsh syndicalists and industrial unionists 
sought a centralisation of the SWMF to make it more effective, the 
anarchosyndicalists of the Ruhr actually advocated a move away from central to local 
organisations.
Despite these organisational and ideological differences the critique of the 
existing trade union movement shared certain affinities. Chief among these was the 
lack of fighting spirit. Hay and Ablett stressed the divisive effects of differing 
minimum rates upon the workers' movement. They stressed that any minimum rate 
was the common goal of all grades of workers in the mines. This underlying theme of 
unity was then bound up with recurrent metaphors of struggle.
Remember, in this work, all petty pride and prejudice has to be dropped. It 
is a case of each for all, and all for each. The collier or hewer, the 
timberman, putter, labourer, etc. have all tQ fight for it...Let us go into 
battle, then, united at last in one common demand, with one unifying 
demand, with all the solidarity which that common cause can give. Or 
demand one, our members as one, our fight as good as won, since we are 
united. 153
The Miners' Next Step was effectively a blueprint to transform the SWMF into a more 
effective fighting organisation. The 'old policy of identity of interest between 
employers and ourselves be abolished, and a policy of open hostility installed,' 154 
predicated on the recognition of 'the war of interest between workers and 
employers.' 155 Similarly, the FVB claimed that the true policy of the unions should be 
'Struggle, struggle! Inexorable struggle in all its forms must be the slogan. To prepare 
for large economic conflict and to enforce it at the given time, that is the purpose of 
the workers' organisations.' The policy of the central trade unions was criticised as 
being too conciliatory and cautious. In contrast to the FVB emphasis on conflict, 
Sachse, the then leader of the Alter Verband, was quoted as seeing the purpose of the
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unions as to 'avoid large economic trouble.' 156 The FVB complained that every time 
the decisive moment for action drew near a central executive appeared to beat it 
down. 157 In both cases the notion of the class war was more explicitly drawn and the 
miners placed in the vanguard of that conflict, seeking the destruction of the existing 
economic system and the establishment of workers' control of the mining industry.
Linked to this more confrontational approach was a critique of the inertia of 
the existing trade union executives. FVB focused on 'mismanagement, despotism, 
autocracy and bureaucracy in the present day central associations.' It argued that the 
development of the trade union movement showed that it could never lead to the 
freedom of the workers, but 'leads them from the servitude of capital into the 
servitude of the central association and [SPD] party popes.' 158 The Miners' Next Step, 
while admitting that leadership had its good points, also attacked the tendency for 
power to be removed from the rank and file workforce and concentrated in the hands 
of executive members. Furthermore leaders hindered the emergence of solidarity 
based on interests common to all, 159 a prerequisite for the success of the trade unions. 
Mainwaring launched a scathing attack on trade union policy through the recently 
created working-class organ The Rhondda Socialist.
We thus see our desired end in an Organisation of the Working Class, 
which will be strong to fight. So strong, that the opposing Capitalists will 
be driven to see the futility of fighting. Let it be remembered that the 
Capitalists fights to-day, not because he loves fighting; far from it, but 
fight he must if he wished to maintain his profits. Hence his desire for 
Conciliation, because he always hopes to show the Labour Leader - that 
epitome of ineptitude - that he cannot afford to pay a wage on which a 
man can live. One could never frame a more scathing indictment of 
Conciliation than that of a Brace, whining for a peep at the balance-sheets 
of the employers, in order to salve his conscience for being a party to 
accepting starvation wages on behalf of those whose interests he is so well 
paid to defend. No! An Organisation which exists to continually 
accommodate its members stomachs to its opponents' pass-book can 
never serve as the medium for Labour's final emancipation! Yet it is the 
property of its members! As such they should seize it! Renovate it! 
Transform it! Shape it into a weapon to wrest control of Industry from the 
Capitalist, later to afford a medium for administering the Industry by the 
Workers themselves. In a word, to make of it an Industrial Union, with the 
definite objective of establishing Industrial Democracy!
Although both syndicalist movements remained small, they did have an effect 
upon the trade unions. Admittedly, the URC plans to reform the SWMF were rejected 
by a ballot vote. 161 However, the election of three socialist (but not syndicalist)
83
leaders to the executive and the replacement of Mabon by the coalfield firebrand C. B. 
Stanton on the executive committee of the International Miners' Federation indicated 
that the miners were certainly willing to countenance a more confrontational policy 
than hitherto pursued. 162 Mabon himself believed that his 'policy - the policy of 
conciliation and arbitration failing conciliation - a policy that I have lived for forty 
years to carry out, and also to serve to the best of my ability in the interest of my 
fellow-workmen - has been rejected unmistakably.' 163 Furthermore, the issue of the 
minimum wage was taken up by the MFGB. Although the Minimum Wage Act 
hastily passed by the Government left many unsatisfied, in comparison to the action 
of the same year in the Ruhr, the 1912 national coal strike can be regarded as at least a 
partial success. 164 The strike also revealed the potential pressure that could be brought 
to bear on the Government by united action by the miners, something that was to be 
of significance during the Great War. Although debate on policy could degenerate 
into personal recriminations, it is significant within terms of the comparison that 
ideological differences did not split the SWMF. Vernon Hartshorn argued that it was 
natural that different policies should emerge. The SWMF should show toleration and 
that only very compelling reasons could justify an attempt to remove an official from 
his post. 165 Therefore, the more radical discourse of URC filtered into that of the 
SWMF. Rather than standing in direct opposition, this discourse worked from within 
to modify existing discursive practices, making them more combative, but not 
replacing them in entirety.
In the Ruhr, the Alter Verband was fiercely critical of the anarchosyndicalists 
claiming that a return to local organisation would be playing into the employers' 
hands by weakening the power of the miners. Only highly organised miners could 
counter highly organised employers. 'Whoever wants to help the workers must advise 
the organisation, which alone can line up against the employers, that is the large, 
stalwart, well disciplined central association.' 166 Although both movements saw 
themselves as engaged in a class struggle, the manner in which it was to be conducted 
and the role the individual miner was to play was essentially different. While the FVB 
saw the miner as the potential perpetrator of direct action, the Alter Verband discourse 
idealised him as the disciplined foot-solider of the organisation.
Despite their small numbers, Briiggemeier argues that the 
anarchosyndicalists contributed to pushing the Alter Verband into the wage 
movement that underpinned the 1912 Dreibundestreik^1 Unlike the 1889 and 1905
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strikes this was a planned action. However, it was fatally crippled by the refusal of the 
Gewerkverein to participate. Out of three areas, Essen, Bochum and Dortmund, only 
in the latter did a majority of the workers strike.
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Relations between the strikers and those who continued to work were
1 A8strained, further souring the trade union discourses. Accusations of strike breaking 
were countered by claims it was a duty not to strike. 169 The Gewerkverein action was 
predicated on their more conciliatory identity. It pointed out that the owners were 
already considering a wage increase and there was, therefore, no need to provoke a 
dispute, which could only end in a struggle. Instead it was better to wait for the 
employers response and use this as a basis for co-operation. Provocation could only 
serve to alienate the public. 170 This peaceful stance was contrasted with the conduct of 
the Alter Verband, which demonstrated its desire for a struggle under any 
circumstances. 171 The strike was also portrayed as essentially politically motivated 
and designed to destroy the Gewerkverein. 172 The common interest of the German 
miners and owners in the health of the industry also meant that the British strike 
offered the opportunity to improve Germany's competitive edge in the world 
markets. 173
The Alter Verband, on the other hand, argued that the time had never been so 
favourably for a strike. They argued that the owners had enjoyed increased profits 
from rising prices for some time, but that this had not filtered down to the workers. 
Through their 'ruthless profit policy' the owners had upset both consumers and 
workers. The employers' assurance that the miners would participate in the upswing 
in the industry was condemned in that it did not offset the wages already lost. 'The 
workers would be fools if they were content with that.' 174 Meanwhile Imbusch's 
notion that the British strike should be exploited in the interests of German economic 
interests was fiercely condemned. 'Therefore these "workers" representatives' stood 
for the interest of German capital and wanted to strike at the interests of the English 
comrades. With justification, therefore, has the organ of the yellow [unions] written.
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that the principles of the Christian Gewerkverein during the strike movement were 
completely yellow sentiments, completely yellow principles.' 175
In the case of both unions their discursive practices acted as the basis of 
legitimacy for action. Since the Gewerkverein regarded the employers' and workers' 
interests as generally the same they were content with a statement that a wage 
increase would be forthcoming if the economic conditions allowed. This notion also 
lay behind Imbusch's attitude towards the British strike. The Alter Verband view that 
the two sides were necessarily in competition meant, on the other hand, that such 
assurances of increases were merely window dressing, designed to distract the miners 
from the huge profits the owners had already made. Finally, while supporting the 
British miners was not a primary motive behind the Ruhr strike, inter-linked notions 
of class identity and the international war against capitalism hardened the Alter 
Verband attitude towards the employers. Moreover, this more combative attitude 
provided a means of differentiating the Alter Verband from the Gewerkverein.
The influence of syndicalist ideas upon the trade union movements in both 
regions differed substantially. Both British and German syndicalist critiques focused 
on similar aspects on trade unionism, such as bureaucratisation. Both also sought to 
propagate a more confrontational identity to mobilise the miners. However, the 
former seems to have been more integrated into the existing movement. Discursive 
differences did not lead to organisational separation. The URC members did not 
advocate a new organisation, but reform of the existing association. As such they 
exerted pressure from within. The anarchosyndicalists of the Ruhr, on the other hand, 
formed their own organisations and pressurised the Alter Verband from without. 
Undoubtedly, this was partly a consequence of the relative strength of the unions at 
the time. However, the Welsh syndicalists, like the SWMF generally, were also firmly 
rooted in the comparatively broader and more cohesive culture of the communities 
they inhabited. On the other hand, in the Ruhr trade union discourse was closely 
connected to a particular milieux or sub-culture. The trade unions sought to mobilise 
these milieux through their discourse, while at the same time making clear 
distinctions between themselves and their rivals. As a consequence of this desire for 
clear self-identification, trade union discourse tended to be more inflexible in the 
Ruhr than South Wales.
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Summary
This chapter has tried to how the discursive identities created by the trade 
unionists in South Wales and the Ruhr differed. It is clear that the three discourses 
highlighted here (Christian-socialism, socialism or social democracy, and 
syndicalism) were in different relationships in the two regions. In South Wales the 
SWMF was able to combine these three strands to create a more inclusive identity. In 
the Ruhr, on the other hand, each discourse was the preserve of a different union. And 
each union sought to distinguish its discourse by placing it in juxtaposition with the 
others. The result was more exclusive identities that were defined by what they were 
not as much as by what they were.
In part this was due to the nature of the civil societies in which the trade 
unions operated. As noted in the preceding chapter, there was a 'pillarisation' of civil 
society in the Ruhr into several milieux. The trade unions were an integral part of this 
segmented civil society in which group membership was mutually exclusive. The 
Gewerkverein, with its provision that members openly accept Christianity and reject 
social democracy, represented a particularly extreme example of how multiple and 
overlapping memberships were regarded with hostility. Such an assertion naturally 
limited the number of miners that the Gewerkverein could hope to organise. It also 
meant that the Gewerkverein was unable to utilise aspects of social-democratic 
discourse to forge its own identity. Indeed, the Gewerkverein was careful to 
distinguish its Christian-socialist ethos from social democracy. It therefore contrasted 
its desire for peaceful co-operation between workers and employers with the Alter 
Verband's idea that industrial relations essentially represented a conflict of interests. 
Similarly, Hue's conviction that religion was, at best, irrelevant to industrial relations 
meant that he could not create an identity that encompassed Christian-socialism. He 
was unable to understand the extent to which religion was the foundation stone of the 
Gewerkverein. In any case to attempt to use Christian thought risked alienating the 
committed Social Democrats that formed the core of its membership. In order to 
legitimise its claim to be the only true miners' union the Alter Verband repeatedly 
characterised the Gewerkverein as a 'yellow' union. In their different ways the leaders 
of both organisations consistently sought through their rhetoric to differentiate 
themselves from their rivals, while the centralised structure facilitated the executives 
imposition of an accepted viewpoint. Thus, although the unions claimed to be
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speaking for the miners as a whole, each was in effect presenting an identity that 
upheld a certain constituency, a 'particularist' ideal of the miner; the one Christian, 
the other social democratic. Occasionally, a truce would be called, as during some of 
the Knappschaft elections, or co-operation would be forced on the unions by 
spontaneous industrial action, as in 1905. Significantly, however, these incidences 
encouraged joint action rather than amalgamation. In fact, the mere hint that one or 
other of the unions was threatened with losing its distinctive identity led to a renewal 
of their rivalry. It was such fears that galvanised Imbusch to pen his pamphlet 
rejecting amalgamation in 1906.
South Wales, on the other hand, suffered comparatively little in terms of 
religious or ethnic tensions. The mining communities were not divided into various 
milieux, consolidated by state pressure and hostile to membership of other groups. 
The result was a more fluid civil society. Admittedly, Mabon had attempted to 
generate tensions between the native Welsh miners and the in-migrant English in the 
early 1890s to safeguard the Sliding Scale. But this attempt lacked the same resonance 
which Christian-socialism and social democracy had with subcultures in the Ruhr, 
while the six-month strike revealed the weaknesses inherent in such a course. Instead, 
pluralist discourse was accepted, if not always welcomed, within the miners' 
movement. For Hartshorn it was only natural that policy differences should emerge 
within a large organisation. This toleration of pluralism allowed the accommodation 
of different ideologies and enabled the SWMF to dominate miners' organisation in 
South Wales. Religiously inclined miners, socialist miners and committed syndicalists 
could all find their own niche with the SWMF's discourse. Furthermore, the federal 
and pit-based organisation of the trade union helped it to portray itself as the 
representative of all miners, irrespective of religious beliefs or ethnic origin and 
allowed space for the continued existence of local differences within an overarching 
framework. The SWMF amalgamated various elements all committed to the shared 
goal of improving the miners' lot. Tensions between the different ideologies certainly 
existed and were played out in the press, often becoming personal in nature. But these 
did not lead to a split, for, unlike the Ruhr, there was no fundamental disagreement in 
South Wales as to who was represented. The activists, whatever their own ideological 
position, sought to represent the miners in their entirety. What was at question was the 
means to improvement, rather than who or what the miners should be.
In summary, the trade union discourses that did emerge were not simple 
reflections of milieux. Over time the identities of all the trade unions underwent 
modification. The Gewerkverein and SWMF became more aggressive, while the Alter 
Verband played down its anti-religious aspects. In both South Wales and the Ruhr, 
discursive identities were as much the product of individuals as they were of social 
structures. Figures such as Brust, Mabon, Hue, Imbusch, Brace and Hartshorn were 
crucial to forging these identities. Ultimately, the trade unions in the Ruhr created 
identities that were comparatively doctrinaire. The miner was not just a miner. He was 
a Social Democrat, or a Christian or a Polish miner. It was difficult to move beyond 
these identities to forge a new one. The different approaches to industrial relations 
were tightly bound up with who the miner was perceived to be. Was he the religious 
miner co-operating with the owners in the spirit of Christian brotherhood or the class 
warrior preparing for the moment when the capitalist system ultimately collapsed? 
Knappschaft, workers' committee and safetymen elections all offered a stage upon 
which this rivalry could be played out. Only the crisis of war was to push the Alter 
Verband and Gewerkverein together.
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'Devotion to Liberalism is a Welsh national trait; it is inherent in the 
Welsh national character', South Wales Daily News, 12 January 1906.'
'...still in the hands of the clerics, who, at every opportunity, more or less 
explain the Social Democrats and the free trade unions as Beelzebub and 
his followers...So that today the political as well as the trade union 
movement is still, as for ten or twenty years, almost exclusively sustained 
from the foreign elements.' Arbeiter-Sekretariat Bochum on the SPD and 
free trade union movement in the area, 1905. 2
Introduction
This chapter examines the discourses employed by political parties to appeal 
to the miners of South Wales and the Ruhr. The pattern of homogenisation and 
fragmentation identified in the examination of the miners' trade unions had parallels 
within the political sphere. While the parliamentary representation of the South Wales 
miners remained largely the preserve of the Liberal Party up to 1918, there was fierce 
competition in the Ruhr between the German Centre Party, the National Liberals and, 
later, the Social Democratic Party for the votes of the miners. Therefore, the dual 
trends of homogenisation and fragmentation applied as much, if not more so, to the 
political as to the industrial arena.
As with the trade unions, the various political parties reinforced these trends. 
As such, this chapter poses similar questions to its predecessor. How did the parties 
construct a discursive identity with which to appeal to the miners? What were the 
constitutive features of these identities? How did they relate to the milieux highlighted 
in chapter one? On the one hand, the chapter will focus on the Liberal discourse in 
South Wales and examine how the party sought to deal with the growing concern with 
labour as a political entity. On the other, it will question why the SPD, despite the 
overwhelmingly industrial character of the region, was ultimately unable to turn the 
Ruhr into a political stronghold.
Before examining the discourses of the various parties some attention must be 
given to the institutional background. As shown in the previous chapter institutional 
factors both limited and offered opportunities for the expression of discourse. Given
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the different electoral systems of Britain and Germany, this was even more the case in 
the political sphere. These systems provided the framework within which discourse 
was played out. Furthermore, between the individual acceptance of a particular 
discourse and the casting of the vote there lies a whole gamut of intermediate factors. 
Results can be, and were, massaged and distorted by gerrymandering, ballot stuffing, 
coercion, treating, plural voting, limited or unequal suffrage, the banning of party 
meetings, and agreements between parties to 'deliver' their electorate. The first 
section therefore briefly considers the implication that the electoral systems had for 
the transmission of discourse.
The Political Systems of Germany and Britain
In both Germany and Britain 1867 represented something of a political 
watershed. During that year both countries experienced significant reform of their 
electoral systems. In Britain Disraeli's 1867 Reform Act expanded the electorate from 
1.4 million to 2.52 million. Later the 1884 Franchise Act introduced by the Gladstone 
government extended the vote to every householder in the counties, increasing the 
electorate to 5 million. In Prussia there was a more dramatic change. Bismarck 
introduced universal male suffrage for the Reichstag elections, a provision that was 
adopted in the Reich Constitution after the Franco-Prussian War. In both cases it was 
pragmatic political considerations that motivated the legislators to extend the vote. 
Disraeli needed the support of radical Liberals to keep his minority Conservative 
government in power, while Bismarck sought to out-manoeuvre the German liberals, 
believing that the elections would provide a conservative majority. 3
Apart from the different size of their electorates there were other significant 
differences between Germany and Britain. Not only did more Germans enjoy the vote; 
they also had greater opportunity to vote. 4 The federal structure of the German Reich 
meant that there was another representative tier between the local and national levels. 
However, universal male suffrage did not apply to the Prussian Landtag, within whose 
boundaries the Ruhr lay. The franchise for the Prussian Landtag was divided into 
three classes according to the level of tax the voters paid. This pattern also applied to 
local elections. Under this system each class elected a third of the representatives, a 
feature that worked to the advantage of the industrialists. Werner Hoffmann's study of 
six industrial communities in the Ruhr reveals that the mineowners, as the highest tax-
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payers, were often the only voters in the first class, allowing them to determine a third 
of representatives directly. 5
Britain lacked an intermediate elective layer between the local and national. 
Furthermore, until the passage of the 1888 Local Government Act, the un-elected 
Justices of the Peace and piecemeal sanitary authorities governed the counties. The 
Local Government Act established elected county councils. The counties were further 
sub-divided into rural and urban district councils, although different franchises 
obtained in different areas. Finally, while voting in Britain was on a 'first past the 
post' basis, in Germany, should no one achieve an overall majority, a second run-off 
round would be held between the two leading candidates.
Two important consequences of these different electoral systems for party 
political development and discourse can be identified. First, the run-off system in 
Germany encouraged a plurality of parties. Should a party lose the first run they could 
also strike a deal with one of the parties going into run-off, delivering their vote in 
return for certain concessions. Margaret Anderson puts this point succinctly:
Experience soon taught political groups to hold onto their separate 
identities, even in districts where they had no hope of winning, in order to 
deny the absolute majority to the strongest party, since advantages that 
eluded the minority in the first ballot (Hauptwahl) might still be attained 
through bargaining away their votes at the time of a runoff. The multiparty 
system that ensued - not just at the level of parliament, but eventually 
replicated in election districts throughout the country - reinforced the 
initial advantages of separation.6
In this way Germany's electoral system promoted a multiplicity of parties and, since 
every party needed to distinguish itself from its opponents, of discourses.
On the other hand, the first-past-the-post system in Britain did not offer these 
opportunities. Instead, it was more advantageous to build up alliances of interests 
prior to the election as division could cost a party victory. Therefore, several interests 
were contained within the 'broad church' of one of the two main parties for much of 
the late nineteenth century. For example, the Newcastle Programme, produced by the 
National Liberal conference in October 1891 and adopted by Gladstone, included a 
wide range of reforms covering temperance, agriculture, religion and labour issues. It 
has been argued that the varied nature of this programme revealed the sectarian 
divisions within the party itself, of which the Welsh group was but one. 7 On the other 
hand, the Welsh contingent has been regarded as a vigorous and positive force within
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the party, able to unite 'Old Liberal' concerns with religious issues and the focus of 
'New Liberalism' upon social and labour questions. 8
Second, universal male suffrage in Germany meant that a self-declared 
working-class party had at least a chance of winning votes. There existed a specific 
electorate at which they could aim their appeal. 9 The disenfranchisement of a large 
section of the British working class meant that, during the nineteenth century, labour 
interests were more often expressed through the existing parties. Perhaps the clearest 
expression of this was the emergence of the so-called 'Lib-Lab' MPs, who combined 
traditional Liberal concerns with an interest in policies directly affecting labour. 
Mabon, the leading Lib-Lab MP in the South Wales coalfield following his election in 
1885, summed up this point of view by claiming that 'I am pledged to vote for Labour 
reform, whatever Government brings in the Bill, but as an individual I am a Liberal.' 10 
These institutional and structural factors contribute to explaining why, in Britain, the 
Liberals were largely able to accommodate labour demands up until the twentieth 
century, while specifically working-class parties were formed in Germany at a 
comparatively early date. 11
Political Discourses, 1890-1900
This examination of the discourses of the various political parties mainly 
focuses on several key constituencies and individuals that were paradigmatic of 
discursive trends. For the Ruhr, the electoral districts are Dortmund-Horde, Bochum- 
Gelsenkirchen and Essen. The SPD ultimately managed to win Dortmund from the 
National Liberals and turn it into a SPD stronghold. Essen, on the other hand, 
remained firmly under the domination of the Centre Party throughout the Kaiserreich, 
except for the period between 1893 and 1898. Finally, Bochum swapped hands 
between all the parties, but by the late 1890s it had become a battleground for the SPD 
and National Liberals. In South Wales the constituencies are the Merthyr Boroughs, 
Glamorgan (Rhondda) and Glamorgan East. The Merthyr Boroughs had a reputation 
for radical politics. The Rhondda was held by that epitome of 'Lib-Labism' Mabon, 
and East Glamorgan repeatedly returned the Liberal Alfred Thomas for much of this 
period.
As already noted the real breakthrough for the SPD in the Ruhr came in 1890, 
its political importance having being negligible in the area during the time of the Anti- 
Socialist Law. Once permitted to campaign freely its percentage share of its vote rose
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steeply from 2.5 percent in 1887 to 11.5 percent in 1890. 12 Unsurprisingly, the issue 
of class featured strongly in SPD discourse. In much of the Ruhr, and in Dortmund in 
particular, one of the party's primary means of disseminating its discourse was 
through its organ Die Rheinische-Westfalische Arbeiterzeitung (RWAZ). Generally, 
but especially during election campaigns, the paper sought to construct a dichotomous 
identity based on the perceived conflict of interests between the working class and the 
employers. In 1893 Carl Wilhelm Tolcke, a long-standing member and influential 
figure within the social-democratic movement, opposed the incumbent National 
Liberal candidate Theodor Adolf von Moller, a factory owner and co-founder of the 
Central Association of German Industry (Centralverbandes deutscher Industrieller, 
Cdl). During the campaign a series of articles appeared under the title ' Volk der Arbeit 
aufgewacht' (People of Work Awake). Within these articles the National Liberals 
were portrayed as the party of the capitalist owners, whose interests were necessarily 
opposed to those of the working class.
What is a party? A party is an interest group, in other words: people, who 
have the same interests towards the economic and political institutions of 
the state, join together in a party. Now since the interests of the factory 
owners, the coal barons, the big businessmen, etc. of all exploiters in 
general, are diametrically opposed to the interests of the workers, it is 
clear that every worker who votes for a candidate of the capitalist parties 
commits an act of treason against his own interests. 13
Moller himself was characterised as a representative of 'mobile capital', an 
employers' candidate. On the other hand, a vote for the SPD was seen as a 'protest 
against the prevailing system of exploitation.' 14 By implication Tolcke and the SPD 
represented the true interests of the working class. Only by voting for the SPD would 
a miner be faithful to his own interests, which were indivisible from those of the 
working class as a whole.
However, the SPD in Dortmund, as elsewhere in the Ruhr, was fighting on 
two fronts. The Centre Party, although weaker in Dortmund than in other 
constituencies, still offered a challenge to the SPD. Its reluctant candidate in 1893 was 
Lambert Lensing, founder and editor of the Catholic organ Tremonia. ]5 In its 
'othering' of the Centre, however, the SPD took a different tack than it did towards 
the National Liberals. A discursive construction of the Centre as merely an 
employers' party was not entirely convincing. Stanley Suval's examination of 
Dortmund shows that, while the SPD drew its support from those in blue-collar
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occupations, the National Liberals relied on white-collar workers. The Centre Party, 
on the other hand, received roughly equal support from both occupational groups. 
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The Centre Party, after all, had links to a dense network of workers' organisations in 
the form of the Catholic Arbeitervereine. Furthermore, the Centre itself drew 
distinctions between the Catholic working class and the predominantly Protestant 
owners. Therefore, rather than portraying the Centre as solely a party of the 
employers, the SPD laid more emphasis upon the way it split the miners' movement. 
Thus, in the same address in which he condemned Moller as the puppet of the 
employers, Tolcke blamed the Centre for weakening working-class interests by 
dividing the movement against itself. 16
However, class identities were also imposed on the Centre Party by the SPD. An 
election declaration that appeared in the paper on the day of the election called on the 
workers to reflect upon the interests that the various parties represented. While the 
National Liberals represented the 'chimney and mine barons', the Centre represented 
the 'estate owners, counts, barons, factory owners, doctors and chaplains. These 
people belong to the propertied middle class, or are rich aristocrats and well-paid 
Church officials; they will therefore only represent their interests, which are in 
opposition to those of the working class.' In some respects the Centre was seen as 
being made up of feudal and backward elements, but these were just as intent on 
exploiting the workers as the industrialists. Finally, the small Freisinnige and 
Democratic parties were characterised as representatives of the lower middle class 
(Kleinburgertum), who could only impotently dream of power. On the other hand, the
social-democratic party consists of workers, is the party of the worker. 
Social Democracy must therefore represent the interests of the workers, in 
contrast to all the other parties of the propertied middle-classes. The 
division is sharply drawn. On one hand stand the propertied classes, to be 
sure split between various conflicts of interest, but completely united 
against the 'covetous' workers, united so that the present exploitation of 
the workers through the capitalist employers shall be maintained. On the 
other side stands the waged worker (Lohnarbeiter) as an independent
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class, represented by Social Democracy, which will bring the exploitation 
of the waged workers through the capitalist employers to an end. 17
Thus, while SPD discourse had certain nuances and established links between various 
opposition parties and certain socio-economic groups in Wilhelmine society, it 
ultimately conflated these differences to produce an essential dichotomy between the 
'propertied' and the workers. The SPD regarded the political sphere as a direct 
extension of the social sphere. The fundamental conflict between capital and labour 
was reflected in the political parties. There existed no autonomous space for politics. 
This discursive interpretation of society was entirely in keeping with the Marxist 
theory that the party had accepted as its ideological basis at the 1891 Erfurt 
conference, 18 and propagated through both its more radical (Die Neue Zeit] and 
reformist journals (Sozialistische Monatshefte). The experience of state repression 
through the Anti-Socialist Laws was instrumental in allowing a whole generation of 
Social Democrats to endorse Marxism. Although Lasallean ideas remained an 
undercurrent within the party, the essential conflict at the root of Marxist ideology 
seemed to correlate better to the discrimination Social Democrats experienced under 
Bismarck. 19 The Anti-Socialist Laws also reinforced the earlier split between the 
labour and liberal movement in Germany. The SPD view that religion was backward 
and an obstacle to full working-class solidarity was closely bound up with this 
acceptance of Marxism. For the SPD class solidarity should be the sole interest of the 
workers. This 'totalising' conception of socialism rigidly defined the contours of SPD 
discourse, limiting its ability and willingness to work with the Christian-Socialists.
The labour-capital dichotomy remained the core theme in SPD discourse 
throughout this period. Admittedly, there did exist internal differences within the SPD 
and three groups can be distinguished. The orthodox Marxists, represented by 
Kautsky, awaited the revolution, which would be the inevitable result of capitalism. 
The Jungen sought to precipitate the revolution. Finally, the revisionists rejected 
revolutionary tactics in favour of practical reform within the existing system.20 It was 
ultimately this latter group that began to gain the upper hand in the movement before 
the war. Yet, despite these differences, the perception that the interests of workers and 
owners were essentially in conflict was common to all.
In subsequent elections in Dortmund the RWAZ used the same kind of rhetoric 
as it had in 1893. In a by-election in October 1895 the SPD was actually successful in
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returning its deputy for Dortmund. However, Dr Liitgenau's hold on the constituency 
was tenuous. During the 1898 elections the paper complained bitterly that:
numerous workers are still not yet awoken to class consciousness, that 
means, they have not yet clearly recognised the conflict of interest 
between the great owners, the small owners and the proletariat and they 
have therefore not gained the insight that [Reichstag] deputies, which 
belong to the owners' parties, could not possibly observe both the interests 
of the workers and the middle-classes at the same time, where the interests 
of both sides are in opposition.
Furthermore, the article called upon the workers to look to what the party stood for 
rather than concentrating on the personality of the candidate. 21 Here again working- 
class interests, notions of class consciousness and voting for the SPD were conflated 
into one and the same thing. Only by voting SPD could the miner express the fact that 
he had fully realised his true identity as a member of the working class. Ultimately, 
the Dortmund party's fears over the underdeveloped sense of class consciousness in 
the constituency seemed to have been realised, as Liitgenau lost the seat to the 
National Liberal candidate Alexander Hilbck in the run-offs. However, the paper 
placed much of the blame upon 'the surprise of the Centre electorate by the leaders', 
who would rather throw their support behind the Protestant, possibly anti-Catholic 
Hilbck than let an irreligious Social Democrat win.22
Parallel discourses to that of the SPD are difficult to discern in South Wales 
during the 1890s. Britain as a whole lacked a large, self-consciously working-class 
party on the same lines as the SPD. Admittedly, the SDF and Socialist League had 
been active in South Wales in the 1880s. In the late 1890s the ILP also sought to 
extend its organisation into the Principality. These associations carried out agitation 
tours on the back of the industrial unrest that disturbed the region during that period.23 
However, their membership remained small and they did not stand for elections for 
much of this period.24 Furthermore, as will be discussed later, ILP discourse in South 
Wales owed much to pre-existing Liberal traditions.
However, common motifs can be identified within the discursive constructions 
of the British Liberals, National Liberals and Centre. One such common theme was 
that of religion. All three parties used this as a basis upon which to build a political 
identity. In South Wales, the Liberal Party was widely regarded as the party of 
Nonconformity and disestablishment was one of the key planks in its platform. The 
discourse of Alfred Thomas, Liberal MP for East Glamorgan, was illustrative of the
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important role Nonconformity played within Liberal discourse in South Wales. At a 
rally in support of Alfred Thomas's candidature held at Pontypridd during the 1885 
election, Thomas Williams, President of the East Glamorgan Three Hundred, 
challenged the audience to be true to their beliefs. 'If you are a Conservative, vote for 
the Tory; but if [you are] Liberals and Nonconformists vote for Mr Alfred Thomas as 
the representative of your principles.' 25 In subsequent elections, all of which Thomas 
won, the same Anglican-Tory/Nonconformist-Liberal dichotomy was used time and 
again. Ten years after he was first elected, during the 1895 elections, Thomas faced a 
challenge from the Conservative, Henry Jackson. One musically inclined Liberal 
supporter placed the discursively constructed identity into song. 26
Should old acquaintance be forgot 
And thrown away for new 
What good would Jackson do for us 
That Thomas will not do
Chorus: For Thomas is man of men 
A Liberal good and true 
A Cymro pure we'll send again 
Our battle to renew
Where Lewis failed shall Jackson will? 
As Tory democrat 
No! East Glamorgan answers plain 
There is no fear of that
For Jackson stands for privilege 
For wealth he stands, and class; 
But Thomas stand for liberty 
The welfare of the mass
Jackson would keep an Alien Church 
To weigh our nation down 
But Thomas means equality 
Our freedom yet to crown!
Its musical merits aside, this election song neatly summed up some of the 
main features of Liberal discourse. Again the Tories were linked to the interests of the 
Anglican Church, the song carrying the implication that the Liberals would naturally 
represent Nonconformity. However, to the religious imagery was added a nationalist 
tone. By 'othering' the Anglican Church as 'alien', the Liberal discourse depicted it as 
something foreign to the Welsh 'nation' and its people. The intermingling of
Say what have Tories done for us 
Where should we stand to-day 
If Tories and their Alien Church 
Had their own sweet way
Again would liberty be dumb 
Again would hide her head 
No never will we yield the faith 
For which our fathers bled
For Liberty means no man's wrong 
Its mission is to bless 
To shield the helpless from the strong 
To succour all distress
If East Glamorgan but unite
As she had done before
Then Thomas need not fear to fight
And Jackson fight no more.
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nationalism and religion was furthered in the sixth verse by reaching back to a 
supposed history of Wales, in which Nonconformist forefathers made sacrifices for 
their faith. This dichotomy between Welsh/Nonconformist and English/Anglican was 
capped by the description of Thomas as a 'Cymro'. Thus Thomas was represented as 
the natural choice for the Welsh-Nonconformist voter, while Jackson was 
characterised as the unnatural, 'foreign' candidate. Within this discourse 
Nonconformity was being linked not only to Liberalism, but also to Welsh national 
identity. 27 True Welshmen were Nonconformists and vice versa. A distinction was 
drawn between these values and Toryism, which represented their negation. Voters 
could give physical manifestation to their Welsh identity by the relatively simple
~) 8
expedient of voting Liberal.
Kenneth O. Morgan has argued that around 1892/3 there was a divergence 
between Liberalism and nationalism and points to the failure of the Cymru Fydd 
movement to find widespread support. 29 However, the issue of Welsh identity 
continued to be used within Liberal discourse as a means of mobilising the voters 
against their Conservative supporters. The combination of religion and nationalism 
played an important role in the myth of the gwerin, which can be roughly equated 
with the German conception of the Volk. Within this conception the Welsh were 
idealised as 'a cultivated, educated, often self-educated, responsible, self-disciplined, 
respectable but on the whole genially poor or perhaps small-propertied people, 
straddling groups perceived as classes in other, less fortunate societies.' This 
independent, dissenting and generally Welsh-speaking populace had a rural character. 
Neil Evans and Kate Sullivan have shown how the Liberal Party used the Welsh 
language itself as a means of fostering this identity and as a weapon against the Tories 
when electioneering, although it sometimes proved double-edged. 31 The Welsh 
peasantry was the ideal of the gwerinol discourse and in Liberal discourse they were 
placed in juxtaposition to the anglicised, Church of England supporting, landowners, 
whose interests were seen as embodied by the Tory Party.
Indeed, although miners dominated the East Glamorganshire constituency by 
the end of the nineteenth century, Thomas continued to pitch an appeal that focused 
on this gwerin ideal. At a meeting at Cilfynydd Thomas's speech contained three 
main points: Irish Home Rule, Disestablishment and the Welsh Land Bill. On the 
situation of the farmers Thomas claimed 'the poor farmer was under the thumb of the 
landlord. This should not be so. So long as the farmer was prepared to pay a fair rent
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for his holding he ought to be secure in his farm as the landlord was in his castle.' 32 
Similarly, during the 1900 campaign Thomas moved seamlessly from religious to 
agricultural issues when criticising the achievements of the Tory Government.
They had the Conscience Clause, but, of all frauds, there was no greater 
fraud than that. How could they expect a little child to say 'I am a 
Nonconformist' and refuse to join the catechism, and then have the finger 
of scorn pointed at him. He was surprised at the Nonconformist parents 
(suffering as they had) allowing their children to be taught by ministers 
who did not belong to the Church of their fathers. The Conservatives had 
also remembered the landlords. They had taken off half the Poor Rates 
from the tenants. Had not the tenants had the advantage? Before that had 
come about they had heard of such-and-such a landlord giving back 20, 30 
or 40 per cent to their tenants; but now, that that law had been passed they 
never hear of that kind of thing. Who has benefited by that law? The 
landlords. The poor man who bought tea at 1 s 4d per pound paid the same 
duty as the rich man who paid four or five times the amount for his tea. 
That was only one small matter, but it showed the principle. 33
The extent to which this nationalist, gwerinol discourse was used by the 
Liberals of South Wales can be illustrated by a brief comparison with the political 
discourse of one of the most successful Conservative politicians in the region. Colonel 
Frederic Courtney Morgan, son of Viscount Tredegar, represented the South 
Monmouthshire constituency from 1874 until 1906, three years before his death. 
Within his election speeches during this time there is virtually no mention of Wales as 
a distinct nation. In fact, following his 1880 victory he even declared that 'the electors 
of the county had taught the rest of England a great lesson, stick to Conservatism.' 34 
His only reference to Wales seems to have been as a result of a direct question during 
the 1895 election campaign. When asked if he was a 'Welsh member [of Parliament]' 
he replied, 'No I am not. I am a Welshman, but I was the member for Monmouthshire, 
or a portion of it.' 35 Admittedly, Monmouthshire was the most anglicised of the Welsh 
constituencies and was not necessarily considered part of Wales. But the complete 
lack of any sense of Welsh nationalism is striking when considered alongside Alfred 
Thomas's discourse. Instead, Morgan, along with other Conservative candidates for 
the Monmouthshire seats, focused upon a sense of 'Britishness' and the Empire. He 
declared in 1895 that if returned to Parliament he would work so that 'our beloved 
country may again be one of the brightest spots in the whole civilized world.' 
Similarly, in 1900 he pledged 'to uphold the integrity of the Empire, the welfare of the 
people, and the interests of the district I represent.' 37 Notions of Empire and the 
welfare of the people were elided. The Empire was portrayed as something that would
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bring prosperity to Britain. For example, Morgan's counterpart in the north 
Monmouthshire constituency, de F. Pennefather, sought to link the interests of Empire 
to those of the workers. He claimed 'as a practical man he knew the greatness of the 
Empire depended upon the workers.' 38 The example of Colonel Morgan would then 
seem to bear out Matthew Cragoe's argument that the Conservative Party in Wales 
used the issue of Empire as a counterweight to Home Rule. 39
Morgan and the other Conservative candidates for Monmouthshire regarded 
the county as part of England rather than Wales. Legally, they may have been correct 
in this assumption, but it is apparent that not all of their constituents felt the same 
way. During the 1895 election a journalist for the South Wales Daily Star reported on 
a debate between the Liberal and Unionist candidates for North Monmouthshire. The 
Liberal R. McKenna was supported by 'a contingent from the hills [who] sang a party 
song to the strains of 'Men of Harlech', [but] this was broken into by the English 
portion singing 'Rule Britannia', and both parties kept it up, amid much cheering.' 40
Although Morgan's lack of concern with 'Welshness' may be explained by the 
ambiguous position of his constituency, the same rejection of a Welsh national 
identity in favour of a British one is found elsewhere. Conservatives at the opposite 
end of the coalfield also emphasised the Empire and Britain over Wales. In 1906 the 
Conservative candidate for Carmarthen was a Mr Ponsonby. He campaigned almost 
exclusively on the issue of Tariff Reform, stressing the benefits duties would bring the 
Empire and the working class, but did not mention Wales once. 41 Similarly, four years 
later a whole page in the Carmarthen Journal was devoted to a Conservative election 
notice in support of Mervyn Peel for East Carmarthen and Lord Tiverton for 
Carmarthen Boroughs. It consisted of four questions, each of which began 'Are you, 
as Britishers.' 42 The contrast is even more striking when placed alongside Liberal 
discourse in the constituency. The Carmarthenshire Liberals played extensively on 
their Welsh credentials. The incumbent, Major Jones, declared in 1895 that 'what he 
was chiefly concerned about was the solidarity of Wales. The question for them was 
not what would happen in Manchester or Derby, but what was to happen in Wales. 
The very essence of freedom was at stake, and it was for the people of Wales to say 
whether the principality was again to return 31 Liberals out of the 34 representatives 
which she was entitled to return.' 43 Fifteen years later Liberal supporters claimed that 
it was their ideal 'all along that they in Wales at any rate should get men who were in 
entire sympathy with their aspirations as a country and as a nation. Their ideals and
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aspiration were national, and characteristic of themselves as a nation, and they liked to 
get a man who was one of them.' 44
It is notable that there is little mention of class in any of the above examples of 
Liberal or Conservative discourse. In fact, there is scant mention of the working class 
in any of Alfred Thomas's election speeches during this period. Where class is 
mentioned, as in Thomas' election song, it is imbued with negative connotations and 
refers to the landowners. The contrast between the 'classes' and the 'masses' implies 
that the former represent sectional interests. The concept of the gwerin was elided 
with the 'masses'. In fact, in much of Liberal discourse there was a juxtaposition 
between 'the people' and the landowners, rather than between classes as in SPD 
discourse. In 1895 an article appeared in the Glamorgan Free Press supporting the 
candidatures of Thomas, for East Glamorgan, and Arthur J. Williams, for South 
Glamorgan. It was comprised of three sections appealing to farmers, workers and 
Nonconformists respectively. The section on the workers concentrated upon the 
Liberals as the party of labour reform. However, in the whole piece there was no 
mention of class. Instead, emphasis was placed upon 'the people' and their opposites 
were once again the landowners rather than the employers.
If you want men to represent the landlords and the landlords' institution 
vote for Major Quinn [the Conservative candidate for South Glamorgan] 
and Mr Jackson, but if you want men who will vindicate the rights of the 
House of Commons as the mouthpiece of the people's wishes and claims, 
do not forget to vote for Messers Arthur Williams and Alfred Thomas, 
and the truth of the old adage, Trech gwlad nag arglwydd.45
The tone of the piece is inclusive, attempting to unite farmers, workers and 
Nonconformists against a perceived 'oligarchy' represented by the landowners.
Within Liberal discourse then the workers were subsumed within this 
conception of the people. In effect Liberal discourse sought to transcend class. If 
classes were recognised at all it was in a co-operative sense. Differences between 
certain groups were recognised, but, just as the SPD did with the German upper- and 
middle-classes, these were conflated to present the people as an essentially 
homogeneous group, whose interests were in opposition to the landlords. In doing so 
the Liberals presented a communitarian ethos. Their MPs represented the 
communities as a whole, rather than certain occupational groups. Therefore, the 
'politics of personality' suited Liberal discourse as it emphasised notable individuals 
from within the community, who were ostensibly products of the same.48 Thus,
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candidates emphasised their local origins or connections. When D. A. Thomas stood 
for Merthyr in the March 1888 by-election he was quick to point out that 'he was a 
native of this borough, and a Welshman on both sides (cheers). In addition to that he 
was closely associated with one of the staple industries of the district and, as his 
prosperity depended to a great extent upon theirs, he was likely to safeguard their 
interest in the House of Commons.' Welsh identity and Liberal credentials again 
served as the crux of Liberal discourse. He spoke 'in the vernacular' to convince his 
audience of his knowledge of Welsh and sharply attacked the Church. The people 
were alive to the fact that their national property, in the shape of tithes, was going into 
the coffers of an establishment entirely out of sympathy with their sentiments and 
feelings.' 49 The recurrent theme of nationalism and religion aside, it is notable that the 
fact that D. A. Thomas was a coalowner was not of prime importance. What was 
important was the implied interdependent relationship between his works and the 
miners. The two were indivisible and by electing D. A. Thomas the miners would 
have an MP who represented the whole community.
A similar combination of community, religion and nationalism was evident in 
the discourse of the National Liberal and Centre parties in Germany. However, while 
the British Liberal Party in Wales was able to articulate a specific nationalism within 
Britain, the National Liberals and Centre parties' discourse was concerned with 
placing themselves within the context of a German identity. The National Liberals 
continually played on this nationalist motif. The election declaration for the 1890 
campaign called upon the voters to ensure that a government-friendly majority was 
elected to the Reichstag.
To ensure the election of such a majority is today more than the duty of all 
friends of the Fatherland. Not in the interest of the party, but for the 
Fatherland we call to our friends that everyone does his duty. It is yours, 
and the affairs of the German Empire, which are dealt with. Allow 
yourselves to be led by the great national point of view, not the 
differences of opinion and conflicts of interest. 5
Specific issues such as the Militdrvorlage (military submission) provided a 
basis for the nationalist propaganda of the National Liberals. 51 At a rally on 4 June 
1893 the National Liberal candidate for Bochum Dr. Haarmann, the Burgermeister of 
Witten, concentrated on the dangerous position that Germany was in and appealed to 
patriotism. To undermine the SPD and the Centre party he pointed out:
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If the speakers of the opposition claim that France does not think about 
war, then the question must be put, why is [France] continually and to the 
extreme arming itself. France has nothing to fear from Germany. Only 
thoughts of revenge, already fostered in the school, form the driving force. 
The opponents point out the high costs, which acceptance of the 
submission will bring. Admittedly the costs are high, but they are not 
prohibitive and they must be affordable, if we can only turn away the 
threat of war or be victorious through a strengthening of the army. 52
By focusing on the danger posed by France and thoughts of revenge Haarmann was 
also reaching back to the very foundations of the German Empire and able to play on 
feelings of national pride. Furthermore, he was able to 'other' the opposition by 
presenting their refusal to support the bill as at least misguided, if not unpatriotic. 
Haarmann was especially critical towards the Centre as they too sought to appropriate 
nationalism as a feature of their discourse. 'They always speak as if no sacrifice is to 
great for the honour and the greatness of the Fatherland and when the time arrives, 
then they refuse the means for the execution of the Militarvorlage necessary for 
Germany's security.' Similarly, Moller in Dortmund appealed to the voters 'on 
election day only to give their vote to a patriotic thinking and feeling man, a man, 
who is primarily concerned with upholding the security of the Fatherland.' 54 Thus 
within National Liberal discourse identification with government policy often 
constituted the measure of one's patriotism. This notion of German identity was a 
recurrent theme in National Liberal discourse throughout the Kaiserreich.
However, the National Liberals were unable to appropriate this entirely. A 
multi-polar ideology, nationalism could be filled with a variety of meanings. Thus, the 
Centre Party was also able to claim the mantle of nationalism. For Centre Party 
activists, however, this could encompass a more critical stance. Within Centre 
discourse 'the true patriotism is not shown by saying yes and amen to all government 
proposals, but that we are of the opinion that the government must listen to the people. 
If we have people's representation we also want to send men who do not merely say 
"yes", but who can also pronounce a decisive "no".' 55 This allowed them the latitude 
to attack certain policies such as the continued ban on the Jesuits. During the 1893 the 
party attacked the Militarvorlage in a leaflet, declaring that it would be injurious to 
the interests of the artisans. 5
At the same time, however, the party was sensitive to accusations of being un- 
German and sought constantly to reaffirm its loyalty to the Kaiser. The combination
109
of monarchism and Catholic sentiment evident in the poem 'Pope and Kaiser' was 
typical of Centre discourse. 57
Holy Father, to you,
Leo, we devote to you
The devotional greeting!
For you we sing with delight
Always from happy breast,
We think about you today,
Hail, to you
Hail to you in the crown,
Ruler of the Fatherland,
Hail to you Kaiser!
Feel in the throne,
The lofty bliss,
Of being the darling of the people 
Hail, to you, Kaiser
Hear in Heaven high, 
Lord, the supplication of your people
And bless them,




Both the National Liberal and the Centre parties used this nationalist discourse 
to 'other' the SPD. For both the SPD represented the party of revolution and 
internationalism, threatening the established social order. It was due to this shared 
perception that, in many of the constituencies in the Ruhr, alliances, sometimes 
formal, sometimes informal, were formed to keep the SPD out. A prime example was 
the 1898 Dortmund election. The local Centre Party, having lost the first round, 
advised its members to vote for the National Liberal candidate, Hilbck, in the run­ 
offs, in order to unseat the SPD incumbent Dr Liitgenau. 58 Interestingly, and perhaps 
as a reflection of the party's knowledge of their position in the constituency, 
Tremonia had been advocating support for Hilbck in the run-offs before the main 
election had actually taken place. A table was even printed mapping the various 
options for the run-offs depending on the results of the main election. 59 Furthermore, 
the Centre still supported Hilbck against Liitgenau, despite complaining that, during 
the first round, some mining officials had used their influence on their workers, 
apparently sitting outside a pub directly in front of one of the voting halls and handing 
out ballots for Hilbck.60 The legitimisation for supporting Hilbck, despite these
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alleged underhanded tactics, was the SPD's revolutionary nature. 'Social Democracy 
is not only the most dangerous nemesis of the Church and the Christian family, but 
also the existing social and civil order.' 61
In fact Hilbck had deliberately sought to exploit the religious and nationalist 
concerns within both National Liberal and Centre discourse by adopting a broad 
approach. Throughout his campaign Hilbck had sought to depict the National Liberals 
as a Volkspartei, a people's party. His election declaration claimed that he would 
represent Protestants, Catholics, industry, agriculture, tradesmen and artisans, officials 
and workers all under the black-white-red flag. 62 At a rally in Lutgendortmund he 
declared his hope that 'this party (the Centre) will gradually develop from an 
ultramontan to a national [party].' This was in sharp contrast to his characterisation of 
the SPD, which was un-national. 'It had been proved how the daze of internationalism 
haunts only the head of the German Social Democrats, while the socialists of other 
lands always stand on the side of their country in national questions.' 63 During the 
run-offs he played this nationalist card to its full extent to draw out the Centre voters. 
'No patriotic man can be in doubt over what he has to do.' 64
Krupp too took a non-confessional stance in his 1893 campaign in Essen, 
previously a Catholic stronghold. In fact, the Krupp campaign represents the best 
example of how the politics of personality functioned in the Ruhr. This was especially 
so since Krupp himself did not directly involve himself in the campaign. His sole 
contribution appears to have been a letter published in the RWZ. In this he 
concentrated on the fact that, as an employer of both Catholic and Protestant workers, 
he was not interested in any religious conflict. 'I demand, as my father did, that in the 
interest of my works and its affiliates that Protestant and Catholics work in friendship 
alongside each other.' 65 Supporters of Krupp's candidature in Essen furthered this 
inclusive tone.
Catholic voters can also vote without reservation for the selected 
candidate of the national parties, Herr Krupp, since Herr Krupp, although 
Protestant, would likewise represent the interests of the Catholic citizens 
as well as the Protestants. What Krupp has done for his officials and 
workers is known worldwide and is recommended as exemplary both 
domestically and abroad. Even now the Krupp works celebrate, through 
its products, great triumphs at the World Exhibition in Chicago, as the 
American and English corespondents have found themselves forced to 
emphasise. The name Krupp has such an outstanding importance for 
Essen and the area, that there could be no more natural or better 
representative than Herr Krupp.
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Krupp was therefore being characterised by his supporters as not only the 
representative of Essen in Germany, but of Germany in the wider world. Much like D. 
A. Thomas in the Merthyr constituency, Krupp's interests were portrayed as 
indivisible from the interests of the community as a whole. Finally, as for candidates 
in other Ruhr seats, the Militarvorlage was used to add a nationalist tone. In this case 
it was presented as something above party politics, necessary for the defence of 
Germany. 66
However, religious differences, and the related issues of national identity, could 
often place the National Liberals and Centre in sharp conflict. This was the case in 
Bochum in the 1890s. Just before the 1893 run-off the Centre had produced a leaflet 
apparently signed by leading local Social Democrats, which advised their supporters 
to vote for the Centre candidate Fuchs. The RWAZ later denied this as a forgery, but 
only after Fuchs had won.67 The 1898 election was marked by particularly robust 
discourse based on religion as the National Liberals sought to mobilise the Protestant 
community in Bochum against the Centre. Just before the run-off election the 
Protestant pastors of the district produced a pamphlet aimed at the faithful. Once 
again Protestantism was elided with nationalism and fear of the enemy without.
You, who have loved our Fatherland, you, who perhaps once waited 
willingly to sacrifice property and blood in the struggle for unity and the 
greatness, you, who live quietly and happily in shelter and protection 
under our beloved, truly solicitous, Protestant Kaiser, do you want be 
complicit through laxity, that our great industrial district should be 
represented by a foreign, Cologne merchant, who belongs to the great, 
ultramontan party which would like to place Germany again under the 
crooked rod (Krummstab] of the Roman Pope.
SQ
The pamphlet ended with the obligatory call to duty for the Protestant, German man. 
The Centre, meanwhile, invoked the sentiments of the Kulturkampf in support of 
Fuchs. At a meeting on 2 June 1898 it was claimed that 'the Centre is also necessary 
in order to build a bulwark for the defence of the rights of the Church. The 
Kulturkampf is finished, however its fighters (KulturMmpfer} wait only for the 
chance, where the Centre loses its crucial power, to give their feelings undisguised 
expression.' 69 Thus, while the National Liberals tended to focus upon monarchist 
sentiments and the memory of the creation of Germany, the Centre were able to play 
upon fears that a renewed Kulturkampf could be just around the corner.
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During the 1898 election campaign in Bochum it was also claimed that 
Franken paid low wages at his factory, an accusation that was refuted by his Catholic 
workers in a counter leaflet. 70 This concern with presenting themselves as interested 
in the welfare of the workers was common to the South Wales Liberals, the National 
Liberals and the Centre. In 1893 the Fuchs campaign had produced a pamphlet 
reproducing a speech the politician made regarding an accident at the Carolinengluck 
mine in which he supported workers' councils and celebrated the victims as 'knights 
of work, fallen on the field of honour.' 71 In 1898 the National Liberals adopted a 
similar stance and stressed that their candidate was the workers' friend. Fuchs had 
done nothing for the miners but, 'Herr Franken, who, as a workers' child, grew up in 
work, is no friend of hollow phrases, but a man of action.' 72
This 'friend of the worker' theme was common to the British Liberals, 
National Liberals and Centre. This was implicit in the importance attached to 
representing the community. It was believed that candidates, who were often 
industrialists or businessmen, would by pursuing their own interests naturally produce 
benefits for their employees. However, within British Liberal and Centre Party 
discourses currents existed which identified more directly with the working class. 
Perhaps the best examples are those of Mabon in the Rhondda and Gerhard Stotzel in 
Essen. Both these men came from working-class backgrounds and both were elected 
as workers' candidates in opposition to middle-class opponents from their own 
parties. 73 In their subsequent election campaigns neither was shy of using this 
identification to their advantage.
In the case of Stotzel this was particularly evident in 1890 when he faced a 
challenge to his monopoly of working-class identity in the shape of Ludwig Schroder, 
Alter Verband leader, miners' delegate to the Kaiser and SPD candidate. Stotzel's 
working-class credentials were continually emphasised at rallies. Matthias Weise, 
member of the Centre's provincial committee, presented Stotzel as:
a man, who came from workers' circles, who knows the circumstances of 
the workers like hardly anyone else. If Herr Stotzel does not now work by 
hand, he has however not stopped working with head and heart. Herr 
Stotzel knows the circumstances of the workers as well as the best miner. 
In Bochum they have selected a miners' candidate, but there are also other 
interests to be represented in the Reichstag. We have also iron and 
steelworkers, who could also use the same right and name a candidate 
from their midst. We would be making a great mistake, if we separate 
ourselves from Herr Stotzel and are not loyal to him, because he is a 
strong-minded man respected by all parties. 74
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Stotzel himself noted that in meetings in Bochum and Recklinghausen he had been 
accused of not being a working-class candidate. In reply he emphasised that his 1877 
victory over a middle-class Centre candidate had been due to the Christian workers. In 
a foreshadowing of the differences that were to afflict the miners' trade union 
movement, Stotzel also rejected the republicanism and atheism of the SPD, arguing 
that social reform could only be achieved on the basis of Christian thought. 75 Stotzel 
and his supporters were then propagating a general working-class identity aimed at 
appealing to the numerous factory workers of Essen as well as the miners. On the 
other hand, Schroder was portrayed as representing only a particular group among the 
working class. Furthermore, by indicating that he had been selected in Bochum for the 
Essen seat, Schroder's credibility as a representative of the locale was undermined.
It is interesting to note that Stotzel also faced a simultaneous working-class 
challenge from an obscure miner called Pohlmann, who had been nominated by the 
Protestant Arbeiterverein. Like other national candidates Pohlmann played on feelings 
of loyalty to royalty and based his appeal upon the Kaiser's proposed social reforms. 76 
Weise ridiculed claims that the Centre was somehow not nationalist. 'The Centre 
voters, to which the workers number, could for once ask whether they are considered 
not national but un-German workers.' Furthermore, the Kaiser's social reforms were 
seen as already part of the Centre's own platform. 77 Therefore, by constructing an 
identity that played on class, national and religious sentiments Stotzel was able to 
effectively occupy the ground that his opponents sought to use. This coupled with his 
existing prominence and the overwhelmingly Catholic structure of the district, with its 
numerous organisations, ensured that he was comfortably returned for the 
constituency for the sixth consecutive time.
Chris Williams has shown how Mabon played upon his labour credentials in 
1885 to defeat another Liberal candidate. At subsequent elections he repeatedly 
emphasised the fact that he represented the 'rights of labour.' 78 In 1892 Mabon faced 
the prospect of campaigning against a Liberal Unionist. During the election campaign 
Mabon spoke at Mardy. A leaflet depicting Mabon was distributed among those 
present. It specifically referred to Mabon as a 'Labour member' honoured by 
appointment to two Royal Commissions, one on Mining Royalties, and the other on 
Labour. Yet, despite this emphasis on labour, the class collaborative tone of 
Liberalism was represented by the presence of Griffiths Thomas, member of the
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Ystrad Local Board and manager of Mardy Collieries. A guest speaker from Cardiff, 
Sir Edward J. Read, deplored the fact that Mabon was being challenged. Read's 
language mixed both the nationalist and labour sentiments that became characteristic 
of Lib-Labism in South Wales.
He had come to ask, in the name of Mr Gladstone and the Liberal party of 
Cardiff, and the Labour party of Cardiff, and in the name of common 
sense, what was meant by opposition in such a constituency as that with a 
man such as they had to represent them? They were Welshmen, he 
presumed. Where were they going to get a Welshman who could stand up 
more nobly for Wales than that candidate had done? They were labouring 
men - where could they pick, from one end of the land to the other, a man 
more worthily representative of the labouring classes than was Mabon? 
They were miners - where could they find a man anywhere who had done 
the real work which Mabon had done in Parliament and on Commissions 
on behalf of the miners of that country?79
Mabon was presented as a capable representative of both Wales as a nation and the 
working class. It is noticeable here that class was not being used with pejorative 
connotations as in Thomas's election song. As early as 1885 Mabon had claimed that 
the miners wanted 'class representation'. 80 Mabon had begun to introduce a new 
element to the language of the people used by the Liberals; one which recognised the 
importance of labour. Welshman and worker, Mabon represented a compound of class
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identity with the other political ideals of Liberalism. The Liberal Unionist nominee 
eventually withdrew from the contest. Indeed, so secure seemed Mabon's position in 
the Rhondda that at the next election thought was given to whether it was necessary 
for him to campaign at home, when his influence might be better used to help in other 
contests. 82 Williams has indicated how Mabon could alternately appear as a champion 
of Labour and of Liberalism. 83
Yet there were tensions within Mabon's Lib-Labism. At a meeting of the 
Cambrian Miners' Association in 1892 he supported the issue of a parliamentary fund, 
arguing it was better not to be dependent on outside aid. He complained 'I tell you 
where I have been bound a little. Not by Tories - they would not ask me, but by 
Liberals [who by] contributing think that on that account they have a claim on me.
a A
They may send £10 or £5, but they expect a meeting for every pound sent.' This 
desire for some degree of independence extended to policy. Where the interests of 
labour and Liberalism seemed to clash, the former often took precedence. Mabon, for 
example, had little to do with Cymru Fydd, believing that the type of Home Rule
o r
supported by this movement would damage the labour cause.
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Political Discourses, 1900-1914
During the January 1910 election campaign in South Wales an article appeared 
in the Merthyr Express that praised politicians such as Mabon, William Brace and 
Tom Richards, while castigating Keir Hardie. It claimed that 'there is absolutely no 
difference of a vital nature between Liberalism and Labour today. Liberals are 
friendly to the general programme of Labour, and nothing is more certain than that 
this programme will never be forwarded or realised without the sympathetic co­ 
operation of a Liberal Government and the Liberal party.' Mabon, Brace and Richards 
were commendable because they understood this. 'They are men who frankly 
recognise how much Labour owes to Liberalism, and how much it has yet to gain 
from Liberal co-operation.' Hardie, on the other hand, failed to understand this. The 
article drew a distinction between Labour and Socialism and accused Hardie of trying
Of
to turn the former into the latter.
But was this hard and fast distinction between Hardie and Mabon entirely 
justified? A look at Hardie's discourse suggests that he too owed much to Liberal 
traditions. During the December 1910 election, for example, Hardie's election address 
played on old Liberal shibboleths. Hardie declared 'Home Rule for Ireland, and for 
Wales, Temperance Reform, Disestablishment, and a thorough overhauling of our 
Educational System have all my heartiest support, and Protection, or, as it is called, 
Tariff Reform, my most strenuous opposition.' 87 Hardie's support for that centrepiece 
of Liberal discourse, disestablishment, was unequivocal. During the January 1910 
campaign he stated at Aberdare 'that he had been advised that it would be a wise 
policy on his part to say as little as possible about Disestablishment. He has been 
during the past session working in Parliament for the recognition of Wales as a 
distinct nation.' 88 Therefore, just as in Liberal discourse, Hardie sought to combine 
the issues of religion and nationality to create an identity that would mobilise the 
workers.
However, the issue of religion could be problematic for Hardie. His 
opponents, specifically Pritchard Morgan, the incumbent that Hardie had unseated in 
1900, sought to use the perceived atheistic nature of socialism to de-legitimise 
Hardie's representation of the Merthyr constituency. A handbill produced by Morgan 
quoted thirteen reasons not to vote for Hardie. Four dealt with religion. 'Socialism 
means death to the religious life of the community - Socialism is irreligious and
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unscrupulous - Socialism teaches no Religion, no King, no Law, no God - Keir 
Hardie's preaching supporters are not Christians, but Pantheists.' 89
The last point suggests that Morgan's attempt to portray Hardie as un- 
Christian was largely unsuccessful. In an open letter to Merthyr ministers in 1911 
Hardie stated that 'socialism is not only not antagonistic to Christianity, but is the 
embodiment of everything which Christ taught concerning the life that now is.' 90 This 
put succinctly Hardie's view of the relationship between socialism and Christianity 
and represented a constant theme in all his discourse. 91 Perhaps more important than 
this was the support he received from a small group of socialist, or at least socialist- 
friendly, ministers. 92 The Revd J. Nicholas, for example, sought to link the spiritual 
goals of the Chapels and the material aims of the socialist claiming that 'Christianity 
needs the Labour Party and the Labour Party needs Christianity.' 93 Meanwhile, the 
Revd George Neighbour openly regretted that the ILP faced religious prejudice and 
hoped through his efforts to ease that. 94 Furthermore, articles linking Christianity, 
socialism and Welsh nationalism also appeared in Welsh language journals,95 
although generally there was a paucity of pro-socialist Welsh literature. 96 It has been 
rightly pointed out that the majority of Nonconformist ministers were generally 
hostile to socialist ideas.97 The miners' agent Vernon Hartshorn blamed his defeat in 
the 1910 elections for Mid-Glamorgan on the intervention of the local ministers. 
Standing as a Labour candidate, Hartshorn believed that the ministers had made it
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seem that 'every vote given to [him] was a vote for Atheism.' A particularly vocal 
opponent, although interestingly a one-time ILP supporter, was W. F. Phillips, who 
contributed articles against socialism to the Nonconformist journals. 99 However, when 
compared to the attitude of the Protestant and Catholic Churches towards socialism in 
the Ruhr, the whole tone of Nonconformity seems more ambiguous. The fact that 
some ministers were supportive of socialist policies is of significance as it illustrates 
how the more fluid nature of civil society in South Wales meant that associations 
were able to accommodate a plurality of viewpoints. Protestant and Catholic ministers 
in the Ruhr did not produce articles entitled 'Why I am a Socialist', 100 and socialist 
ministers were a comparative rarity in Germany. Where they did engage with social 
issues their intervention was seen as a means of preventing the working class from 
being seduced by social democracy. The less than monolithic antipathy to socialism of 
the Nonconformist ministers, their failure to produce any effective counter-measures 
and the open support of a minority provided socialism in Wales with some legitimacy.
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This allowed it to be largely elided with older themes by the Welsh labour 
movement. 101
Hardie successfully 'blended Radical and Labour appeals'. 102 But while 
Hardie undoubtedly adopted several of the themes evident in Liberal discourse in 
South Wales, he was also careful to maintain an independent identity. Although he 
supported Liberal initiatives, such as the budget in 1909, he was careful to emphasise 
that co-operation was 'not to be taken as an indication of that [the Labour Party] had 
merged their independence or identity in the Liberal party.' 103 In his personal life too 
he seems have tried to maintain a certain distance from the Liberals. 104 Where his 
discourse differed from that of the Liberals was in its emphasis upon the working 
class. As Peter Stead has argued, by maintaining his independence, Hardie was able 
'to capture the very word "labour".' 105 Yet, the way in which he combined this class 
with a nationalist identity is evident in this speech he gave at Dowlais.
The Nationalist Party that I have in mind is this; the people of Wales 
fighting to recover the possession of the land of Wales, the working class 
of Wales acquiring possession of the mines, of the furnaces, and of the 
railways, of the great public works generally, and working these as 
comrades, not for the benefit of shareholders, but for the good of every 
man, woman and child within your borders. That is the kind of 
Nationalism I want to see brought about. And when that comes the red 
dragon [will be] emblazoned on the red flag of Socialism, the international 
emblem of the world. 106
This first part, with its emphasis on 'the people' and 'the land', had strong resonance 
with the gwerin image supported by the Liberals. However, the rest of the speech was 
in sharp opposition. As already noted, much of Liberal discourse in the 1890s had 
little to say about class. The rural gwerin were placed in juxtaposition to the 
landowners, while the working class was subsumed within the wider community, their 
interests seen as coterminous with those of the employers. Hardie was effectively 
denying this identity of interest between employers and workers, while replacing the 
gwerin with the Welsh working class. Admittedly, elements of the communitarian 
ethos of Liberalism remained. Commenting on the Aberdare dispute he deplored the 
effects that it had upon the valley communities. 'An industrial Crisis like the one now 
prevailing in the Aberdare Valley and elsewhere, shows how dependent the entire 
community is upon the working class. Shopkeepers in the Strike Area are being 
ruined, and all classes are suffering inconvenience and loss. The working man is the 
foundation upon which the whole superstructure of Society rests.' The working class
was now being characterised as the most important group within society rather than a 
part within the interdependent whole. Furthermore, the 'other' within Hardie's 
discourse included not only the landowners but also the capitalists. 'The Labour Party, 
whose candidate I am, is giving the working class a new feeling of hope and 
confidence in themselves. If all will combine and Vote Solid for Labour, the day will 
soon come when there shall be neither Landlord or Capitalist left to grind the faces of 
the poor, when in fact there shall be no more poor amongst us.' 107
This consistent 'othering' of the employers marked the fundamental difference 
in the discursive practice of Hardie and his Liberal counterparts. However, during the 
1900s, Liberal discourse became increasingly concerned with labour issues. The 
Rhondda Leader noted in 1903 that there appeared to be a change in political currents 
with title 'Lab-Lib' increasingly replacing 'Lib-Lab'. Indeed, at the annual 
demonstration of the SWMF No. 1 district Mabon called upon Liberal representatives
i riftto become representatives of Labour first. Alfred Thomas's electoral poem for 
1910, in contrast to 1895, made no mention of religion or nationalism. Instead it was 
focused firmly on the economic benefits that the workers could expect under free 
trade. 109
For whom will you vote? Sir Alfred Thomas, Brace and Mabon 
Is it a Liberal or a Tory Are not the men for the Lords to tread on; 
That will lead John Bull to glory? Mabon fights on behalf of labour, 
This simple question is answered at once. Despite the strenuous tones of Balfour. 
Since the Tory is such a dunce.
If we speak of old age pensions,
If the Tories get in first, Tories say, 'We had the same intentions', 
Then our Parliament will be the worse; They promised them long years ago, 
They will put tax on bread, The Liberals had to give them though. 
And hit the workman on the head.
Sir Alfred Thomas is the man,
If the Liberals win the day, If he doesn't triumph then who can? 
Then we'll certainly have fair play; Vote for him and Labour too, 
They'll help the poor and tax the rich, And you'll be paid, and we paid too. 
They'll pull the workman from the ditch.
Something of a shift is therefore identifiable within Liberal discourse. More 
emphasis was now being placed upon the industrial working class. It is clear then that 
the Liberals could, up to a point, adapt the language of class to their own needs. 
However, unlike Hardie, they were unwilling to accept the labour-capital dichotomy 
as a basis of their discourse. Older notions of the people remained strong and the 
conflict between the Lords and the Commons in 1910 provided an excellent
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opportunity for the Liberals to exploit the discursive dichotomy they had created in 
the nineteenth century. At the massive demonstration at Victoria Park, Swansea on 18 
September 1909 in support of the 'People's Budget' the common theme was 'the 
People vs. the Lords'. Alfred Mond claimed that the landlords wished 'to make the 
people subservient to their charity and their doles, while the Liberals wanted to make 
them free and independent men and women, not relying on charity and doles, but on 
their rights as citizens.' Mond also emphasised the communitarian ideals of Liberals 
by the juxtaposition of the industrialist and the landlord. 'The man who created the 
works gave employment to hundreds, increased the rateable value, and added wealth 
to the community, the man who owned the land was creating nothing. [The Liberals] 
wanted the burden shifted from industry to indolence, taken off the backs of the 
workers and put on the shirkers.'' 10
That Mond should stress the importance of the industrialist to the well-being 
of the community is not surprising since he was a prominent employer himself. 
However, Mabon, who, since the affiliation of the MFGB to the Labour Party on 1 
January 1909, had officially been a Labour MP, also used the same dichotomy.
[The Lords] wished at all cost to reserve their power to plunder the 
people. Every Labour representative and every Liberal and Radical citizen 
in the realm must be of the opinion that the feudal age should in fact and 
practice come to an end. Our present system of land ownership had 
devastated the countryside, it had imposed heavy burdens upon industries, 
and cramped the development of towns and villages - simply crippled 
capital and impoverished labour. The House of Lords must either be 
mended or ended, the question being 'Who is to govern, the Peers or the 
People?'
Yet Mabon prioritised his Labour identity and it was to this that he coupled notions of 
patriotism. He claimed that 'he was prepared to place before them the views of the 
people which he hoped to represent from a Labour standpoint, and he would be 
prepared to add everything that appertained to Welsh nationalism and every 
progressive measure, wherever it might come from.'
Mabon's stress on Labour, however, did not go far enough for some. During 
the second 1910 election Mabon was severely criticised by the Mid-Rhondda Socialist 
Propaganda Committee. Their speakers, such as Ben Tillett and George Edbury, cast 
doubts on Mabon's Labour credentials, pointing to his lack of support for the 
Cambrian strikers. The election itself was 'fake' since the Liberals could be relied 
upon to support the capitalists. Working-class interests were both independent from
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and in opposition to those of the Liberals. 'It did not matter whether Tory or Liberal, 
they were both alike, and at the next election this class must cut the political bonds 
which were tying them down to slavery.' However, ultimately the Committee did not 
run its own 'working-class' candidate due to lack of funds to pay the returning 
officer. 112
By the end of the 1900s a political discourse predicated on a specifically 
working-class identity and with some affinities to SPD language in the Ruhr was 
beginning to emerge during general elections. As Chris Williams has shown in his 
study of the Rhondda, this discourse existed at a lower level from an earlier date, 113 
and influenced the campaign to affiliate the MFGB to the Labour Party. Workers 
elsewhere were also attempting to place members of their own class on local 
authorities. In Ammanford, for example, meetings of workmen decided to field ten 
candidates, among them five colliers, for the Ammanford Urban District Council. 114 
But it was by the late 1900s that this discourse based on the working class began to 
make a wider impact at the national level in Wales. Two reasons can be identified as 
contributing towards this growth. First, the industrial disputes of 1910 and 1911 
placed pressure on the Liberals' gwerin discourse. The strikes and the introduction of 
troops undermined a discourse based on co-operation and community. The Liberals, 
however, remained wedded to their old discourse based on co-operation between 
classes and were unable to accept one predicated on conflict between labour and 
capital. Instead, they sought to paper over the cracks. John S. Ellis has argued, for 
example, that the pomp surrounding the Prince of Wales's investiture in 1911 was a 
deliberate attempt to create a new identity, which encompassed both elements of the 
gwerin and the Anglican Church." 5 Second, during the 1900s there was a growth in 
Labour and Socialist organisations. Although these may have disagreed over the 
means they shared a common commitment to advancing the interests of the working 
class. 116 They were also willing to tie the social directly to the political, as Hardie did 
with the Aberdare strike. They used strikes and unrest to reinforce their demands for 
independent working-class representation. However, the discourse used by Labour 
MPs in this period still owed much to Liberal traditions. The gwerin image was not 
wholly abandoned. Many Labour MPs, after all, had been Lib-Labs. Rather than a 
clean break between Liberal and Labour discursive practice, there was a more fluid 
shifting of accent. Political organisations and trade unions were placing increasing 
stress on a specific working-class identity. This impacted on politicians' discourse.
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contributing to a growing emphasis on 'labour'. Consequently, Labour was in a better 
position to seize on the industrial unrest of the late 1900s and tie the social more 
explicitly to the political. However, rather than abandoning Liberalism's 
communitarian ethos, Labour was able to realign it. The community was being made 
synonymous with the working class, while employers replaced the landowners as the 
'other.' This realignment did not reach fruition until after the war, but was underway 
before 1914.
The fluidity of discourse evident in South Wales, at least between Liberalism 
and Labour, was in marked contrast to the comparative rigidity of political languages 
in the Ruhr. The split between the German labour and liberal movements had 
occurred much earlier and by the 1890s the SPD had established its own distinctive 
political identity, and, unlike the British Labour Party in the 1900s, did not draw much 
from other political currents within the region. In the years before the war it continued 
to predicate an identity largely based upon the working class and began to notch up 
more successes with Hue being elected for Bochum and Theodor Bomelburg for 
Dortmund in 1903 and 1907. However, during the 1900s the revisionist wing of the 
party did begin to utilise a more patriotic language. 117 Hue, for example, was keen to 
stress the reformist nature of the SPD. ' [The Party] is the real reform party, although
118the radical reform party, in our parliament'. He complained that during election 
campaigns the opposition accused the SPD of seeking to overthrow the state when in 
actual fact thousands of members and activists were diligently working for reform of 
the system rather than its destruction. 119 In a later article he defended Bebel's claim 
that, should Germany be threatened, Social Democrats would take up arms in defence 
of the country. Hue maintained that 'one cannot stress enough: patriotism 
(Nationalbewusstsein) - not nationalism - is not anti-social democratic'. 120 Despite 
this patriotic element the language of class remained central. Reformist action was 
meant to benefit the working class and overcome the twin obstacles of 'conservative 
and clericalism'.
By the 1900s the Polish community had also began to make an independent 
impact in electoral contests. The network of Polish associations now included 
electoral committees and in 1903 Polish candidates stood for the Essen, Bochum and 
Dortmund seats. In no seat did the Polish vote rise to more than seven percent. 121 
However, as Suval argues, the Polish vote in Dortmund-Horde was not about winning 
the election, but had everything to do with expressing a certain identity. 'Since the
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Poles could not hope to reach the run-off, most of their ballots were just to affirm their 
separateness. The Polish candidate did not live in the district; he did not even have to 
campaign. Polish votes were designed to show the other social groupings that the 
Poles had arrived and were to be reckoned with.' 122 Voting for the Polish candidate 
was, therefore, a means of affirming a specific ethnic identity and the party's 
discourse was consequently predicated on that ethnicity.
Despite the emergence of this Polish there was little change in the discourses 
of the older parties. Bomelburg, a leading figure in the bricklayers' union, used the 
same discursively created dichotomy in his 1907 campaign as Tolcke had used in 
1893. The National Liberals were once again castigated as the 'party of the great, 
industrialist, German bourgeoisie.' 123 The Centre, on the other hand, was once more 
accused of splitting the workers.
In fact, the Centre had actually dropped their usual candidate, Lambert 
Lensing, for one with stronger working-class credentials for the 1907 election. This 
probably represented the local party's acceptance that they needed a more working- 
class image. Since 1890 they had been squeezed out of the run-offs, which became a 
struggle between the National Liberals and the SPD. Furthermore, from 1900 onwards 
the increasing professionalisation of the Christian trade unions led them to shake off 
non-worker direction and establish their own control. 124 Johann Effert was a 
prominent figure in the Christian trade union movement and had been leader of the 
Commission of Seven during the 1905 strike. However, while Effert claimed to be an 
Arbeiterkandidat (workers' candidate), the Centre Party itself continued to be 
depicted as a Volkspartei. Effert was both 'a man of the people, a man of severe 
work.' He would represent both the workers and middle-classes. In fact, the very 
emphasis of the SPD upon the working class was seen as a weakness within Centre 
discourse. 'Social Democracy, the patented "workers' party", wants to follow a "pure 
workers' politics", they show no interest for the remaining estates (Stande).' Effert 
agreed that the working class outnumbered the others in society, but argued that if 
they tried to pursue a purely working-class type of politics the other estates would 
come together to defend themselves. The workers would inevitably fail 'because 
capital is not on our side.' Finally, the usual stick of Christianity was used, as in every 
election, to beat the SPD. 'Because Christianity and Socialism stand in opposition like 
fire and water, therefore a practising Christian cannot be a Social Democrat.' 125
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Other Centre candidates, such as workers' secretary Giesberts in Essen, also 
stressed their working-class origins. 126 However, the discourse used in Effort's 
candidature demonstrates that, although the Centre Party was becoming increasingly 
aware of the potential advantage to be gained from selecting working-class 
candidates, the rhetoric used by the party remained fundamentally unchanged. 
Emphasis was still placed on the Volk and the community, of which the workers were 
just one, albeit, a sizeable part. The workers' interests could only be furthered through 
co-operation with others, an explicit rejection of the class conflict that lay at the heart 
of SPD discourse.
The SPD, on the other hand, rejected the idea that Effert would be able to do 
anything constructive for the workers in the Reichstag precisely because his party had 
a middle-class wing. 'First the Centre lets working-class deputies 
(Arbeiterabgeordneten) be elected, then they will neutralise them. The Centre was a 
middle-class party and had now become a capitalist party.' The Centre's social and 
economic policy was regarded as no different from that of the National Liberals. An 
example was made of their support for tariffs, which directly affected workers through 
higher prices for bread. 'If the Catholic workers want their workers' interests 
represented in the Reichstag, they must attach themselves to the workers' party, 
Social Democracy.' 127
Pamphlets and leaflets also depicted this working-class SPD/non-working- 
class Centre dichotomy. Although few of the thousands of leaflets that were printed 
for elections have survived, one illustrates well the discursive practice of the SPD 
towards the Centre. Entitled 'Who should we believe?' it attacked the Centre's claims 
that it was the most socially active party in Germany. Accusations of splitting the 
labour movement mainly revolved around the issue of Christian trade unions.
The Centre founded Christian trade unions. If these really sought to fulfil 
their purpose, i.e. to represent workers' interests, then they affect them 
like a spanner in the works (Knuppel zwischen den Beine). Where is there 
a case recorded in which the Centre took the side of the workers in a wage 
dispute? Nowhere! It is neutral - in favour of the employer. The Christian 
trade union leaders will be described - when it's in the interests of 
capitalism - exactly like the free trade unionists as liars, troublemakers 
and unscrupulous agitators, who bring down misfortune and despair on 
the workers.
The interests of the workers were placed in opposition to those of the counts, lawyers 
and prelates within the party. 'The demands of the workers' interest simply mean a
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damaging of their own interests.' Worse, however, were the Christian trade union 
leaders who actually betrayed the interests of their own class. 128 Therefore, not only 
was the Centre in opposition to the working class, it actually undermined them from 
within.
Class was placed above religious identity. The pamphlet criticised the Centre's 
continual claims that religion was in danger, arguing that this was simply a cover for 
the interests of the capitalists and the landowners. 'Christian duty for the workers, 
Christian rights from the Lords. Why are the Catholic workers forbidden to unite with 
their class comrades to improve their material conditions? Because that would 
endanger religion!' 129 The SPD, on the other hand, had raised the expectations of the 
workers.
It taught the worker, that he already has a higher goal in this world than 
simply serving the pleasures of a handful of people. It taught him to 
respect himself, but at the same time his obligations as one human being 
to another and, most valuably, it taught him to recognise the world of 
work. Social Democracy ennobled the worker; it raised him to the proper 
position as the bearer of the prosperity of the nation. 130
Interestingly, there was an echo of the religious justification used by the British 
Labour movement, when it claimed that the SPD represented the 'true spirit of 
Christianity.' 131 However, this is not nearly as extensively developed as it was in 
Hardie's political language and the impression is of something tagged on rather than 
central to Social Democratic discourse. The view of religion the SPD continually 
reiterated was that it was a private matter, 132 something that largely limited its use in 
constructing a collective identity.
SPD discourse in the twenty-two years between 1890 and 1912 appears not to 
have changed much. Admittedly there were attempts to reach out to other groups, 
such as white-collar workers. During the 1907 run-offs in Essen, for example, an 
appeal was made to make every effort to win both 'workers and the small officials.' 133 
In 1903 Leimpeter, while criticising the other parties for abandoning the workers as 
soon as the elections were over, claimed that the representation of the SPD as 'un- 
national' was unjust. But ultimately he referred back to the workers, stating that such 
accusations were unjustified 'because only [the Social Democrats] care for the well- 
being of their voters.' 134 Just as religion remained the centre point of Centre discourse 
so class remained the central pillar of SPD rhetoric.
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Summary
The striking difference between the political discourses of the Ruhr and South 
Wales was the comparatively 'fixed' nature of the former compared with the fluidity 
of the latter. Crucially political languages in the Ruhr were largely 'milieu-fixated' 
while in South Wales they were 'community-fixated'. In the former discourse was 
concerned with mobilising a certain constituency or subculture which consistently 
provided it with a core of support. Although the parties claimed to represent the 
community in its entirety, they invariably tried to mobilise their followers by placing 
one group in juxtaposition to another. In this manner, Catholics were contrasted to 
Protestants, Social Democrats to Christians, and so on. In South Wales, on the other 
hand, parties sought to encompass the whole of the community. The juxtaposition of 
identities in South Wales was between those perceived as belonging to the community 
(in Liberal discourse the workers and industrialists) and those who did not (the 
landowners).
The Liberal party was able to dominate the political field through its 
successful linkage of nationalist and religious concerns. This found a certain 
resonance in the predominantly Nonconformist mining valleys. Although, when 
compared with the activities of Catholic priests in Germany, Nonconformist ministers 
may not have been so intimately involved in electioneering, their seemingly 
ubiquitous presence on the platforms of Liberal candidates was symptomatic of the 
links between Liberalism and Nonconformity.
Within Liberal political language the workers did not really emerge as a 
distinctive group, but were subsumed within the broader idea of the community. It 
was believed that what was good for the community would inevitably benefit the 
workers. The gwerin image itself was mainly rural, but it seems that its nationalist and 
religious components were enough to tie the majority of the miners to Liberalism until 
the 1900s.
Liberal discourse also showed a certain degree of elasticity in accommodating 
the growing language of labour. The emergence of the Lib-Lab MPs can be regarded 
as strengthening the appeal of Liberalism generally by placing a greater emphasis on 
the needs of the working class. Indeed, the Lib-Lab MPs introduced a shift in the 
connotations associated with the term 'class'. In earlier Liberal language it was used 
pejoratively and contrasted to 'the people' or 'masses'. Mabon, however, used the
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concept positively, especially when he spoke of the 'labouring classes'. This positive 
usage became more widespread from 1900. But to claim that Lib-Lab discourse 
proved a stepping stone to the political language of Labour is perhaps too simplistic. 
Keir Hardie's discourse, for example, owed much to Liberal traditions. What was 
occurring in South Wales was a re-alignment of emphasis. Gradually notions of the 
community and the working class were being elided, becoming synonymous. At the 
same time the industrialists, who had been considered part of the community by 
Liberalism, were being excluded and aligned with the landowners. While Liberal 
ideas continued to have force, labour issues were becoming more and more 
prominent. This was not a completely linear process, but nevertheless there seems a 
general tendency towards Labour. The fact that Labour did not represent a complete 
break with South Wales's Liberal past and actually inherited much of its progressive 
mantle was to lay the basis for its successes in inter-war Wales.
In the Ruhr, on other hand, there was less interchange between political 
discourses. Each party had largely established its discursive identity by the 1890s, if 
not earlier. Both the Centre and National Liberal parties shared certain affinities with 
the Liberals in South Wales in the way that they combined nationalism with religion 
and attempted a cross class appeal. Both parties hoped through this mixture to form 
the basis of a Volkspartei, although in reality they were delimited by religion. 
However, depending on the political circumstances, this could be either inclusive or 
exclusive. In Dortmund, for example, the National Liberals sought to develop a 
general religious identity to counter the growth of Social Democracy. In Bochum in 
the 1890s, however, the National Liberals used the Volk in a more exclusive manner, 
seeking to 'other' the Catholics through their perceived divided loyalties. Ultimately, 
although both parties considered themselves representative of the German nation, one 
was closely linked to Protestantism, while the other saw its explicit goal as the 
protection of the Catholic Church. This, coupled with the organisational structures 
that they had built, meant that they had a strong head start over the SPD when that 
party finally emerged from the wilderness of the Anti-Socialist Law.
Once able to campaign freely the SPD constructed its own identity explicitly 
around the working class. While the Centre and National Liberals characterised 
themselves as representatives of the whole community, the SPD portrayed the 
workers as the community and in inevitable opposition to the other classes owing to 
the workings of capitalism. Unlike the other parties in the Ruhr and the Labour
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movement in South Wales, it had no real religious element within its appeal, 
something that weakened attempts to encompass all the workers.
Over time there were slight changes and modifications made to these 
identities. As the example of Effert shows, the Centre Party became aware of the 
advantages of more identifiably working-class candidates in this overwhelmingly 
industrial region. However, Effert's candidature remained firmly bound to the 
traditional discursive practices of the Centre. There was no interchange with either the 
SPD or the National Liberals. So while there were some changes in political discourse 
in the Ruhr it occurred within parties rather than between, as was the case in South 
Wales.
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Chapter Four 
The Great War and the Post-War Years, 1914-1926
'The threats of the trenches and the drafting to the army...created a 
psychological state, which was everywhere favourable to the Spartacist 
agitation.' Reichskommissar Carl Severing on how the bad experiences of 
the miners during the war fed the extreme left. 1
'the circumstances of the war intensified the men's convictions that they 
were being exploited by their employers and by the Government. They 
believed that they were morally and legally entitled to a share in the boom 
of prosperity which, as they alleged, the war had brought to their 
employers.' Revd. J. Vyrnwy Morgan commenting on the Welsh miners 
who were determined to use their bargaining position to enforce higher 
wages. 2
Introduction
In 1914 the pattern of trade unionism in the mining industries of both areas 
presented very different pictures. Apart from several small craft associations, the 
SWMF had incorporated the local unions that had existed under the Sliding Scale. 
The Gewerkverein and the Alter Verband, on the other hand, had been driven even 
further apart by the acrimony surrounding the failure of the 1912 strike. For the 
moment the following chapter leaves aside the issue of discourse and identity and 
examines how the Great War impacted on lifeworld of the miners and civil society in 
the two areas. It argues that the conflict accentuated the process of fragmentation and 
homogenisation that previous chapters have identified. The strength of the SWMF 
allowed the South Wales miners to win substantial concessions from the Government 
and the employers. On the other hand, the stronger position of the Ruhr industrialists, 
coupled with the divisions in the German miners' movement, meant the unions in the 
Ruhr were unable to take advantage of their better bargaining position to force 
substantial concessions.
The war also impacted upon politics. The chapter shows that it not only gave 
fresh impetus to organisation for the labour movement in South Wales, but it also 
provided an opportunity for activists to demonstrate their competence and credibility. 
In Germany, however, the issue of support for the war was extremely divisive and 
split the SPD. This split laid the foundations for the emergence of the Communist 
party, which challenged the SPD's claim to represent the workers. Underpinning these 
political changes in the Ruhr was the fragmentation of the social milieux, which had
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characterised Wilhelmine Germany. It will be shown that the experience of strikes, 
lockouts, unemployment and political violence tended deep divisions between the 
Ruhr miners. On the other hand, in South Wales positive experience of the war 
consolidated support for the Labour party's case for nationalisation and strengthened 
the appeal of the SWMF. Moreover, the common experience of unemployment and 
industrial action general helped reinforce the more cohesive social structures and 
strengthened support for Labour.
The Great War and the Miners
The declaration of war appeared to be greeted in South Wales and the Ruhr 
with the same jingoistic fervour that it received elsewhere. A few days after the 
outbreak of the conflict the pro-war Western Mail claimed that 'patriotic fervour 
characterises the whole of the Welsh nation in the present crisis.' 3 This was despite 
the fact that anti-war feelings were evident immediately before 4 August 1914. 
Vernon Hartshorn, for example, defended the SWMF's refusal to call off its holiday, 
pointing out that it was in accordance with resolutions passed by the Miners' 
International Congresses, which committed the miners to preventing hostilities.4
The picture of the war being enthusiastically endorsed by the peoples of 
Europe has recently been questioned. The reaction to the outbreak of war has been re- 
examined revealing a far more complex set of attitudes obscured by the general 
account of ardent nationalism. 5 In fact the jubilant scenes that were eagerly reported 
by the British and German press concealed a more apprehensive attitude. This usually 
manifested itself through the hoarding of goods. The SWMF Executive felt compelled 
as early as 6 August to issue a resolution to 'discourage the practice adopted by 
workmen and other people of laying in large stocks of necessaries.' Similarly, in the 
Ruhr, the editors of the Westfalische Volkszeitung appealed to suppliers not to 
introduce arbitrary price rises for goods7 and blamed the 'stampede' of women to the 
shops for increases. 8 Furthermore, the initial dislocation of trade caused a rise in 
unemployment leading mining unions in both areas to provide relief for the 
unemployed and soldiers' dependants. 9
Yet despite the previous anti-war sentiments of the labour movement and the 
less than encompassing nationalist fervour there was little immediate resistance to the 
conflict. In both countries the war was portrayed as one of national defence.
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Hartshorn's defence of the SWMF ended with a call for the labour movement to give 
'its complete solidarity to the support of the British Government' in the battle between 
democracy and 'reactionary Prussian military autocracy.' 10 Meanwhile, both the SPD 
and Catholic press in the Ruhr supported a defensive war against Tsarist absolutism." 
For the SPD support for war credits was consistent with the patriotic note which had 
emerged in its political language in the 1900s. Later the issue was to seriously damage 
the unity of the SPD. But in 1914 those who continued to oppose the war, such as 
Keir Hardie, found themselves isolated, threatened and roughly treated. 12
The belief that the war was defensive helped create a sense of national unity in 
both countries. However, this found more concrete expression in Germany through 
the Burgfrieden (literally Peace of the Fortress). The sectionalist claims of all classes 
of society were to be shelved to allow the successful prosecution of the war. In 
industry this was symbolised by the union's decision to give up their right to strike. 13 
In Britain, on the other hand, the union's announcement of an industrial truce lacked 
the conviction of their German counterparts. In fact, the British unions only agreed to 
give up their right to strike in March 1915 following talks with Lloyd George, then 
Minister of Munitions. The MFGB refused to be bound by the Treasury Agreement, 
but made a guarantee to seek arbitration in disputes. The SWMF even stood aside 
from this guarantee. This refusal, however, should be seen with the context of the 
wages dispute it was already involved in.
The different attitudes of the British and German unions should be seen in the 
context of their status prior to the war. The British unions were well established 
within society and recognised by employers and state alike. Many of the German 
unions, on the other hand, were still struggling to achieve recognition on the eve of 
the war. 14 Through full co-operation the German trade unions hoped to win the 
recognition that had until now eluded them and were therefore willing to give up more 
than their British counterparts. 15 The Bergarbeiterzeitung estimated in December 
1914 that 30,000 of its members were at the front fighting for the Fatherland and 
claimed that after the war they could never again be regarded as enemies of the 
Reich. 16 This hope also extended to the SPD. Hue, who toured the region explaining 
Government policy and the need for continued production to the miners, exemplified 
this attitude. At Bochum he justified SPD support for the war.
From one side the behaviour of the SPD concerning war credits is 
criticised. But on this matter the party had only held to its programme,
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because the living leaders, as well as the dead, had always said that they 
would always stand by their Fatherland and take up arms when the 
borders are threatened. Before the war the Social Democrats were accused 
of being unpatriotic fellows and revolutionaries. After the war [the Social 
Democrats] will not tolerate such suggestions and will demand equality 
with other parties. 17
At a miners' meeting in Altenbochum in 1917 it was claimed that 'the organisations 
[the miners' unions] must behave perfectly. After the war the Alter Verband members 
will hopefully not be treated as third and fourth-class citizens anymore.' 18 Similarly, 
Hermann Vogelsang's pamphlet Der Weltkrieg: Deutschlands Bergarbeiter im Kriege 
(The World War: Germany's Miners at War) dwelt on the sacrifices the miners were 
making for the Fatherland both at the front and at home. 19
The British and German states reacted differently to the outbreak of the war. 
While the British government centralised power through the Defence of the Realm 
Act of 8 August 1914, which allowed intervention into any aspect of military and 
civilian life, the German government decentralised power through the Prussian Law 
of Siege of 4 June 1851. This law divided the country into a series of military districts 
each under the command of a Deputy Commanding General. The view that the 
German organisation of the home front was mismanaged, while the British state 
adapted well, has been justifiably questioned. Yet the Law of Siege clearly 
complicated the working of the wartime administration, creating as one contemporary 
commented 'twenty-odd shadow governments...and in this manner work is 
duplicated, not in collaboration, but rather alongside or even against each other.' 21 
There was a lack of communication between the German military districts and no 
provision for co-ordination was contained within the law. Furthermore, the military 
districts did not correlate with the municipal boundaries, increasing the possibility for 
confusion in the application of ordinances. 2
The initial unemployment soon became a labour shortage. An estimated 17 
percent of the British mining workforce had enlisted by February 1915, representing 
the youngest and fittest of the workforce. 23 Roughly 40 percent of the 19 to 38 age 
group enlisted in the first seven months of the war. Unsurprisingly, this led to a fall in 
coal production of about 11 percent. 24 Some of these young miners saw enlistment as 
a way out of the mines. 25 In Germany, about a quarter of the workforce was called 
up. 26 The Hibernia mining company lost 30 percent of its pre-war labour force. 27 The 
Helene and Amalie pits lost 108 workers and 8 officials in the war. Its workforce fell
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from 3,173 in 1913 to 2,789 in 1914. Output per man and shift correspondingly fell 
from 1,114 tons to 1,083 tons.28 Although the German mobilisation may have been 
more successful than previously suggested, the loss of miners to the army did cause 
difficulties for the companies, which had often gone to great lengths to form a stable, 
reliable workforce.29
We need not be detained by the details of the British and German 
Government's intervention in the industry. 30 Generally the British Government 
proved more willing to intervene in the coal industry and where they did it was 
usually to the benefit of the miners. Three examples can be highlighted as 
demonstrating this point. First, on 23 February 1915 the Coal Mining Organisation 
Committee (COMC) was established. Made of up three representatives each from the 
Mining Association of Great Britain (MAGB) and the MFGB and chaired by the 
Chief Inspector of Mines, Sir Richard Redmayne, its object was to 'secure the 
necessary production of coal during the war.' 31 The importance of the COMC should 
not be overestimated, as it lacked powers of enforcement. However, it did illustrate 
that the British government recognised that union co-operation was essential to the 
war effort. Its proposals were based upon the 'harmonious co-operation between 
employers and employed.' At local level, for example, it suggested that 'coal-master 
and miners...should confer together and themselves determine to what extent...the 
Act should be suspended in individual districts.' 32 Admittedly, such negotiations were 
about deciding how much the working day should be increased, but they did grant the 
unions a voice in deciding the terms of change.
Second, in July 1915 the Government intervened to end a strike in South 
Wales over wages. Feelings of exploitation were rife among the Welsh miners and 
were openly expressed in the press by Hartshorn.33 Frustrated over deadlocked 
negotiations, the miners ignored the advice of the leaders and went on strike on 15 
July 1915. 34 J. L. Williams indicates the feelings of solidarity among the miners 
during this strike, which earned the condemnation of the press. While noting that the 
Bedlinog ILP was anti-war, feelings in the lodge were divided. However, 'everybody 
agreed pretty well that we had to get better wages and conditions.' 35 After five days 
the strikers accepted an agreement brokered by Lloyd George, which granted most of 
their demands. The employers, on the other hand, had to be content with letters from 
Walter Runciman of the Board of Trade praising their 'patriotic spirit.' 36
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Third, at the end of 1916 the Government established control of the South 
Wales coalfield. Despite the 1915 wage increase, industrial relations in the coalfield 
continued to be acrimonious. The conciliation procedure established after 1915 
regularly saw demands for wage increases by the miners, decreases by the employers 
and prevarication by the chairman. Another wage increase was granted in June 1916 
to avert a strike. The owners initially refused to be a part to it, but later grudgingly 
withdrew their refusal. 37 Eventually the Government took control of the coalfield on 
29 November to forestall another strike. As Graeme Holmes has noted, Government 
control did not entail substantial changes in the way the industry was run. 38 However, 
the miners gained materially as their wage demands were largely accommodated. Jim 
Evans recalled his high pay due to the war wages. 'I was earning one pound two and 
nine say when I was fourteen, and when I was fifteen I was earning four pounds two 
and nine with the awards.' 39
The position of the Ruhr miners differed markedly from those in South Wales. 
Despite the unions' participation in the Burgfrieden and their propaganda efforts they 
received little recognition from the German employers. In 1915 the four unions 
produced a proposal for a joint-conciliation board.40 Much like the COMC it aimed at 
'the peaceful mediation and settlement of disputes.' 41 However, the attitude of the 
various mining offices and Government-Presidents was negative. The Government- 
President of Arnsberg commented that it was a 'highly dangerous experiment.' 42 Von 
Sydow, Minister of Commerce, fearing that it would disrupt production, ordered the 
issue dropped. 43
Similarly, the various proposals for wage rises submitted by the unions to the 
Zechenverband repeatedly met with rejection, or counter-claims that production must 
first be increased.44 Such rejections led the Bergarbeiterzeitung to question why there 
was no mutual understanding in the mining industry. 'We have to ask this after more 
than three years of war! Everywhere the will to accommodation is present. In the 
mining industry the old spirit of lordship (Herrengeisf) reigns as before!' 45 Similarly, 
the Gewerkverein complained that:
while in other professions employers and employees build working 
communities and settle emerging question through joint work, the owners 
in the mining industry refuse every meeting and every negotiation with 
the workers' organisations. The efforts of the workers to establish a joint 
conciliation board failed due to the resistance of the owners. Many strike 
questions, which could be settled through joint work, therefore continue to 
exist and contribute to the deterioration of the atmosphere.
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On why this was so both the employers and unions agreed. In 1915 the Alter 
Verband pointed to the MFGB successful wage demand and claimed that this 
depended upon the strength of that organisation. If the German miners were as 
organised as the English then their position would be very different.47 Similarly, the 
employers were claiming as late as 1918 'that the number of organised workers is too 
small for them to be recognised as the representatives of the entire workforce.' 48 When 
the unionists raised the issue of direct wage negotiations between their representatives 
on the works' committees and management, von Gayl supported the employers' view 
that the number of organised workers was too small to justify that course. The unions 
complained that while the employers took that view, they also made it as difficult as 
possible to organise the workers. 49 The owners also emphasised the different nature of 
the British and German unions. The British unions were characterised as being solely 
economic while the latter were Social Democratic. 50 Therefore, political fears still 
impinged on industrial relations in the Ruhr, despite the SPD support for war credits.
The trade unions in the Ruhr were also undermined by the importation of 
foreign and POW labour. The deployment of Belgian civilian workers and Russian- 
Polish workers seems to have reached its peak in 1917. In January and July 1917 there 
were 16,300 Russian-Poles and 17,000 Belgians in the Ruhr pits respectively,51 while 
70,000 POWs were employed by the armistice. 52 In some mines the proportion of 
foreign and POW labour was quite high. At Wehofen pit, and the Gewerkschaft 
Deutscher Kaiser 3/7 and Ronsberghof shafts, for example, they made up 46 percent 
of the workforce. 53 The latter company stated, however, that 'the readiness of the 
workers, especially those from the occupied areas, gives cause to complain. The 
absenteeism at individual pits with a large workforce new to mining (bergfremd) 
amounts to 20 percent of the total workforce. The overtime shifts do not suffice to 
make up the loss through absenteeism.' 54
Some recognition of the trade unions' role in the war effort came in 1916 with 
the introduction of the Auxiliary Service Law. The Law formed part of the 
Hindenburg Programme, which was designed to increase production. The Law's 
architect, General Groener, recognised the need for trade union co-operation if targets 
were to be met and labour used most efficiently. SPD representatives in the Reichstag 
were, therefore, able to incorporate some important concessions, such as the exclusion 
of company unionists from works' committees. 55 The Law seemed to force the
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employers into recognising the unions. As a result the Alter Verband's reaction to the 
Law was generally positive. 56 However, by April 1917 the Bergarbeiterzeitung felt 
obliged to publish an article defending its position since the Independent Social 
Democratic Party (Unabhangige Sozialdemokratische Partel Deutschlands, USPD) 
had circulated leaflets in the region. The USPD accused the SPD and Free Trade 
Unions of placing the German working class in a 'straitjacket' by accepting the Law. 
Accusing the Law's opponents of being fanatics, the paper justified its position by 
pointing to the war situation and claimed that it was a moral victory for the unions. 'It 
has been shown at the beginning of the war, but more expressly during the 
consultation of the Law, that the Government recognises the trade unions as the 
professional representation of the workers.' 57 In fact, the Law proved a double-edged 
sword for, as Karin Hartewig has noted, it limited the miners' ability to move between 
miners, which was a common means of redress in the Ruhr. The Law largely, but not
en
entirely, closed this avenue.
Furthermore, industrialists colluded with the military authorities to have 
troublesome employees removed. Three union representatives upon the workers' 
committee of the Welheim mine were drafted soon after their election. Similarly, at 
the Schlagel und Eisen pits, an Alter Verband candidate was elected only to be drafted 
less than a month later, the only man in the mine to be conscripted. 59 The Essen No. 3 
Mining Office claimed in the first case that the 'mine saw them (the draftees) as a 
danger to the peace of the workforce.' 60
The relatively better position of the Welsh miners compared with their 
counterparts in the Ruhr is revealed by a comparison of wages and wartime 
consumption. As graphs 1 and 2 show, after an initial drop, British miners' real 
earnings declined gradually from the outbreak of the war, but rose above their pre-war 
level by the end of the war. German miners' earnings, on the other hand, fell much 
more steeply and never rose to their pre-war level for the duration of the war.
Although the extent of the food shortages and their effect upon German 
morale has been recently questioned,61 it seems clear that the Welsh miners suffered 
less privation than the Ruhr miners did.
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Graphs 1 & 2: Miners money and real wages in Germany and Britain, 1914-1918
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In 1917 the Gewerkverein produced a pamphlet on the causes of the wildcat strikes 
that had begun to affect the Ruhr from 1916. The majority of their twenty-four points 
dealt with the issue of food shortages and distribution.62 These strikes tended to be 
short, localised affairs, aimed at securing better rations and increased wages, although 
strike waves towards the end of the war began to make political demands. 63 The 
unions claimed that the strikes were the work of unorganised miners,64 but other 
evidence suggests that many were organised and points to a loss of control by the 
unions over their members.65 By contrast social disorder over food in South Wales 
was more limited and became apparent only from the end of 1917.
Furthermore, the issue of food supply and distribution provided an issue upon 
which the labour movement in South Wales could coalesce. Following his 
appointment as Food Controller, D. A. Thomas, by then Lord Rhondda, established a 
system of Food Control Committees (FCCs) throughout the country to oversee 
rationing and price controls.67 The members of these committees were usually Liberal 
and Tory local notables, such as shopkeepers, precisely the individuals who were 
alleged to be profiteering. Shopkeepers were also criticised for allegedly favouring 
their wealthier customers over working-class families.68 These sentiments developed 
into demands for increased working-class representation upon the FCCs. Workers in 
Tredegar, for example, passed a resolution requesting the resignation of the local 
FCCs due to its 'unrepresentative composition from the standpoint of the working 
class.' 69 The growing recognition that the Liberal notables did not adequately
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represent their interests increased the pressure for independent representation. Trades 
and Labour Councils (TLCs) began, therefore, to grow in importance and prestige as 
guardians of the interests of the working class. 70 The Tredegar TLC became involved 
in campaigns to increase labour representation on local political bodies, as well as the 
FCCs. 71 Meanwhile, on the other side of the coalfield, T. D. Williams, a miner and 
chairman of the Ammanford TLC, personally took charge of the distribution of 
margarine following a fracas that left a shop window broken. 72
Interestingly, the previous year Williams had sought appointment to the 
Ammanford Urban District Council (UDC). Williams had been selected by the TLC 
and was supported by its members on the UDC. However, William Evans, a Liberal, 
building contractor and UDC member since 1910, threw his support behind the 
second candidate James Henry Lawley. His decision followed extensive questioning 
over the composition of the TLC and its links with the ILP. He concluded that 'as 
regards the two gentleman proposed, one was quite as good as the other, and 
personally he should be very pleased to see them both on the Council, but there was 
this difference between them, one carried the Red Flag, and the other the Red, White 
and Blue, and it was always safe to follow the Union Jack.' 73 Although 
generalisations should not be made of this local example (Lawley was also a miner), it 
does illustrate TLC attempts to promote Labour representation on local bodies and 
hints at a growing distance between Liberal and Labour parties. The increasing 
significance of the Ammanford TLC was further illustrated by its organisation, in 
conjunction with the Llandybie TLC, of the first May Day celebration in the town in 
1918. 74
Meanwhile, in the Ruhr, the labour movement was becoming increasingly 
fragmented. Although the SPD had voted for war credits in 1914, its left wing became 
uneasy as the war progressed. Opposition to and criticism of the SPD leadership 
became increasingly vocal, as demonstrated by the attacks of the Auxiliary Service 
Law. One small anti-war group was centred on Karl Minster in Duisburg. 75 Minster 
had an outlet for his anti-war sentiments in the Niederrheinische Volkstimme. 
However, Minster was removed from the editorship in early 1916. 76 This removal of 
opposition tendencies from the party press was repeated elsewhere in Germany and 
ultimately the operation of the press bureau for the Rhineland and Westphalia was 
suspended on 1 July 1916 because there lay 'inside the social-democratic movement 
an ever sharper political antagonism.'
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The importance of the control of the party organs is highlighted by the 
example of August Erdmann. Erdmann was Reichstag deputy for Dortmund. 
Following the split in the SPD in 1917 he joined the USPD. Following his defection 
to the USPD, Erdmann became a non-entity in the Majority Social Democratic Party 
(Mehrheits sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, MSPD) press. This tactic seems 
to have been effective as the local Dortmund organisation was not deeply affected by 
the schism. In fact, USPD organisation in the area remained weak. The divisions 
within the USPD movement itself were illustrated by the actions of the Dortmund 
faction's leaders, Hermann Linke and Adolf Meinberg in the post-war years. While 
the former ultimately rejoined the SPD, the latter became a member of the German 
Communist Party (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, KPD). 79
In Gelsenkirchen the USPD faction was more successful. On 18 May and 12 
November 1916 conferences were held in the area which condemned the nationalist 
tone of the Volksblatt and registered opposition to the war. The latter conference 
prompted Hue to resign as SPD candidate for the Bochum-Gelsenkirchen 
constituency. On the 6 May 1918 a USPD association for the electoral district of 
Bochum-Gelsenkirchen-Hattingen-Witten was established. 80
From 1917 the anti-war movement in South Wales also began to grow and 
tensions within the labour movement heightened. Brace, by then a junior minister, 
received a stormy reception at Gwaun-cae-Gurwen and was extensively questioned 
about the war. 81 A conference of the British Council of Soldiers and Workers 
Delegates was held in Swansea in July 1917, but was disrupted by pro-war 
supporters. 82 Up-and-coming leaders also demonstrated opposition to the war. James
n •)
Griffiths turned the White House in Ammanford into a bastion of pacifism, and was 
supported by S. O. Davies, checkweigher at the Great Mountain Colliery. 84 A. J. Cook 
also began to adopt an increasingly anti-war stance from 1915. 85 However, unlike the 
Ruhr, these tensions in South Wales were largely contained within the existing labour 
movement.
Despite between the anti- and pro-war movements, an overview of the effect 
of the Great War upon the mining communities of South Wales and the Ruhr reveals 
that it had a divisive effect upon the latter, while serving to strengthen labour 
organisations in the former. Admittedly, the war did see some advances for the Ruhr 
miners' unions. The four unions drew closer together, 86 as demonstrated by their 
common front against the company unions in the safetymen elections of 1915. The
142
Auxiliary Service Law also granted the unions a degree of recognition and there was 
an increase in trade union membership in the latter years of the war.
However, in comparison with the miners' movement in South Wales, the Ruhr 
miners had not been able to force significant concessions out of the employers or 
government during the conflict. First, the individual miner was financially worse off. 
Second, miners' contact with the state had generally been unfavourable. Not only did 
they suffer from continued food shortages, but they also faced the draft if they were 
deemed too troublesome. Third, the recognition granted to the unions by the 
employers was grudging. Fourth, the mining workforce itself experienced a process of 
restructuring through the introduction of female, youth, foreign and POW labour. As a 
result the Ruhr miners' experience of the war was one of 'decline in real wages,
o n
hunger and increasing numbers of accidents.' These factors, coupled with the 
union's decision to give up the right to strike, undermined their ability to present 
themselves as the protectors of the miner's interests. As a result alternative forms of 
action, such as wildcat strikes and workforce meetings, began to increase as 
evidenced by the strike waves of 1917 and 1918. These strikes were in fact building 
upon older forms of interest articulation. 89 These conditions provided fertile ground 
for the left-wing industrial organisations that had existed in the Ruhr prior to the war. 
Finally, although the Centre Party emerged from the war largely unscathed, those 
miners represented by the SPD were split between the MSPD and USPD.
The Welsh miners, by contrast, came out of the war with a sense of 
confidence. Significant victories had been won in terms of wages and organisation. 
Although there were unofficial strikes in South Wales, these did not pose an 
organisational threat to the SWMF and should perhaps be seen in terms of prodding 
the union leadership towards a more aggressive policy. Most important for subsequent 
events was the experience of state control. For the Welsh miners this was positive and 
fed into their determination to win nationalisation of the industry in the post-war 
years. Although there were tensions between pro- and anti-war supporters in the 
labour movement, these lacked the intensity of comparable divisions in the Ruhr and 
did not take organisational form. Just as before the war, potentially divisive discourses 
were contained within the existing structure of the labour movement. In the post-war 
years nationalisation provided a key concept for the union's discourse; one that could 
unite the different factions through its demonstrable benefits to the miners as a whole. 
The movement itself was in fact strengthened through the revitalisation of the TLCs
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and the role SWMF officials played in the local communities during the conflict. 
Their activities also raised the profile of the Labour Party, while participation on the 
FCCs revealed the division of interest between the Liberal 'shopocracy' and the 
working class.
The pressures of war served to accentuate the processes of fragmentation and 
homogenisation outlined in the previous chapters. Consequently, the lifeworld of the 
Ruhr became less synchronous. Working conditions had deteriorated as a substantial 
proportion of the workforce had been drafted into the army to be replaced by forced 
labour and POWs. Although the Alter Verband and the Gewerkverein moved closer 
together they found it increasingly difficult to control the wild-cat strikes during the 
second half of the conflict. Furthermore, fragmentation occurred along new lines. 
Both the SPD and the Alter Verband, for example, now faced a challenge on their left 
in the form of the USPD and syndicalists. In South Wales, on the other hand, the 
lifeworld of the Welsh miners appears to have become more synchronous. Their 
improved bargaining position consolidated the SWMF. Incorporation of the craft 
unions further strengthened the union. In the political sphere, Labour organisations 
gained credibility through their work on community matters, such as food shortages. 
This sowed the seeds for the replacement of the Liberal dominance with a Labour 
hegemony, although this was not to come to full fruition until the 1920s.
The Post-war Years, 1919-1926
The dramatic events of the first half of the 1920s in South Wales and the Ruhr 
have been extensively covered. The very different histories of the two regions during 
this period make a narrative comparison difficult. Therefore, rather than providing a 
detailed account of these events, this section will concentrate on some of the main 
features of post-war industrial relations and politics and upon their effect on the 
lifeworld and implications for civil society.
Industrial Relations and Trade Unionism
Although the German mining unions had been unable to win full recognition 
during the war, they were able to do so in its aftermath. Talks had been held in August 
and October 1918 between the employers and trade union functionaries, but at each 
session the former sought to limit concessions. The revolution changed the context of
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negotiations. The trade unions informed employers that without certain concessions 
regarding wages and hours they would be unable to control their members. Following 
tough negotiations an eight-hour day including winding time, increased bonuses for 
overtime and a minimum wage was agreed on 14 November 1918. On 23 November 
1918 an agreement was signed that effectively recognised the trade unions. 90 Wage 
negotiations would now take place within the context of the 
Zentralarbeitsgemeinschaft (Central Works Community, ZAG).
In South Wales the industry remained under state control until 1921. The 
positive experience of Government control was clear in the miners' demand for 
nationalisation. In fact, the desirability of nationalisation had been raised in 1912. In 
1918 the SWMF revived the concept in a proposal at the MFGB Southport 
conference. 91 Nationalisation became the leading policy goal of the MFGB, and the 
Sankey Commission gave the impression that its hopes might be realised. However, 
Eddie May, in his case study of the Gwaun-cae-Gurwen pits, argues that by 1919 
there was already a change in Government policy regarding the mining industry. A 
tendency to side with the employers was emerging. He concludes that the relationship 
between the state, capital and labour was conditional. 92 This view corresponds with 
that of Tien-Lung Liu's in his analysis of the British and German Labour Ministries 
generally. Liu disputes cultural explanations of policy making (i.e. that the British 
state was liberal/non-interventionist, while the German state was 
authoritarian/interventionist). Instead, he argues that contingency was the shaping 
factor behind the state's approach to industrial relations in both countries. 93 For 
example, the occupation of the Ruhr and the subsequent inflation and political unrest 
prompted the Stresemann government to give the Labour Minister, Brauns, a free 
hand in industrial relations and he repeatedly imposed arbitration.94 In fact, due to 
their continued weakness, the Gewerkverein and the Alter Verband came to rely on 
state intervention.95 On the other hand, Liu sees successive British governments as 
siding with the employers through their support for the Supply and Transport 
Organisation (STO), which was to run emergency services in the event of a large- 
scale strike. 96
Whatever the approach of the two states, it is clear that the mining unions in 
South Wales and the Ruhr were in very different positions. In nationalisation the 
SWMF had a rallying point for its members and leaders. Industrial conflict could, 
therefore, be largely simplified to a struggle between the union and the employers.
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The trade unions in the Ruhr, on the other hand, lacked this focus. The ZAG provided 
the Gewerkverein and the Alter Verband with the recognition that they had so dearly 
wanted and on that ground they felt obliged to protect it. Unlike the SWMF, the Ruhr 
unions faced pressure not only from the employers, who sought to win back the 
concessions granted during the revolution, but also from their own membership. 
Individual workforces continued the pattern of localised strikes during the war, 
striking for increased wages, a six-hour shift, socialisation and the formation of mine 
councils. The Thyssen mines in Hamborn were particularly prominent in this respect 
and their strikes in late 1918 and 1919 had a domino effect upon neighbouring pits. 97
Furthermore, although the company unions had largely been eliminated by the 
agreement, the Gewerkverein and Alter Verband faced a new challenge in the form of 
syndicalist-communist unions, which were able to capitalise on the workers' 
discontent. Two main oppositional unions can be identified, although the boundaries 
between them were often fluid. The FVdG re-emerged after the war. Its leader Fritz 
Kater conducted a tour of the area between 10 and 17 December 1918 and syndicalists 
played a role in strikes in the Hamborn area in 1919. 98 The Rhenish-Westphalian 
FVdG merged with several other syndicalist unions at a conference in Diisseldorf on 
15 and 16 September 1919 to form the Freie Arbeiter-Union (Free Workers' Union 
Germany, FAU). 99 The most important of these unions for the mining industry was 
the Allgemeine Bergarbeiter Union (General Miners' Union). Formed on 30 March 
1919, the organisation was decentralised and modelled on the basis of the council 
system (Rate system)™ At the end of 1919 the FAUD had some 30,000 Ruhr miners 
among its membership. 101 By 1923, however, the FAUD had some 57,127 members 
and 143 branches in the Ruhr and metalworkers formed the majority, comprising 
34,183 or 59.8 percent of total membership. Miners made up 19,358 or 33.9 percent, 
although at its founding conference 47,060 miners from the Ruhr were represented. 
Furthermore, while the metalworkers had 52 branches with an average size of 657, the 
miners had 70 with an average membership of 277, suggesting that the latter were 
more thinly spread. 102 The years 1919 and 1920 represented a peak for syndicalism in 
the Ruhr, 103 while in South Wales its anti-state doctrines, if not its fighting spirit, were 
largely abandoned in favour of state collectivism.
Tensions between communist and syndicalist elements within the FAUD led 
to a split in 1920 and the formation of Freie Arbeiter Union (Gelsenkirchen) (Free 
Workers' Union Gelsenkirchen, FAU (G)). The FAU (G) was more inclined towards
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communism than syndicalism and in September 1921 it merged with two other 
unions, the Verband der Hand und Kopfarbeiter (Association of Hand and Head 
Workers) and the Freie Landarbeiter Verbandes (Free Agricultural Workers' 
Association) to form the communist Union der Hand- und Kopfarbeiter (Union of 
Hand and Head Workers). 105 It appears that the majority of miners previously 
organised in the FAUD made the move to the FAU Gelsenkirchen and later the 
Union. By the end of 1920 the Union organised approximately 66,000 miners in the 
Ruhr. 106 Eric Weitz claims that, in the mining sector, most of the communists were 
organised in the Union although it proved an undisciplined body. 107 It is clear that 
even within the newer trade unions there were divisions on questions of ideology and 
policy. The pattern of unionisation in the early 1920s was then characterised by 
increased fragmentation. Yet, that these organisations posed a real challenge to the 
established trade unions is revealed by the results of the works councils and 
Knappschaft elections (see tables 4.1 and 4.2). Yet, these results disguise the extent of 
the leftist union's challenge in individual mines. The Dortmund police authorities 
reported in 1924 that the 'the Free Trade Unions state that they have lost more than 40 
percent of their earlier votes. Especially evident is the decline of the mining 
association.' As table 4.3 illustrates, in Dortmund the Alter Verband came second to 
the syndicalists in all but one mine.
The radical unions were able to capitalise on the discontent of the miners with 
the policy of the four established organisations. An example was the eventual 
rejection of six-hour shifts by the Gewerkverein and the Alter Verband and their 
acceptance of overtime. 108 The FAU believed 'that the members of the four miners' 
associations, because of the last action of their leaders, will leave their organisations 
en masse and will fill the syndicalist ranks.' 109 The combined effects of 
disappointment with the ZAG, the emergence of syndicalist-communist unions and 
the demographic fluctuations in the workforce can be clearly seen in the membership 
of the three main pre-war unions (see table 4.4).
After an initial surge in support towards the end of the war, the pre-war trade 
unions saw a steady decline in membership after 1919/1920. Unfortunately, figures 
for the Gewerkverein are fragmentary, but it appears that it proved better at retaining 
its members than did the Alter Verband or the ZZP.
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Source: Jager, Bergarbeitermilieus, p. 47.
Table 4.2: Percentage of seats won on works council election in the Ruhr mining industry by 
the trade unions, 1921-1926
Percentage Participation
Free Trade Union (including Alter Verband)


























































Source: Jager, Bergarbeitermilieus, p. 49. 








































































































Source: Polizeiverwaltung to Regierungsprasident Arnsberg, 28 April 1924, STAM OB A 14481. * At 
Minister Stein the Gewerkverein and the ZZP candidates stood on a joint ticket. Key: S = seats.







































Source: JSger, Bergarbeitermilieus, p. 339; Williams, Capitalism, pp. 88-9. * Approximate figures.
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This impression is reinforced by analysis of the Knappschaft and works' council 
elections. In the former the Gewerkverein was successful in retaining its vote, while in 
the latter it increased its percentage between 1921 and 1926."° The Alter Verband 
and the ZZP, on the other hand, recorded a decrease. The syndicalist-communist 
nature of the FAUD and Union would suggest that they had greater success in 
attracting members from the social-democratic Alter Verband than the religious 
Gewerkverein. Although caution must be exercised in drawing too direct a link 
between Alter Verband losses and FAUD/Union growth, there is some evidence to 
movement from one to the other. Former Alter Verband official Johann Spaniol, for 
example, became leader of the Federation der Bergarbeiter Deutschlands 
(Syndikalisten) (Federation of German Miners, Syndicalist). Its membership in the 
Oberhausen area was almost twice that of the Alter Verband. 111 The agents of the 
Euro Kolpin also reported on the Communist agitation within the members' meetings 
of the Alter Verband and other unions, so that the associations felt obliged to warn 
their members against such actions. I12A KPD member in Hamborn hinted at the depth 
of rivalry between the old unions and the syndicalist-communist organisations arising 
from the revolution. 'When he is in the pit, he always notices the relentless enmity 
between the SPD and the KPD. Co-operation with the SPD is impossible. Our dead 
comrades must shame us if we went along with the SPD.'" 3 Conflict between the 
unions was not only played out within the context of works council and Knappschaft 
elections, but also through physical confrontation. Following the negotiation of an 
overtime agreement communists and syndicalists at the Westerholt mine forced their 
way into the works council room and threatened the Alter Verband and Gewerkverein 
representatives. Since the Union rejected the agreement, the management believed 
that it had become a test of strength between the Union and Alter Verband. 114 The 
management of the Helene and Amalie mines reported that during the February 1919 
strike 'at the Amalie shaft around 150 miners, who for the most part belonged to the 
Gewerkverein, refused to join this movement. A dispute arose between those willing 
to work and the strikers. Armed, the strikers moved to the Amalie mine, occupied the 
shaft and forced the workers to come up. The workers were lined up at the shaft and 
were to be led through Essen in dirty condition (i.e. in their work clothes).' Two 
months later 142,000 miners out of a total workforce of 250,000 struck work in favour 
of a six-hour shift. The Helene and Amalie management reported that the 
Gewerkverein members were content with the seven hours eventually negotiated by
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the ZAG and Reich Labour Minister Bauer, but 'the section of the workforce, which 
belongs to the Communist Party, is not content with the course of the strike.' 115 
Meanwhile confrontation with the Alter Verband could be quite violent. The 
Westfalische Volkszeitung reported the formation of security units to protect the mines 
during the February 1919 strike. A miner was injured at an incident at the Alter 
Verband building in Bochum between these units and armed miners. 116
The divisive nature of trade unionism in the Ruhr during this period is 
highlighted by their different conceptions of socialisation. Initially, there appeared to 
be unanimity on the issue within the region. On 10 January 1919 the local SPD, 
USPD and communists spontaneously formed a nine-man commission in Essen. With 
equal representation given to each group, this Commission of Nine was to prepare the 
ground for socialisation. Furthermore, on 13 January 1919 a conference of Workers 
and Soldiers Council representatives, union and Government representatives 
unanimously adopted a resolution supporting socialisation, although Jiirgen Tampke 
hints that the large crowd that had gathered outside may have intimidated some of the 
delegates. 117
However, the diverse understandings of socialisation were clear to both union 
leaders and outside observers. Imbusch commented at the time that the word had 
become a slogan (Schlagworf) that hid many different meanings. For some it meant 
the abolition of private property, for others workers' control, for yet more 
nationalisation. 118 Bergassessor von Lowenstein commented the following year that 
'the slogan of socialisation possesses however too great an attraction, has become too 
indispensable a means of recruitment (Werbemittel) for the socialist party and the free 
trade unions to drop it in their struggle for existence against the radical movements of 
the Unionists and Communists.' 119
Although the Government initially refused to recognise the Commission, it did 
establish its own Socialisation Commissars. The miners accepted the Commissars in a 
second conference on 20 January and the Government eventually recognised the 
Commission on 14 February. In the meantime tensions between the Commission 
members were increasing due to spontaneous attempts to occupy some mines. But 
it was events in Hervest-Dorsten that precipitated the split between the SPD and left- 
wing representatives. The murder of the president of the colliery clerks' association, 
Kohlmann, provided the army with the excuse to occupy the area. The violence and 
death of forty miners, which followed the arrival of the Freikorps Lichtschlag, was
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condemned by a conference in Miilheim on 16 February and a general strike 
proclaimed. At the miners' conference two days later the USPD and KPD delegates 
supported the proclamation, while the SPD representatives attempted to pass a 
resolution condemning it. The refusal to allow a vote to be taken on the resolution led 
the SPD members to leave the hall and resign from the Commission. 121 This 
effectively ended the co-operation between the three socialist parties in the Ruhr on 
the issue of socialization.
The SWMF did not suffer the same degree of organisational fragmentation. 
Admittedly there were differences of opinion within the union regarding 
nationalisation. Although the SWMF delegates to the MFGB had been at the forefront 
of the decision to adopt nationalisation, there were dissenting voices within the 
organisation. Government sources reported 'support of nationalisation is not 
unanimous. In South Wales and Lancashire there is a good deal of opposition.' 123 
Unrest was further attributed to younger miners.
The situation with regard to nationalisation is on the whole unchanged, 
but recent reports from South Wales indicate that certain sections of 
miners in that coalfield are hostile to the demand of the Miners' 
Federation of Great Britain for nationalisation. In that district there is said 
to be widespread and definite reaction against extremist elements, 
consisting for the most part of young men, inspired by the doctrines of the 
Plebs' League. The older miners are becoming irritated at the constant 
stoppages of work on all sorts of pretexts, and the consequent serious 
losses in wages. In last week's Report a meeting at Gilfach Goch was 
mentioned at which a resolution was passed protesting against the 
nationalisation of the mines. A similar resolution was passed at a largely 
attended meeting at Pontypridd, and it is stated that this attitude was to be 
emphasised by the holding of three great demonstrations of protest in 
representative centres of the South Wales coalfield. These examples of 
opposition to nationalisation, however, must at present be regarded as a 
district exception to the general miners' attitude. 1 4
It was in this vein that some miners led by the Unionist candidate for Rhondda West, 
Gwilym Rowlands, gathered at Mountain Ash Pavilion in April 1920 to protest 
against nationalisation. 1 5
Resistance to nationalisation in South Wales actually came from two 
directions, as noted by the same Government sources.
In addition to the unofficial campaign in South Wales against 
nationalisation of the mines conducted by conservative elements within 
the Miners' Federation it may be noted that there is another unofficial 
movement of a different kind in existence in South Wales. This is the 
Syndicalist movement, which is reported to have a large following in the
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South Wales area. The Syndicalist one is, of course, against the 
nationalisation of the mines on the ground that it is incompatible with the 
conduct of the industry on the principle of 'The Mines for the Miners'. 
Neither of these unofficial campaigns, however, appears to be of very 
great importance, and the great body of miners in South Wales will 
certainly be loyal to the programme of the MFGB. 126
Despite these differences of opinion, in general the miners' movement in South 
Wales was supportive of nationalisation. It is also significant that policy differences 
did not lead to the establishment of separate organisations. In fact, in 1919 and 1920 
the SWMF was successful in merging some of the smaller craft unions into its 
structure. The South Wales Enginemen, for example, voted to merge with the SWMF 
in 1920, 127 while the South Wales and Monmouthshire Colliery Officials Union 
passed a resolution in favour of amalgamation at the end of 1919. 128 William Hopkins, 
leader of the Enginemen, complained that enginemen who joined the SWMF had their 
demands met, but those in the Association did not. 129 He explained that the 'reason for 
[the amalgamation] is because of your (the employers') persistent refusal to do 
anything when we try to get you to improve the position of our lower paid men.' 130 
The employer's intransigent attitude led Hopkins to declare angrily, 'We are simply 
nonentities!' Meanwhile, the SWMF ambition to absorb the smaller unions was 
succinctly put by J. D. Morgan at the 1919 May Day demonstration at Ystradgynlais. 
'It was unfortunate that they had more than one Union in the coal mining industry. 
There were small Unions, which he believed were working to the disadvantage of the 
men as a whole. The days of the small Union were numbered. He believed that the 
whole of the men in the coal mining industry should come into the Miners' Federation 
- whether they worked underground or on the surface.' 132 Table 4.3 illustrates how 
SWMF membership increased in this period.
The defeat of 1921, however, began to reverse this process of amalgamations 
that had occurred since the war. Claude Stanfield, a checkweigher and ILP member, 
recalled that following the defeat there was a lack of interest in unionism among the 
men. 133 Moreover, the Enginemen, Stokers and Craftmens' Association was 
resurrected after the strike as the South Wales and Monmouthshire Mechanical and 
Surface Workers' Union, before reverting to its original name in 1924. The 
Mechanical Union's leader D. B. Jones claimed that its members sought more co­ 
operative, peaceful relations with employers.
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There are many men who are saying that they will not pay to the Miners' 
Federation again and who are turning their attention to us. Some of them - 
I say it quite openly - are not in accord with the spirit of the Miners' 
Federation and object to having conflicts; they want what Mr Bonar Law 
expressed as peace and tranquility; and they think they will get less 
eruptions in our organisation. 134
Occupational differences and the concept of skilled work were also used to 
distinguish the Mechanical Union from the SWMF. Its General Secretary claimed the 
miners had 'no conception of their work; it was of paramount importance to get men 
to conduct the affairs of mechanics and surface workers who had direct knowledge 
and experience of the skilled work they were called upon to perform. The Federation 
catered for those employed at the coal face, forgetting that a strong arm and a thick 
head could cut coal, whilst it required brains to drive an engine.' 135 Although 
employers did not make the re-establishment of the craft union easy, 136 the SWMF 
took its formation seriously and conducted a vigorous, but unsuccessful campaign to 
destroy it. 137 The sense that the SWMF had lost both a degree of cohesiveness and 
power since the 1921 lockout was put succinctly by an unnamed craftsman writing in 
the communist pit paper Red Dawn.
I believe the time had come when a move should be made in a direction 
that would appeal to all mechanical sections in such a way that they would 
immediately leave D. B. Jones and his scab organisation, who are nothing 
but poached members from the Miners' Federation. We would then see 
again in South Wales an organisation that would be a power, catering for 
all sections similar to what was experienced prior to the 1921 lock-out. 138
The 1926 strike, however, saw a further fragmentation of the SWMF. Toward the end 
of the strike the South Wales Miners' Industrial Union was formed. The following 
years saw a long-drawn struggle both against this 'scab' union and non-unionism in 
an effort to rebuild the SWMF.
For both regions the period between 1919 and 1926 were turbulent years. 
However, for the Ruhr miners' unions, they were generally marked by increased 
fragmentation. In the ZAG the older unions saw their first major concession from the 
employers. It provided a focal point for co-operation between the Alter Verband and 
the Gewerkverein and offered the opportunity to overcome the differences that had 
undermined the unions in the past. Unfortunately, this co-operation became 
increasingly negative in scope. Hopes that the ZAG could be used as a stepping stone 
to further concessions and a genuinely tripartite system of industrial relations were
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dashed. Instead both unions were forced into defending it against both radical unions 
and employers. The events of the Revolution left a bitter and enduring legacy of 
resentment between the left-wing trade unions. Violence and death were not 
uncommon and the victims became martyrs for their respective sides. Finally, the 
confusion that surrounded what socialisation actually meant illustrates the fragmented 
nature of the miners' lifeworld. The term was used by all the trade unions, but its 
actual meaning varied enormously between organisations.
The issue of nationalisation in South Wales represented a strong contrast to 
this confusion. Although there was not unanimous support for nationalisation, the 
attitude of the majority of the miners was positive. The meaning of nationalisation 
was also immediately understood. It meant state control. Some, as will be shown in 
the next chapter, sought to go beyond nationalisation. But even these individuals 
recognised the need for state control as a first step. Nationalisation, unlike 
socialisation in the Ruhr, provided a common frame of reference for the Welsh 
miners.
Work Processes and Miners' Communities
The inter-war period saw changes in the work process in both regions. As 
experienced miners were returning from the front, the Ruhr mines lost their POW and 
foreign labour. The system of Raubbau (robbing) during the war meant that many of 
the best seams had been worked, while shortages had led to regression in 
mechanisation that continued in the immediate post-war years. 139 Employers, 
therefore, sought to maintain and increase production by expanding the workforce. 
The number of underground workers increased from 261,348 in 1918 to 384,833 by 
1921, surpassing its pre-war level. Meanwhile, the surface workforce increased from 
90,770 in 1918 to 141,388 in 1922. 140
From the mid-1920s, however, the Ruhr coal companies sought to tackle rising 
costs through rationalisation and mechanisation. By 1924 the workforce was 80,000 
less than it had been in 1922. 141 Bergassessor Mathias wrote of the industry in 1924:
The overall picture of German mining technology today differs 
considerably from the past. In the mining industry [there now] operate 
machines, which win coal, while the pre-war clumsy structure, which 
required many men and [was] only too often paralysed as a result of 
damage, is no more. Today one encounters in great numbers the light, and 
easily handled, one-man, pneumatic pick... 14
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The records of the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks AG confirm this impressionistic 
evidence of widespread mechanisation. In 1925 52.9 percent of its production was 
machine cut, 24 percent was won by shot-firing, while the remaining 23.1 percent was 
won by hand. Of the machine won coal the overwhelming majority (91.9 percent) was 
cut using pneumatic pick. However, the distribution of mechanisation across the 
company's mines was uneven, as shown in table 4.5. 












































Source: Bergrat Funcke to Dr Jungst, 5 October 1925, BBA 625.
Mechanisation undoubtedly made a strong impact, both in terms of coal winning and 
hauling, on the Ruhr coal industry, but did not totally eliminate handworking. 
Stenbock-Fenmor's description of his work underground in the early 1920s illustrates 
the continued existence of the Kameradschaft style of working. 143
The South Wales workforce also expanded in 1919 and 1920. The Housing 
Committee of the Ogmore and Garw UDC anticipated a total increase of 7,810 at the 
collieries in the area in 1918/19. 144 In terms of mechanisation, however, South Wales 
lagged behind the Ruhr. Coombes remembers the first coal-cutting machinery being 
introduced to his area during the war, 145 and, compared with the Ruhr, South Wales 
remained under-mechanised in the 1920s. Trevor Boyns, however, has questioned the 
fairness of accusations that the Welsh owners were slow to introduce machines to 
their mines. He argues that, while geological factors limited the introduction of coal 
cutters, Welsh owners were quick to utilise advances in conveyor technology. More 
importantly, Boyns indicates that the introduction of conveyors largely avoided 
conflict with the hewers and left their small-group style of working relatively 
untouched. 146 Tenfelde has argued that changes in the working methods before the 
war led to a loss of autonomy and solidarity among the miners through deskilling. 
However, as chapter one has shown, work processes in South Wales and the Ruhr
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were not dissimilar before the war. It was in the 1920s, with the widespread 
mechanisation of the Ruhr mines, that the experience of work really began to differ 
between the two regions. While the hewers of South Wales largely continued to work 
in small groups, the German miners had to adapt to new techniques and machinery 
with all the consequences for autonomy, skill and solidarity that Tenfelde suggests. 
When considered in the terms of the comparison, it appears then that the process of 
deskilling in the Ruhr is better located in the 1920s, rather than in the pre-war period 
as Tenfelde does. 147
In the wake of the trade depression and rationalisation came unemployment. 
Interestingly, German historians have regarded the experience of unemployment 
during the Weimar Republic as divisive. The unemployed were increasingly isolated, 
not only from the workplace, but 'also from the organisational and cultural traditions 
of the Social democratic labor movement.' Those who were still employed enjoyed 
the benefits of what wage increases there were as well as social welfare schemes such 
as municipal housing. As a result, there developed 'something of a "respectable" 
working-class culture distinct from the "rougher" street culture.' 148 Historians have 
identified such divisions in the pre-war British working class. 149 The inter-war years, 
on the other hand, saw a lessening of the stigma attached to drawing relief in those 
areas of endemic unemployment. Instead unemployment was 'experienced 
collectively.' 150 Unemployed miners could, for example, remain members of the 
SWMF and were therefore not segregated from their employed colleagues. The 
regionalised nature of unemployment in Britain and the more diverse industrial base 
in the Ruhr suggests that divisions between employed and unemployed were not as 
great in South Wales as in the Ruhr. The Llanbradach Workmen's Hall, for example, 
established a committee to devise a scheme allowing the unemployed and their 
families to use the facilities. 151 However, divisions were not completely absent. In 
1923 the hall's committee passed a resolution refusing free entry to the unemployed, 
apart for a few elderly men who had failed to find work.
The unions, especially those in the Ruhr, also had to contend with 
demographic changes. As shown above, the Ruhr workforce expanded in the early 
1920s. Many of these new miners were young, unmarried and new to the job. 153 This 
new workforce was more amenable to ideas of direct action than the discipline of 
trade union work. Tenfelde characterises the turbulent circumstances in the Ruhr 
during the early years of the Weimar Republic as a 'Generationskonflikt'. Yet this
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movement also drew on older traditions in the mining movement through its use of 
workforce meetings and direct democracy. 154 Lucas, in his study of Hamborn and 
Remscheid, also places the appeal of direct action in the former down to the relatively 
youthful proletariat, whose experiences of discontinuity and insecurity in life made 
direct action seem the best means of immediate redress. 155 In fact, some Bergamter 
complained that, in their rush to recruit, some companies often made no attempt to 
distinguish between peaceful and restless workers. 156
Yet, while the employers were trying to increase the workforce, there is also 
evidence suggesting that many were seeking to leave the Ruhr. In 1919 several of the 
Bergamter reported on active advertising for emigration to South America. Dortmund 
No. 3 office, for example, reported the establishment of an office to organise 
emigration under the direction of Karl Kura, a member of the Mont Cenis 1/3 
workforce. 157 Meanwhile, the Hamm office reported on migration to the less sunny 
climes of Holland. 158
One pre-war milieu particularly affected by this out-migration was the Polish 
sub-culture. As is evident in the above tables, the Polish miners' union, an important 
part of the pre-war milieu, went into terminal decline in the mid-1920s. KleBmann 
notes that the ZZP experienced a certain radicalisation after the war, but found it 
difficult to maintain its membership due to the emigration of the Poles to the 
resurrected Polish State. 159 The Recklinghausen Bergamt reported that the Poles 
tended to return to their homeland rather than emigrate to foreign countries, 16 but 
many also left for the industrial regions of France. The Bochum police claimed that 
'as far as can be observed here a distinct calmness has set in. The organisational 
activity has at any rate essentially slackened. The Polish population acts completely 
indifferently. The emigration of Poles to the French industrial regions 
continues.. .25,000 have arrived, up to now, in those regions.' 161
Such out-migration tended to undermine the Polish milieu and Klefimann sees 
it as facing an existential dilemma in the 1920s. 162 However, the Polish sub-culture 
did not completely break-up. Polish organisations continued their efforts to maintain 
their Polish identity. The Polish Workers' Party, for example, continued to raise the 
issue of Polish language education, although much time was taken up at meetings 
with expressions of support for the Polish State. 163 Furthermore, in some areas, such 
as Bottrop, Polish communities formed part of Communist strongholds. 164 While 
contemporaries regarded the colonies as an obstacle to organisation before the war,
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Bruggemeier argues that after the war both the SPD and KPD were able to make 
inroads. Some even became 'red' strongholds. 165 On one hand, the Polish milieu had 
to contend with the loss of its constituent members, while on the other hand, other 
sections were being integrated into other sub-cultures. The Polish milieu that 
remained was divided between socialist and nationalist variants.
South Wales, on the other hand, experienced a more general loss of 
population, prompted by the downturn in the fortunes of the coal industry. There was 
also a decline in the Welsh language. 166 These demographic changes served to further 
homogenise the mining communities. The process of secularisation prior to the Great 
War also continued in the 1920s. The various denominations recognised that they had 
to engage in interdenominational social work, but, in general, their main focus 
remained on the education and salvation based on individual development. 167 
However, the effects of the decline of the industry and the large strikes of 1921 and 
1926 placed the emphasis on collective rather than self-help. It is probably over 
stating the case to claim that the chapels lost influence simply because 'the chapel
1 ACpeople didn't believe in anything outside it.' During the strikes, the chapels 
performed important relief work. Ultimately, however, they were unable to convert 
their principles into enduring practicalities. 169
Secularisation was a feature of both regions and was aided by the continuing 
spread of secular forms of entertainment. In the 1920s the number of miners' cinemas 
in South Wales increased despite the industrial defeats. 170 The workers' appreciation 
for sport remained undiminished. The football teams of the coastal cities were a focus 
for regional identities for the South Wales miners. 171 Sporting teams, however, did not 
escape the effects of deprivation. The Ammanford rugby club suffered following the 
1925 and 1926 strikes as many of its players left the area in search of work. 172 This 
was despite the relative success of the first strike and the fact that the anthracite 
coalfield was less affected by the decline in coal exports than the rest of the Welsh 
coalfield. 173
Similarly, the Schalke 04 football team was until 1924 dominated by 
miners. 174 Schalke 04 had only 90 members on the eve of the war, but after the 
conflict its membership surged to 1,000. 175 Although the Schalke team was regarded 
as politically neutral, other teams and sporting associations in the Ruhr were linked to 
certain political parties. 176 The links between sport and socialist politics were more 
marked in the Ruhr than in South Wales. In fact, British government reports argued
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that 'the British working man's innate love of sport is the healthiest antidote to 
extremist teaching.' Although sports associations in the Ruhr were not simply 
regarded as recruitment schools for the parties, during the 1920s some associations 
became the foci for power struggles between Communists and Social Democrats. 178 
Especially after the dissolution of the Union, the Communists were reported as 
'gouging' Social democratic organisations from within. 179 However, in general, there 
was a trend towards the commercialisation of leisure that increasingly created a mass 
culture. 180
In South Wales the long strikes also provided ample leisure time for the 
establishment of workers' cricket and other sport teams. 181 For some 'sport' became a 
means of survival. Rees Davies and his brothers, for example, worked as boxers to 
supplement their income. 182 In fact the miners adopted a wide variety of survival 
techniques. During the 1926 strike the Social and Entertainment Committee of the 
Garw Valley put on 130 free concerts, fourteen road races, seven whist drives, ten 
dances, two gymnastic displays, eight boxing tournaments, five drama performances 
and a carnival. 183 Soup kitchens, fund-raising events, stealing from the workplace, 
looting of shops and the working of outcrop coal, all formed part of the miners' 
repertoire of self-help. Despite similarities in the ways the miners tried to make 
ends meet during the industrial disputes of the 1920s, the actual impact of those 
strikes upon the communities differed markedly. Francis and Smith have argued that 
the collective effort of the 1926 strike in particular helped create an alternative society 
within the coalfield. 185 Whether this is the case or not, it seems clear that the industrial 
defeat led the miners to turn increasingly to Labour to satisfy their interests. Other 
historians have stressed how the labour movement captured positions of authority 
from the pre-war elite. Gilbert, therefore, sees the local miners' lodge and Labour
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Party as edging out the influence of the chapels and employers in Ynysybwl. 
Similarly, the socialist Query Club in Tredegar is depicted as waging a concerted 
campaign to establish control of local institutions. 187 Charlie Gibbons' resolution that 
'appeals from Industrial, Political and educational bodies will not be considered or
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entertained unless such bodies are exclusively controlled by the workers', might 
represent an extreme, but it does illustrate the labour movement's commitment to 
extending its influence independent of other groups. It would appear that, despite the 
fragmentation on the industrial level through the re-emergence of craft unionism, on 
the political level a new Labour hegemony was reinforced.
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In the Ruhr, on the other hand, the strikes of 1919 and 1920 and the 
Ruhrkampf of 1920 were not a cohesive experience and led to increased political and 
union fragmentation. The British strikes of 1921 and 1926 occurred under Coalition 
and Tory governments respectively, leaving Labour's political reputation relatively 
untainted and allowing its representatives to play a supportive role to the miners. 189 
The 1919/20 strikes and the Ruhrkampf of 1920, however, occurred under a 
Government headed by the SPD, the self-proclaimed workers' party. The bitterness 
aroused by the use of troops and Freikorps during these disputes further fractured the 
labour movement in the region and reinforced the formation of a Communist milieu. 
The Union and the formation of Communist organisations to rival those of the SPD 
underpinned this milieu. Admittedly, in 1924 the KPD, following Comintern 
instructions, ordered Communists to join existing unions rather than establish radical 
alternatives and the subsequent break with the syndicalist-communist Union led to the 
decline of that organisation. In contrast to South Wales, where industrial events 
reinforced Labour's position, in the Ruhr political events would seem to have actually 
lessened the fractured nature of the union movement. However, this proved short­ 
lived and in 1928 the idea of Communist unions was revived in the form of the 
Revolutionare Gewerkschafts-Opposition (Revolutionary Trade Union Opposition, 
RGO). 190
This section has tried to highlight the fragmented lifeworld the Ruhr miners as 
opposed to a greater continuity in South Wales. In the pit, mechanisation changed the 
nature of work in the Ruhr, while the work of the hewers was less affected in South 
Wales. While sporting teams continued to provide a focus for the community in the 
latter region, in the former different political groups contested them. The older 
milieux that characterised the Ruhr may have begun to break down in the 1920s, but 
their force was far from spent. And new alignments and divisions were also appearing 
in the Ruhr. For example, social divisions opened up between the unemployed and 
those still in work. The opposite was true of South Wales, where the common 
experience of unemployment and long industrial disputes lessened the stigma that had 
been attached to claiming relief before the war. Finally, the erosion of the milieux 
may suggest that a more 'fluid' civil society was beginning to appear, but new social 
alignments underpinned different political movements. The Communists in the Ruhr 




The changed electoral system in Germany and the extended franchise in 
Britain opened up new opportunities for the political parties in the coalfield. The 
Representation of the People Act of 1918 expanded the British electorate to include 
many more workers. There has been debate on the implications of electoral reform for 
the fortunes of the Labour. 191 Whichever position is adopted it is clear the parties were 
now chasing more votes. In Germany reform was more wide-ranging. Adult suffrage 
was introduced for the over 20s, the three-class system abolished and a proportional 
representation list system introduced.
An overview of the political developments in the two regions illustrates a 
continuation in the trends of homogenisation and fragmentation. In South Wales, the 
Labour Party was eventually able to build on its pre-war successes in local 
government and usurp the Liberal dominance, transforming the mining constituencies 
of South Wales into a Labour stronghold. In the Ruhr, on the other hand, the socialist 
labour movement was split. Initially the SPD were successful in winning almost forty 
percent of the vote, while the USPD could only manage four percent. By the 1920 
Reichstag election, however, the SPD vote had collapsed; they were overtaken by the 
USPD and faced a new challenge from the KPD, which had now decided to 
participate in elections. By the 1924 elections the USPD had dwindled to a splinter 
party, the majority of its moderate members rejoining the SPD, its radicals the KPD.
Labour's success in the South Wales mining constituencies was partly based 
on advances it made both in terms of organisation and prestige during the war. The 
confidence of the SWMF and the revitalised TLCs provided a sound basis for Labour 
to expand its political activity, although appeals were made to expand its 
organisational base in other directions. William Harris appealed for the formation of 
local Labour Parties and better organisation among women. 192 To this effect the 
Colliery Workers' Magazine, established by the SWMF in 1923, carried a regular 
women's column that sought to involve them in both industrial and political concerns. 
Often written by Elizabeth Andrews, the Labour Party's Women's Organiser in 
Wales, the column focused on themes that were regarded as having a special salience 
for women, such as housing and pithead baths. 193 Thus while seeking to involve 
women the magazine also revealed a gendered conception of their role, one that 
revolved around domestic and welfare concerns. Despite his appeal Harris too
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revealed a somewhat chauvinist view of women's meetings. He complained 'in the 
smaller villages there is a tendency to depend too much on one or two to carry on the 
work, and if they are absent from the meetings, the whole atmosphere becomes too 
much of the "gossipy" character, whilst if they meet jointly with men, this weakness 
does not exist.' 194
Despite Labour's organisational advances victory was not guaranteed. In 
Ammanford, for example, the local TLC decided to field six candidates in the local 
elections, four of whom were employed in the mines, for the 1919 UDC elections. All 
six were defeated. At the post-mortem the TLC decided it had made a tactical blunder 
in putting up candidates for every seat. 195 It was another two years before Labour 
finally captured the Ammanford UDC. 196 On the other hand, Labour controlled the 
nearby Cwmamman UDC from 1919. 197 The labour movement's dominance was such 
that one contributor to the Amman Valley Chronicle complained during the 1925 
anthracite strike that 'the attitude of the Cwmamman Urban District Council of late 
towards matters that are anti-Labour prompts one to ask whether the local Trades and 
Labour Councils is not ruling the destiny of the area.' 198 Complaints over Labour 
dominance were also raised in Maesteg. The Independents on the UDC repeatedly 
accused Labour of using its dominant position to elect chairmen from their own ranks, 
while passing over non-Labour individuals with more experience. John Evans, the 
Labour chairman, was castigated as an 'ambassador of Lenin' and of using the 
'methods of Russia'. 199
Apart from the continued strength of Liberalism on some local authorities in 
1919 and 1920 there was also some resistance to Labour politics from within the 
labour movement. Die-hard syndicalists like Charlie Gibbons opposed political action 
as an unwelcome diversion. In 1922 Gibbons claimed the 'last election cost £100 to 
this lodge. It was time to turn our attention to the Industrial field, and the money of 
the organisation should be used on the industrial field. The Miners Organisation had 
failed to give us a bread and cheese basis of life, and if we had failed to force the 
Government, what hopes had Local Authorities to do so.' That Noah Tromans, 
Gibbons' main opponent in the Ferndale lodge, was successful in his counter 
resolution by 35 votes to 15 reflects the importance attached to political action, 
especially after the SWMF's first heavy post-war defeat. 200
Local elections in the Ruhr, on the other hand, reflected the fragmentation of 
the socialist movement after 1919. In 1919 the SPD formed the second largest party,
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just behind the Centre, in the Bochum city elections. By 1924 the SPD had slipped 
into joint third place behind the Centre and KPD, although it was able to regain a lead 
over the Communists by 1926 (see table 4.6). 













































Source: Gerhard Stein, Die Wahlen zum Stadtparlament, zum Preussischen Landtag und zum Reichstag 
in der Stadt Bochum in den Jahren 1924 bis 1933, Bochum, July 1970, pp. 15 and 22.
At the parliamentary level Labour successfully dominated the majority of the 
mining constituencies from 1918. However, Pontypridd, Neath and Merthyr Tydfil 
initially fell to Coalition Liberal candidates, while Aberdare re-elected former radical 
Charles Stanton. Stanton, who had joined the National Democratic Party in 1916, 
largely based his appeal on a patriotic, anti-Bolshevik basis and sought to mobilise ex- 
servicemen. Such support was transitory and, following the decline of the British 
Workers' League, Stanton was forced to rely on Conservative support. This proved 
inadequate to secure his re-election in 1922 and the Labour candidate George Hall 
defeated him. 201 Since the miners formed a majority, or at least a substantial part, of 
the electorate in the constituencies shown in table 4.7, it is reasonable to assume that 
most gave their vote to Labour, although some continued to support the Liberals and 
the Conservatives at all electoral levels. 202
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Table 4.7: Seats contested by Labour, 1918-1924: Percentage of Labour vote in South Wales 






































































Source: D. Tanner, 'The Pattern of Labour Polities' in Tanner, Williams and Hopkin (eds.), Labour, p. 
119. * Labour lost these elections.
Due to the plurality of parties in the Ruhr and the more diverse socio- 
economic structure of the region it is much more difficult to draw direct links between 
the miners and a particular party. Some contemporaries and historians seem to suggest 
that the miners were well represented among left-wing organisations.203 Hans 
Spethmann, for example, sees the miners as particularly involved with the Ruhr Red 
Army. 204 This approach is supported by Tschirbs, who sees the 80,000 strong force as 
being predominantly made up of miners. 205 Others, however, have questioned the 
miners' involvement. 206 Of the sixteen leaders that Lucas mentions in his study of the 
Army only two are described as miners. 207 Fragmentary evidence from court-martials 
following the conflict reveals that in Recklinghausen 50 out of 67 prisoners were 
described as Bergmann, one as Steiger. In Essen, on the other hand, miners made up 
only 45 out of 182 court-martialled prisoners, although they seemed to form the single 
largest occupational group.208 The different proportion of miners, 76 percent against 
25, probably reflects the greater occupational diversity in Essen as opposed to 
Recklinghausen. It seems, therefore, that miners were not over-represented among the 
Army. Moreover, participation in the Army does not automatically equate with 
political radicalism and could be partly viewed as a defensive reaction to the 
perceived threat posed by the Freikorps and Reichswehr troops.
There is some impressionistic evidence that points to wider KPD support from 
the miners. Stenbock-Fermor met several committed Communists in the mine, but 
these were the exception rather than the rule. He found the miners generally apathetic
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and believed they harboured a strong distrust of 'intellectuals', a term which 
encompassed the KPD leadership. He believed that the miners supported the KPD as 
the lesser of other evils. Interestingly, he also hints at a generational difference among 
the workforce, for while he sees the Communists as the most strongly supported 
group, some of the older workers retained SPD sympathies. 209 Other evidence 
suggests that the miners, while an important source of Communist support, were not 
overly represented among activists. Only in three areas were Communist city 
councillors predominantly miners (see 4.8). Furthermore, reports on the strength of 
KPD cells in the mines suggest that they were in decline in 1924 (see table 4.9). 

























































Source: Beatrix Herlemann, Die kommunalpolitik Aktivitaten der KPD im Ruhrgebiet, 1914-33, Ph.D, 
Ruhr-Universita't Bochum, Appendix. Not all cities had elections in 1926. * The councils were 
expanded for the 1926 elections.






















Source: Oberprasident to Minister des Innern, 10 October 1924, STAD 16910.
Of the thirty-eight shafts in the Gelsenkirchen area only six were reported to have 
KPD cells. Membership in the area had fallen from 1,876 to 558, while in Buer it had 
declined from 1,850 in 1923 to 300 in 1924. Membership in Bochum had shrunk from 
1,200 in May 1923 to 450 in 1924. The police report concluded that the decline in 
KPD support was due to fear of the police and French occupation authorities.
The report also reveals some of the difficulties the KPD had to operate under. 
The party's main newspaper in the region the Ruhr-Echo was periodically banned,
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while demonstrations were broken up and leaders arrested and victimised. As a result 
the party became increasingly isolated from the workplace and took its activities on to 
the streets. Moreover, the party's basis of support came increasingly from the 
unemployed.211 In fact, the KPD made efforts to organise the unemployed.212 A police 
report on a meeting of the Essen KPD recorded the leadership's view that 'the 
factories are controlled not by the Communists, but the Social Democrats and the 
Centre. The majority of the membership is at the moment unemployed; the KPD is 
actually the party of the unemployed.' Its membership stood at 7,600, but out of 
29,230 miners in the area only 339 were KPD members.213
Table 4.10 reveals that the decline in the SPD vote very roughly equalled the 
increase in the USPD/KPD vote. The Centre's votes, on the other hand, remained 
fairly even between 1919 and 1924. Admittedly, this is a somewhat crude analysis as 
it does not account for first time voters, nor does it provide a breakdown of votes by 
occupation. It would appear that the KPD did draw a substantial current of support 
from the miners which had previously voted SPD, but it is also clear that the SPD 
maintained a core of support and that, by the second election in 1924, was beginning 
to recover some ground (see table 4.10). 






































Source: Jager, Bergarbeitermilieus, p. 30. Under Biirgerliche Parteien Jager includes the DNVP, DVP, 
DDP, WP and CSVD.
While the KPD represented a formidable challenge to the SPD, the 
Communists in South Wales did not become a major challenge to Labour. Several 
reasons can be cited for this difference. First, divisions between pro- and anti-war 
figures in the South Wales labour movement did not have the same degree of 
acrimony as they did in the Ruhr and did not linger on into the 1920s. Morgan Jones, 
for example, had served eighteen months as a conscientious objector during the war, 
yet became Labour MP for Caerphilly in 1921 and held the seat until his death in 
1939.214 Secondly, although South Wales certainly experienced a certain degree of
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violence during the 1920s it was not comparable to the armed conflict in the Ruhr. 
Violence in South Wales occurred not between rival political groups, but was directed 
against the blacklegs who broke the norms of the labour movement. The small 
Communist minority participated in the strike of 1921 and 1926 alongside their 
Labour counterparts. The psychological gulf that emerged between the SPD and KPD 
as a result of political violence was avoided in South Wales. Third, Communists in 
South Wales did not seek to establish counter-organisations that posed a direct threat 
to the SWMF and Labour Party. Arthur Horner remembered that 'the Communist 
Party was never, in my mind, a breakaway from either the Trade Union Movement or 
the Labour Party. In the early years, Communists remained members of the Labour 
Party. The Party was designed as a spearhead of the working class, with a Marxist 
philosophy and a readiness to defend at all times the real interests of the working 
class.' 215 The powerful position of the SWMF immediately after the war made the 
notion of a separate union movement a non-starter. Instead, like the syndicalists in the 
pre-war movement, the communist activists in South Wales sought to work through 
the existing labour organisations.
The extent to which the Welsh Communists remained rooted within the 
traditions of the pre-war labour movement can be exaggerated. Tension between more 
moderate and radical activists on both the industrial and political level should not be 
overlooked. An example of this tension can be seen in Hartshorn's resignation due to 
'an atmosphere of hate and suspicion which has been created against leaders who 
believe in steady revolutionary reform.' 216 Following the 1918 election he was also at 
pains to distinguish Labour from Communist. He complained about the manner in 
which the party had been labelled Bolshevik. This was 'a charge so sweeping as that 
brings within its effects not only the few men who are preaching revolution, but the 
far greater number of sober Labour leaders.' 217 Tom Richards, SWMF Secretary, 
expressed a similar view when he criticised Communist policy, 'you can destroy 
capitalism only by destroying the people of this country. When we have sense enough 
to take hold of the reins of government of this country, depend upon it there will be no
*? 1 8need to shout class warfare or advocate revolution.'
Yet, despite these tensions, the most striking aspect of the Communists' 
relationship with Labour, in comparison to the KPD and the SPD, is the degree of 
openness. As will be shown the Colliery Workers' Magazine provided a forum both
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for those who opposed and supported Communist ideas. Such reasoned debate was 
more difficult in the acrimonious atmosphere in the Ruhr.
Summary
The Great War accentuated the pre-war trends visible in political and 
industrial developments in South Wales and the Ruhr in the period 1919 to 1926. 
First, there was greater continuity in the lifeworld of the Welsh miners than in that of 
the Ruhr miners. Secondly, despite an observable erosion of the old milieux that 
characterised Wilhelmine society, the emergence of new social divisions meant that 
civil society in the Ruhr remained comparatively more segmented than in South 
Wales.
In the terms of trade unionism, the strength of the SWMF coupled with the 
importance of Welsh steam coal for the war effort gave the union a superior position 
in its negotiations with employers. When employers sought to resist wage increases 
the Government interfered to the benefit of the union. As a result the union was able 
to expand its membership and absorb the smaller craft unions in the industry. The 
SWMF came out of the war with an overwhelming sense of confidence, which was 
expressed by its support for nationalisation. By the end of 1922 this confidence 
severely dented and the position of the SWMF began to deteriorate as the craft unions 
broke away. It suffered a more debilitating blow at the end of the 1926 strike with the 
formation of the South Wales Miners' Industrial Union.
However, even the defeats the SWMF suffered in 1921 and 1926, and the 
consequent unemployment and hardship, added to the synchronous nature of the 
lifeworld of the Welsh miners. The commonality of these experiences generally 
helped to draw the mining communities closer together. Moreover, there was greater 
continuity in the way the Welsh miner experienced work. Although the introduction 
of conveyors affected the hauliers, the hewers' small working groups were largely 
untouched.
Unlike the SWMF the mining unions in the Ruhr were unable to use the war to 
expand their influence and the ordinary miners were subject to a far greater degree of 
deskilling through mechanisation. The employers were able to use the argument that 
the mining unions did not represent the whole of the workforce. The structure of the 
mining workforce in the Ruhr also underwent substantial change during the war. The 
employment of female, youth, foreign and POW labour further undermined trade
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union attempts to exert influence over the employers and the state. Since the unions 
were unable to protect their members' interests, and the majority of miners were not 
members anyway, the workers turned to short-lived strikes to force higher wages and 
better rations from management. The strikes, through their use of workforce meetings 
and direct democracy, tapped into an older tradition of miners' protest and were 
particularly amenable to syndicalist tactics. The flood of young workers into the area 
immediately after the war further strengthened the appeal of direct action. Thus, while 
Alter Verband and Gewerkverein drew closer together, the miners' movement was 
split on the left by the emergence of syndicalist-communist unions. Strikes were 
generally divisive affairs that set one group of miners against another (or one 
generation against another). Finally, inter-union dialogue was undermined by the 
myriad, competing interpretations of socialisation. By 1924 the threat posed by these 
radical organisations had changed. While rationalisation and stabilisation weakened 
the syndicalists, the KPD tried to take their struggle against the Social Democrats into 
the Free Trade Unions in 1924.
On the political level, the war strengthened Labour in the mining 
constituencies. Through their efforts on local authorities and on the TLCs Labour was 
able to demonstrate its ability to see to the needs of the working class and support 
their interests. The party also benefited from the growing strength of the SWMF and 
the close links between the two was mutually beneficial. Labour also escaped an 
enduring schism between pro- and anti-war camps. Indicative of the comparatively 
fluid civil society in South Wales is the relationship between the Communists and 
Labour. For most of this period double membership was tolerated. Although there 
were tensions between Labour and the small groups of Communist activists, both 
groups worked together during the strikes. The community endeavour of these strikes 
coupled with the decline or incorporation of the older elite based on the chapel, 
allowed a strongly pro-Labour political culture to emerge in the mining valleys.
This toleration of multiple group membership is in sharp contrast to the Ruhr. 
In Germany the war caused an enduring and acrimonious split in the SPD. The war 
was a much more controversial issue for the SPD than for the Labour Party and the 
pretence that it was a defensive conflict became increasingly hard to sustain after the 
defeat of Russia. The comparatively more segmented nature of civil society and the 
leadership's desire to impose harmony on the organisation meant that the SPD found 
it more difficult to tolerate plural discourses within its own organisation. An example
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of this was the party's decision to shut down social-democratic papers, which began 
to criticise the war effort. The dissidents were forced to split from the SPD if they 
were to air their own discourse. Although many of the USPD eventually rejoined the 
SPD, the radical majority filled the KPD ranks. For this group memories of the 
Revolution were raw and immediate and co-operation with the SPD scarcely an 
option. The KPD sought to create, or capture organisations, to create its own milieu to 
rival those of the SPD and the Centre. Part of the KPD strength came from the older 
Polish milieu, which was increasingly dividing into nationalist and socialist camps, 
despite the emigration of many Polish workers. In the 1920s the KPD became 
increasingly a party of the unemployed and streets rather than the workforce, but the 
process of rationalisation in the mines provided a large potential electorate. As Weitz 
argues, a consequence of increasing unemployment was a social-cultural division in 
the German working class. Unemployment was a collective experience in South 
Wales and served to strengthen Labour, but in the Ruhr it further divided the German 
miners. Divisions in the Ruhr stretched across the social, cultural and political, 
strengthening splits in each and in turn being strengthened. By contrast, in South 
Wales, the collective experience of the miners in each area was mutually reinforcing.
These experiences, however, had to be interpreted and reinforced by the trade 
unions and the political parties. The identities they created were crucial as attempts to 
interpret the events around them. Issues such as nationalisation, socialisation, national 
identity and class were the key concepts that made up the stuff of those identities.
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Chapter Five 
Miners' Trade Unionism and Political Identities, 1918-1926
'He used to think that Liberalism stood for that once [the welfare of the 
majority of the people]. When he first took an interest in politics, the great 
voices of Gladstone, Tom Ellis and the young Lloyd George still rang... In 
those days he felt like Wordsworth that it was a blessing to be alive, but; 
'Oh! For a touch of the vanished hand/And the sound of that voice which 
is/ still.' They did not find the idealistic note there was in those days. 
Regretfully he said it [the Liberal Party] was a hard, commercialised party. 
He had ceased to hope for the coming of the golden age he longed and 
yearned and prayed for.' Rev Waldo Lewis explaining his conversion to 
Labour during electioneering at Carmarthen. 1
'We're cheated by everyone, but by the KPD the least, that's why we vote 
for them.' A miner's comment to Stenbock-Fermor during his sojourn in 
the mines. 2
Introduction
The preceding chapter sought to illustrate the effects that total war had upon 
the lifeworld and civil society in the South Wales and Ruhr coalfields. This chapter 
turns back to the discursive practices of the trade unions and the political parties as 
they sought to interpret the turbulent events in which they found themselves 
enmeshed. In South Wales, the Fed was strengthened, while the Labour party 
eventually superseded the Liberals. In the Ruhr, new syndicalist-communist 
organisations challenged the older unions. The SPD vote, following the highpoint of 
the 1919 Nationalversammlung campaign, was devastated in the subsequent 
Reichstag elections. However, the question remains as to how this intensification of 
homogenisation and fragmentation consolidated through the discourse of the 
organisations, both industrial and political. How was the Labour party able to usurp 
the position of the Liberals in the mining valleys, while the Fed amalgamated the 
smaller craft unions immediately after the war? On the other hand, why did the 
socialist labour movement in the Ruhr split between the Communists and the Social 
Democrats?
Of special interest is the degree to which the issue of nationalisation or 
socialisation acted as a rallying point for both the political and industrial 
organisations. In post-war South Wales, the Labour party continued to incorporate 
elements of Liberalism, such as concerns with Disestablishment and nationalism, into 
its discourse, while at the same time strengthening its image as the party of the
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working class during the strikes and lockouts. In the context of conflict between 
labour and capital in the 1920s, the party was thus able to adopt the mantle of 
progressivism from Liberalism. In the Ruhr, the Centre party largely continued to 
propound a discourse similar to that used in Wilhelmine Germany, although it 
dropped its monarchism. The SPD meanwhile found itself in the difficult position of 
being the party of the Republic. The USPD, and later the KPD, partly inherited from 
the SPD the mantle of the anti-capitalist party. The SPD, therefore, found its position 
as the party of the left seriously challenged. This situation had not existed under the 
Empire. If, as Ross McKibbin has suggested, 1920s British politics was essentially the 
extension of an ossified Edwardian form of politics, 3 then Weimar politics represented 
new and turbulent territory.
Socialisation and Nationalisation
As pointed out in the previous chapter the issue of socialisation was 
symptomatic of the divisions in miners' trade unionism in the Ruhr. The term had 
become a slogan that was exploited by all the trade unions. It became yet another as a 
means of recruitment.4 Yet, beneath the slogans very different conceptions and values 
were attached to the idea of socialisation. Although several variants and numerous 
plans existed, three broad approaches can be distinguished: socialisation as 
nationalisation, socialisation through small share ownership and socialisation as 
workers' control.
The fragmentary nature of the various radical trade unions in the Ruhr makes 
identifying a common approach to workers' control of the mines difficult to pin down. 
The cases of 'wild' socialisation in 1919 have been portrayed as a response to the 
economic difficulties that faced the miners in the Ruhr. In this interpretation the 
occupation of individual mines represented the most obvious form of redress in a 
country whose economy was characterised by shortages and had little to do with a 
loftier sounding, but less materialistic, growth of class consciousness. 5
This view is certainly justified when applied to the 'wild' socialisation. 
However, the Commission of Nine, the body elected following the seizure of the 
Zechenverband offices in 1919, did attempt to provide an ideological basis for 
socialisation. Its particular conception of socialisation was set out in the pamphlet Die 
Sozialisierung des Bergbaues und der Gemralstreik im rheinisch-westfalischen 
Industriegebiet. The pamphlet began with the economic background to the unrest that
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characterised the region in 1919. Of all the workers the miners were portrayed as 
suffering most under the war economy. Admittedly wages had risen, but not in 
relation to prices and 'a wage demand was not to be thought of. First the mines were 
rull of forced workers, POWs and civilian prisoners, and the skilled miner, who could 
not be so easily replaced, was kept in place by the threat - slave away and keep your 
head down or the trenches.' Under these circumstances it was not surprising that, 
following the end of the war, there was a flood of wage demands. However, 'the 
capitalists countered the wage demands with the sharpest resistance, insisted on the 
profits and their 'Herr-im-Hause' standpoint. So it came to 'wild' strikes, which 
threatened in December to cripple the whole economy.'
It was in this situation that the idea of socialisation found fertile soil. 
However, the Commission was careful to draw a distinction between its idea of 
socialisation and the 'wild' socialisation. The establishment of Workers' and Soldiers' 
Councils is seen as a positive step towards socialisation, but 'unfortunately confusion 
still reigned on how socialisation was actually to be understood.' The pamphlet 
argued that socialisation was not to be understood with the simple phrase 'the pit 
belongs to us' and that coal could be exchanged for food supplies. This 'childishness', 
propagated by the Syndicalists, made less and less impression on the miners. 6 Instead 
there, 'soon came the clarity that of the control of the mines by the workers must 
precede socialisation, that it is a prerequisite of socialisation and at the same time its 
important component. And not only control of the individual works, but also the 
employers' organisations.' 7
The Commission, therefore, perceived socialisation as meaning workers' 
control of not only the mines, but also the whole administrative apparatus of the 
industry. The Commission modelled its socialisation plans on the Ratesystem (council 
system) established during the Revolution. Peter von Oertzen sees the two, 
socialisation and the Ratesystem, as inseparable. 8 The Commission explained the 
Ratesystem as:
the workers, the industrial workers and employees (Angestellten), the 
agricultural workers and the farmers, the soldiers, administrating their 
affairs themselves. It means, through its full application (like in Russia), 
the complete transformation of the state, in which the rule of bureaucracy 
and parliamentarianism is to great degree superfluous. Through only its 
partial application it means an advance against capital's power and 
bureaucracy, in which control of the capitalist works and authorities is 
brought about - not through Parliament, whose control becomes
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completely illusionary in the course of time because of the complication 
(Komplizierung) of the state machine - but by the workers. 9
The system was made up of a pyramid of councils divided into four levels:
i) Steigerrevierrate, which was responsible for safety in the individual districts 
in the mine. Echoing the Alter Verband's pre-war concern with the safetymen, 
and thereby illustrating some of the continuities between the organisations, the 
Commission argued that these new councils would not prove a 'white 
ointment', but would be able to properly enforce health and safety regulations.
ii) Zechenrdte, which oversaw the whole mine
iii) Bergrevierrate, which represented the common interests of mines in certain 
geographical areas
iv) Zentralzechenrat (Central Mines Council), which was to oversee the entire 
condition of the industry in the region I0
Interestingly, it was suggested that the Central Council would have the toughest job as 
it would have to watch over the various employers' organisations, suggesting that 
those organisations would still exist. However, the scheme was seen very much as 
part of a process of working towards workers' control and ultimately there would be 
no role left for the owners.
The slow introduction of socialisation further distinguished the Commission 
from the Syndicalists. Expanding on the ideas of childishness, the Commission sought 
to portray the Syndicalists as simple or unreasonable. All 'thinking workers' were to 
resist efforts at wild socialisation, while 'no reasonable person believed, that 
socialisation could be immediately enforced.' The councils were to exercise control as 
a check to the encroachment of the mineowners' power. 'The miners are then ready to 
tolerate the yoke of private capitalism a while [longer], but they insist that the right of 
control, which is in their interest, as in the interest of the commonality 
(Allgemeinheif), absolutely necessary, [and] must be immediately introduced. The 
councils shall serve this control and only this control.'
If the council system represented a transitional stage, a milestone on the way 
to socialisation, the Commission was in no doubt of the legitimacy of its demands. In 
response to the Government's refusal to recognise the Commission, the pamphlet 
stated:
The gentlemen of the Government can indeed concede or refuse the 
authority of this Commission. That is their affair. But they cannot decide, 
whether it continues to exist or not. The Commission of Nine is an 
organ of the revolutionary workforce. They have created this 
Commission and alone decide [its future]; the Government has then
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nothing at all to say and the workforce can cry to it: Hands off! The 
revolutionary workforce itself has created this organ to prepare the 
socialisation of the mining industry. This socialisation will come, whether 
it is enforced by the Government or against it; that is still the question. In 
any case it will be enforced by the workforce...So long as the miners of 
the Rhenish-Westphalian industrial areas believe that [the industry] 
must be socialised, they will require an organ that prepares this 
socialisation and only people, who have the full trust of the 
revolutionary workers, can form this organ 12
For the Commission its legitimacy was located in the perceived revolutionary nature 
of the working class, and of the miners in particular. The Commission itself stood 
outside the normal structures of authority. Indeed, the insistence that the elected 
Government had no authority over the Commission raised the issue of dual control, if 
only in the mining industry. The Commission clearly perceived itself as the nucleus of 
a new society: a society that would be realised through the transformation of the 
existing order. As already mentioned Russia was seen as an example of how this 
transformation might work out in practice, although within the document as a whole 
the Soviet-style of Government was not taken as a model to be imitated. It has been 
suggested that the Ratesystem, of which socialisation was an integral part, offered a 
third way between communist dictatorship and bourgeois democracy. 13 However, if 
Soviet Russia was not a model, the Commission too placed the interests of the 
working class first and above the more diverse social interests represented by the 
Nationalversammlung. Such heavy emphasis on the revolutionary working class, 
coupled with the radical left-wing political composition of the Commission after 16 
February 1919, was unlikely to expand the appeal of socialisation beyond the working 
class, or beyond even a certain section of the working class. There also existed 
competing conceptions of socialisation. It therefore seems unlikely that the issue of 
socialisation could have attracted broad enough support among the working class, let 
alone across German society as a whole, to provide a viable 'third way'.
Yet if the Commission rejected the authority of the SPD dominated 
government, it was conscious that its theoretical basis was still to be found within 
social-democratic ideology. Criticism of the SPD minister was harsh and the 
Commission felt compelled to point out that, in its original form, it had included SPD 
representatives. 14 In fact, the Commission played upon its social-democratic heritage.
Until now socialisation was for every Social Democrat a clear and 
unambiguous concept. It means 'expropriation of the expropriators', as 
Karl Marx classically expressed it. It means: revocation of private
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property in the means of production, expropriation of the previous owner, 
the transfer of this means of production to the ownership of society, the 
communality. The ruling Social Democrats appear with the acceptance of 
their offices to have thrown this social-democratic view over board, 
because in their ordinance the bracketed socialisation is still only 
synonymous with 'influence through the Reich' and a 'share of the 
people's community (Volksgesamtheif) in its profits'. Instead of the 
social-democratic, robust view, 'socio-political' blather! Instead of the 
struggle against the power of capital, a shameful pact with the capitalist 
rulers! 15
In this sense the Commission members, and by implication their wider supporters, 
were being portrayed as the keepers of the old faith. It was they who had remained 
true to the principles of the SPD as adopted by the Erfurt conference of 1891. The 
MSPD, especially those that had accepted office, were seen as at best as individuals 
who had lost their way, at worst traitors. Later the pamphlet described the Alter 
Verband, Gewerkverein and ZZP decision not to support the call for a general strike 
in February 1919 under the heading of betrayal. 16 The Alter Verband was, owing to its 
MSPD sympathies, singled out for special criticism. 'Once - long, long ago - [the 
Alter Verband] carried forward the red pennant of the fighting proletariat, today its 
leaders have made it into a strike-breaking organisation.' Such language echoed pre­ 
war accusations directed at the Gewerkverein by the Alter Verband. Expanding the 
betrayal/faith metaphor the Alter Verband leaders were described as 'genuine 
Judases.' 17 In other words, the MSPD and Alter Verband had lost their position as the 
vanguard of the class struggle; that honour now fell to the Commission who were 
continuing the decade's long fight against capitalism.
The conclusion of the pamphlet clearly distinguished the Commission's idea 
of socialisation from others. 'Socialisation [was] not mere nationalisation 
(Verstaatlichung) of the mining works, but the transfer of mining property to the 
community and the administration of the industry to the workers' councils. Ultimately 
then control was to rest with the workers themselves, the state playing only a 
subsidiary role.
Although the primary evidence is somewhat fragmentary, it is clear that the 
diverse syndicalist-communist trade unions also supported a notion of socialisation 
that was predicated on the idea of relentless class conflict between the workers and 
the owners. In fact, the antagonistic attitude towards employers was even more clearly 
expressed by these organisations than by the Commission. The Union der Hand und
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Kopfarbeiter, despite tensions between syndicalist and communist wings, was clear 
on the relationship between employers and employed. The Union claimed in its organ 
that 'resistance to socialisation is grounded in the class instinct of the exploiters 
(Ausbeutertums), which is nurtured and maintained by the interests of property.' On 
the other hand, 'socialisation itself is sustained by the class interest of the exploited 
[and] is dictated by inalienable, natural human rights. Measured against the strengths 
of these two camps, [the realisation of] socialisation means an extremely hard and 
stubborn struggle.' 18
The emphasis on class, struggle and betrayal by the Social Democrats also 
provided the main themes within the discourse of the other syndicalist-communist 
unions and left-radical parties. An Allgemeine Arbeiter Union leaflet distributed at the 
General mine addressed the 'revolutionary workers' and condemned the treachery of 
the SPD. The 'working class must take up the struggle against the whole of capitalist 
society, overthrow the ruling authority and erect [their] own power.' The workers of 
the Ruhr, miners and metalworkers were characterised as the 'vanguard' of the 
German and West European revolutionary workers' movement. 'They must see the 
clearest, travel the furthest down the route of revolution; they must most keenly 
recognise their enemies.' Among those enemies were the other trade unions. The 
FAUD were criticised for not accepting the importance of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, while the FAU (G) was seen as not accepting the basic nature of the 
struggle. True revolutionaries were to leave these bodies and join the AAU. 'The 
revolutionary working class must recognise that they [can] never co-operate in the 
organs of the capitalist economy.' The only way the workers could realise their true 
freedom was through 'uncompromising class conflict.' For the AAU, like the Union, 
there was no middle ground in this conflict. It was a question of being for or against 
the revolution. 19
The syndicalist FAUD, while accepting the unavoidable conflict between 
capital and labour, also believed that the other unions needed to be fought as they 
were 'after all only institutions of bureaucracy. Where bureaucracy rules little is 
achieved, therefore our task must be to educate and enlighten the miners.' On the 
other hand, an invitation to affiliate with the Communists was rejected since the FAU 
was 'a purely economic fighting organisation and not a political organ.' 
Parliamentarianism and political parties were also condemned because they were 
tainted by the interest of capital. 21 A pamphlet entitled 'What do the Syndicalists
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want?' differentiated the movement from the 'Marxist parties.' The SPD, USPD and 
KPD were supposedly obsessed with the conquest of political power, which drew 
attention away from what really mattered, the economic struggle.22 What was lacking 
in German society was a spirit of solidarity among the working class. It could be 
created through a general strike. 23
It is clear then that there were differences in the discourses of the communist 
and syndicalist groups. At the same time the boundaries between these discourses 
were permeable, especially immediately after the Revolution. Both sides eventually 
published leaflets and booklets in an effort to demarcate their organisational 
identity. 24 Yet the various left-wing trade unions, be they syndicalist or communist, 
shared a common view of industrial relations. Both employers and workers were 
depicted as being in inevitable conflict, two monolithic forces struggling for the 
control of the industry. Any system of bargaining was therefore seen as an unwelcome 
compromise, a 'stale peace between capital and labour.' 25 Where the unions differed 
was in how the conflict was to be resolved. All agreed on the importance of the strike 
as a weapon. This is made clear in the numerous calls for general strikes, which 
characterised industrial relations during the 1920s. Where the unions differed was in 
their understanding of the role politics played in the final liberation of the proletariat. 
The syndicalists, as illustrated in the FAUD's rejection of the Communist invitation to 
engage in joint political action, saw the true site of struggle as the pit itself. For the 
FAUD, the general strike itself would ultimately destroy the forces of capitalism, all 
other strikes being skirmishes in the war. For the Communist trade union members, 
the strike was an adjunct to political action. Ultimately, as the AAU leaflet shows, it 
was the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat that would break the chains 
that were seen as fettering the workers. For the Syndicalists the miner was seen as 
fighting on one front. He was an economic warrior pure and simple. Too much 
engagement with politics could only provide a distraction and prove a weakness. 
Meanwhile, for the Communists, the miner was the 'vanguard' of the revolutionary 
workforce in both the industrial and political spheres. The general strike, the armed 
insurrection and the ballot were all weapons in the armoury of the proletariat, their 
usefulness fluctuating according to circumstance.
As already pointed out, the Union was a rather diverse, confused body, 
embracing syndicalists and communists, a characteristic that proved a constant 
headache for the KPD leadership.26 Their differences were enough to keep the
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activists, who drove the unions forward and determined their direction apart. 
Ultimately this contributed to the weakness of miners' unionism in the Ruhr and made 
resistance to the employer's offensive from the mid-1920s onward more difficult. 
Unlike the pre-war period, during which ethnicity and religion had generally 
prevented trade union co-operation,27 it was now more clearly ideology and those 
responsible for its manufacture and dissemination, which prevented the trade unions 
from finding a common ground.
Despite these differences, the similarities between the language used by the 
left-wing unions and that used by the Alter Verband before the war are striking. The 
relationship between employers and employed is defined in terms of conflict and 
socialisation reduced to a trial of strength. Indeed, the emphasis and importance 
placed on the strike as a weapon echoes the belligerent attitude of the Alter Verband 
during the early 1890s, before Moller and Hue forged a more restrained image. 28 In 
some respects the language employed by the syndicalist and communist unionists 
represented a reassertion of that more aggressive strain in the discourse of the Alter 
Verband and complemented the re-emergence of the tradition of pit-head meetings 
and direct democracy. As described in the previous chapter the USPD, KPD and 
syndicalists often drew their strength from the old left-wing currents of Social 
Democracy. As shown above, the Commission at least was very conscious of its 
social-democratic heritage and sought to establish a lineage linking itself to the SPD 
of the Wilhelmine Empire. Similarly, within the meetings and publications of the 
Union, AAU and FAUD, there is a sense that they saw themselves as the true bearers 
of the workers' revolution, while the Alter Verband and SPD were betraying it.
In much the same way the Communists regarded themselves as the true 
inheritors of the revolutionary tradition. The old link with Social Democracy was not 
forgotten and could be shown in a positive light. For example, during the 1925 
presidential election a potted biography of the communist candidate and KPD leader, 
Ernst Thalmann appeared in the Westfalischer Kdmpfer. Like pre-war SPD 
propaganda it concentrated on the fact that Thalmann was a working-class candidate. 
Among his credentials was his membership of the SPD from the age of sixteen. His 
break with the SPD occurred during the war when he challenged the 'treacherous 
policy of the Social Democrats.' Yet his previous party membership was still included 
as part of his '20 years in the labour movement.' 29 The idea of treachery implied that, 
unlike the remaining SPD activists, Thalmann had kept the faith. During the campaign
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Thalmann spoke at both Essen and Dortmund. Symbolising the internationalism of the 
movement unnamed representatives of both the English and French Communists 
spoke at his meetings. Thalmann himself stressed how the KPD had taken the mantle 
of defenders of the working class. He conflated the forces of the Republic and the 
monarchy, represented respectively by their flags, and depicted them as united against 
the working class. Worse, those who ruled in the Republic were also those who had 
run business under the monarchy. The blame was laid squarely on the shoulders of the 
SPD. Even here in the Ruhr, 'the historic land of the German class struggle', the SPD 
had betrayed the workers in the aftermath of the Kapp Putsch. 30
An earlier article in the paper had also focused on the betrayal of the Bielefeld 
agreement. For the authors the Red Ruhr Army had held victory in its hands, but had 
allowed it to slip away because it lacked a strong, centralised communist party and 
had believed the promises of the Social Democrats. 'Through the duplicity of the 
social democratic leaders the mass action of the Ruhr proletariat was choked.' Four 
years later the situation was different. Now just such a party existed, but first the 
workers had to be clear, 'that only one party represented their interests in Germany.' 
Again mixing republican and monarchist imagery, the paper saw a united front of 
'black-white-red-gold workers' traitors' storming against the KPD. However, once 
the revolutionary workers were united under the KPD banner the 'cadaver of Social 
Democracy' could be removed.31
The idea that the SPD had betrayed the revolutionary workers and were a 
spent force was a constant theme within KPD discourse during this period. This was 
often represented as an alliance between the SPD and the bourgeoisie. 32 No 
distinction was made between the Republic and the old regime. One pamphlet posed 
the question, 'Ebert or Ludendorff?', but suggested that there was no difference. 'One 
year of the middle-class Republic has shown you that it is nothing more than the old 
dictatorship of capital.' 33 Unsurprisingly, leaflet literature advocated revolution 
instead of Republic. Seizing on the enthusiasm of Revolution early leaflets contrasted 
the Council Republic (Raterepublik) with the middle-class Republic proposed by the 
SPD. This was often bound up with the issues of workers' control and socialisation. 4 
Many also had an internationalist tone, calling on the workers of the world to unite, 
often in defence of Soviet Russia.
In contrast to left-wing parties and unions, the Alter Verband, whose 
ideological approach was still very much shaped by Hue until his death in 1922.
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regarded socialisation as something akin to nationalisation. It is important to note here 
that the Alter Verband characterised its conception of socialisation as 
Vergesellschaftung (socialisation), rather than Verstaatlichung (nationalisation). In 
fact Hue, like the Commission of Nine, rejected the latter, although he admitted that 
there were many Socialist Democrats who had not realised that the union's demand 
was not Verstaatlichung?6 However, the Bergarbeiterzeitung commented in 1919 that 
previously the union had used the word nationalisation, rather than socialisation, as it 
was better understood. In fact, nationalisation was a goal it had sought since its 
foundation. Furthermore, of all the various concepts of socialisation that circulated 
in the Ruhr during the early 1920s, the Alter Verband's notion was more akin to the 
MFGB's blueprint for nationalisation of the British coal industry. Therefore, in order 
to distinguish the Alter Verband's proposals from those of the syndicalists, they shall 
be referred to as nationalisation here.
Nationalisation had been an issue discussed by both the MFGB and the Alter 
Verband before 1919. The MFGB had proposed it in 1912, while, during the war an 
article had appeared in the Bergarbeiterzeitung promoting the idea of nationalisation 
and seeking to refute the idea that state mines were less profitable than their private 
counterparts. 38 In fact, a common tactic in the debate over nationalisation, both in 
Germany and Britain, was to compare the position of the existing German state mines 
with the private mines in the Ruhr. Unsurprisingly, the employers in both countries 
would claim lower production and wages, while the trade unions would claim greater 
efficiency and more humane treatment. 39
The MFGB 1919 proposals for nationalisation, however, differed from the 1912 
plan in that control of the industry would lie with both the workers and the state. 
Initiated by the SWMF, the proposals called for the 'transfer of the entire industry 
from Private Ownership and Control to State Ownership with joint control and 
administration by the Workmen and the State.' The miners were not to be the passive 
subjects of nationalisation, but active in the management of the mines. This point was 
further elaborated by the former SWMF Executive member and current MFGB 
Secretary, Frank Hodges, who stated:
The principal point to me in this resolution is one that has not yet been 
elaborated, that is the question of control. For the last two or three years a 
new movement has sprung up in the labour world which deals with the 
question of joint control of the industry by representatives from the side 
which represents, for the most part, the consumer and representatives of
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the workmen who are producers. Nationalisation in the old sense is no 
longer attractive. As a matter of fact you can have nationalisation but still 
be in no better position than you are now under private ownership. That is 
the experience of institutions which have been State owned and State 
controlled for many years...Now is it any good to have these mines 
nationalised unless we are going to exercise some form of control as 
producers? If not, the whole tendency will be towards the power of the 
bureaucracy. We shall be given no status at all in the industry, except to 
be the mere producers, as we have been in the past years. Under State 
ownership the workmen should be desirous of having something more 
than the mere question of wages or mere consideration of employment; 
the workmen should have some directive power in the industry in which 
they are engaged. 41
The SWMF proposals envisaged a continuation and extension of the de facto 
bipartite system of industrial relations established during the war. 42 Ultimately there 
was no place for private capital within this system. The new rules adopted by the 
SWMF in 1917 declared its goal to be the 'complete abolition of capitalism.' 43 This 
removal of capitalism was often justified on the grounds of efficiency. Hodges argued 
at a meeting of officials in the Garw that removing the owners and their profits would 
lower coal prices. 44
The argument for nationalisation was put most succinctly in Hodges's book, 
Nationalisation of the Mines. The book is symptomatic of the feeling of strength the 
SWMF had immediately after the war. SWMF publications and meetings during 1919 
were imbued with an overwhelming sense of confidence. Nationalisation, it was 
repeatedly claimed, was almost inevitable. Hartshorn, for example, commented that 
'there is no question of whether the Government will agree to nationalisation or not; 
the adoption of that principle in the very near future is absolutely inevitable.' 45 Not 
only was nationalisation inevitable, but it was also right for the working class had 
now reached such a stage of education that it could take over the direction of the 
industry. Hodges commented in the preface to his book that 'we are confronted with 
an increasingly educated working class; a class which more and more rejects the 
imposition of external will and authority over it; a class which yearns for the status of 
responsible manhood in industry and rebels against any cramping institution which 
thwarts its aspirations for freedom.'
Although much of the book is taken up with attacks on the inefficiencies of 
capitalist production, the image of the educated, responsible miner was one that
permeated Hodges's argument. The idea of labour as a simple commodity to be 
bought and sold in the market place was rejected. Hodges claimed:
improved education has made the continuance of such a status impossible. 
The labourer, besides having labour power to sell is also possessed of a 
human soul which is feeling the urge of strong aspirations...He wants a 
greater share in the direction of industry. The miner wants to be in his job 
as a complete human being...His new status will be that of a partner in 
industry. Manual labourer and technician will engage together in the mine, 
and sell their commodity, labour, not to a non-labouring shareholder, but 
to all men in their calling, as their contribution to the production of the 
finished article. 47
This new status would mean new responsibilities, which would have a cumulative 
effect. Hodges believed that over time the miners' social outlook and sense of social 
responsibility would grow. 'Interest will be the father of still greater interest' and 
slowly the irresponsible would be reduced in number.48 This emphasis on 
responsibility, education and partnership would superficially seem to echo the 
discourse of a pre-1910 generation of miners' leaders, such as Mabon. However, the 
identity that Hodges was trying to create differed from Mabon's in that the miners 
were seen as in partnership with other workers rather than employers. While the 
labourer and technician are present in the above extract, the owner is conspicuous by 
his absence. Earlier in the book Hodges denied that there could ever be an identity of 
interest between the employers and the workers. Pointing to the increasing number of 
working days lost to disputes between 1916 and 1919, Hodges wrote:
But the antagonism is not of recent growth, for the pre-war figures are no 
better; if anything, they are worse. It is not so much the effect that these 
strikes have upon output that is important, but that gradual formation of a 
permanent psychology of antagonism, which is created as a result. There 
is no co-operation between workmen and employers; there is no common 
motive in industry; no conscious attempt to attain the highest efficiency; 
no elimination of waste; no internal economies. Both pursue opposite 
aims.
Against Mabon's conception of workers and owners sharing the fortunes of the 
industry, Hodges claimed that the attitude of the miners was now - '"production for 
private profit is wrong, but as long as it exists, we will fight for a larger and larger 
share of it, regardless of the amount or kind of work performed." As long as the 
workman sees that a margin of private profit exists he will struggle to secure it.' 
Therefore, in direct contrast to Mabon, Hodges denied the owners' right to profit. The 
very existence of profit could only ensure continuous industrial unrest. Much like the
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discourse of the Alter Verband and post-war left-wing unions, Hodges accepted that 
relations between owners and workers could only be understood in terms of struggle. 
Only by removing the employers and the profit motive, could peace be restored.
In a subsequent chapter Hodges made it clear that the aspirations of the miners 
could only be met when the obstacle of capitalist influence was removed.
We now see the secret of the claim for the Nationalisation of the Mines. It 
will be the reason for claims in the future by the workers in other 
industries for the nationalisation of all industries, because only through 
the removal of the influence of the capitalist in the industry can the 
workers experience the gratification of that impulse or freedom for 
expansion, and for self-expression, which they feel in their innermost 
beings. Whether he be politician or priest, whether he is scholarly 
economist or ignorant capitalist, none can prevent the realisation of those 
aspirations.50
But the miner was not only to find individual and class realisation through 
nationalisation. He was also to act as a model for other workers. Just as The Miners' 
Next Step had sought to portray the miners as the vanguard of the British working 
class, so too Hodges envisaged them as setting an example for other workers to follow 
once nationalisation was achieved.
It is clear from Hodges's book that the more collaborationist trend within the 
SWMF discourse was weakening during the war and in the post-war period it was 
submerged by a more aggressive tone. By the post-war period, Hodges was not 
regarded as being on the extreme left of the movement, although in the pre-war years 
he had been an ILP member and was briefly identified with Ablett and the URC. 51 At 
the February 1919 MFGB conference in London, for example, more radical members 
of the South Wales delegation such as Noah Ablett and S. O. Davies attacked the 
proposed acceptance of the Sankey Commission, while Hartshorn and Hodges 
supported it. 52 Moreover, looking back over his career following the vilification of his 
role in the 1921 strike, and five years after the publication of Nationalisation of the 
Mines, he claimed that he always sought to avoid conflict and preferred negotiation to 
the strike action. 53 The book is illustrative of how acceptance of nationalisation and 
the removal of capitalist influence became the mainstream position in the SWMF and 
provides a good example of how the more radical, combative identity of the miners, 
succoured by wartime industrial relations, began to marginalise more co-operative 
conceptions.
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Meanwhile, in the Ruhr, the unrest and attempts at 'wild' socialisation initially 
brought the leaders of the various unions and political parties together. At first the 
Alter Verband organ seemed supportive of the proposed council system, although 
critical of the USPD and Spartakists lack of patience. 54 However, following the break 
between the left-wing parties in 1919 the Alter Verband propagated its own plan of 
nationalisation in opposition to the radical unions. Hue, like Hodges, was keen to 
justify nationalisation on the grounds that it would make the industry more efficient. 
The majority scheme produced by the Socialisation Commission in 1919, to which 
Hue was a signatory, proposed that the industry be so reorganised that it was put in 
the service of the community rather than profit, thereby ending the exploitation of the 
miners and the consumers. The ownership of existent state and private mines would 
be transferred to a Deutsche Kohlengemeinschaft (German Coal Community). At the 
top of this stood a five-man directorate elected from the Reichskohlenrat (Reich Coal 
Council) which was made up of representatives of the Government, owners, workers 
and consumers. 55
Clearly, Hue's conception of nationalisation differed somewhat from Hodges's. 
The concern to involve all sections of the industry as well as Government and the 
consumers must be seen in terms of the socio-political background in which the Alter 
Verband was operating. First, the Alter Verband was in a very much weaker position 
than the SWMF. Not only was its influence on industrial relations very weak, but its 
organisation was threatened by the new radical unions. The fragmented nature of 
unionism meant that even if joint Government-worker administration was introduced 
the Alter Verband was not guaranteed to be the sole or even main representative of 
the miners' side. A more far-reaching plan might also hand the initiative to the 
Syndicalists or the KPD and make it difficult to differentiate the Alter Verband, which 
was already losing members, from the other unions. The SPD also found much of its 
electoral support eroded following the 1920 Reichstag election. Secondly, the Alter 
Verband leaders as Social Democrats recognised the precarious position of the SPD- 
led Government. Not only were they aware of the needs of reconstruction, they were 
also undoubtedly wary of the effect any attempt to implement a more radical scheme 
might have on the agreement made with the German military or upon the Allies.
Despite these differences in the details, there are some striking similarities in the 
discourse used by SWMF/Labour and the Alter Verband/SPD. Nationalisation in both 
regions was presented as not solely the miners' problem, but one for the nation. The
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MFGB publicity campaign, for example, was entitled The Mines for the Nation' and, 
as will be shown later, often used highly emotive language designed to appeal to other 
groups in British society. The Alter Verband and SPD discourse, reflecting the 
problems facing both the party and union, emphasised the national dimension even 
more than the SWMF. Hermann Loffler placed nationalisation within the context of 
the extension of the miner's right to co-determination in the industry. Nationalisation 
was portrayed as the culmination of a path that had begun with the foundation of the 
union and passed through the introduction of workers' committees and safetymen. 
Loffler emphasised that nationalisation would place the industry in the service of the 
nation and democracy. 56 Pointing to Russia, Loffler argued that the type of 
socialisation introduced by the Communists had destroyed the economy and brought 
foreign military forces on to Russian soil. This type of socialisation was rejected by 
the Social Democrats in the interests of the German people (VolK). 'The 
nationalisation of the coal industry shall not serve an occupation or a class, but the 
people's community (Volksgemeinschafi). That is why the whole public must support 
Social Democracy in its struggle. If it has the support of the people, then it can also 
achieve the victory.' 57
Moreover, although the MFGB slogan 'Mines for the Nation' may have not 
been replicated by the Alter Verband, Hue did stress in his Die Sozialisierung der 
Kohlenwirtschaft that the nationalisation of the industry was not simply a workers' 
question, but one for the wider community. Yet underpinning this appeal was a 
similar idea that the miners would be able to achieve their full potential through 
nationalisation. 'Under private capitalist rule the human is degraded to a soulless 
work machine.' Hue also seized on Imbusch's words to expand on the idea that 
humanisation of work was the end goal of nationalisation. 'The economy should in 
reality serve humanity. We do not live merely to produce; we produce in order to 
live.' 58 This conscious use of Gewerkverein discourse was partly due to a certain 
thawing of relations between the two old unions. In organisational terms this was 
represented by their co-operation in the ZAG. However, Hue also aimed at bringing 
the Gewerkverein on side and cited Imbusch several time in the pamphlet in order to 
legitimise his argument. Hue's references to the Christian trade unionist can be 
regarded as a continuation of a trend evident before the war of emphasising the 
similarities in the two union's bread and butter demands in order to strengthen the 
case for amalgamation.
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Relations between the Alter Verband and the Gewerkverein had improved 
during the war. This new co-operative attitude was seemingly consolidated by their 
membership of the ZAG. However, the Gewerkverein consistently protected its own 
organisational identity and any suggestions of amalgamation were met with a blunt 
negative, just as they had been before the war. Echoing Imbusch's 1906 pamphlet an 
article entitled 'Is an amalgamation of the miners' unions possible?' appeared in Die 
Bergknappe in 1918. The demand for amalgamation allegedly originated from 
'irresponsible radical agitators' (Schreier) and 'idealists'. Just like Imbusch's earlier 
work, the article looked back over the history of the two unions. Again it was their 
different world-views that distinguished the unions and made amalgamation 
impossible 'In the last decade the fundamental position of the different trade union 
movements have not changed.' A strong Christian union was required to 
counterbalance the materialism of the Free Trade Unions. Drawing on fears of 
Bolshevism, the article suggested that the lack of such a balance could tip the SPD 
into communism and the Alter Verband itself could come under the influence of 
radicals. On the other hand, co-operation on practical occupational questions was 
desirable. In fact, the question of amalgamation was seen as damaging the possibility 
for co-operation as it destroyed trust between the unions. 59 Subsequent articles took a 
similar line. The Gewerkverein was continually represented as a Christian movement 
and its religious nature contrasted to the materialistic and socialistic qualities of the 
SPD and Alter Verband.60 This sense of continuity in the values of the Gewerkverein 
was further reinforced at their annual conferences. Speaking on the goals of the union, 
Imbusch stated 'they remain in the future as before.' Their attitude to the employers 
also remained 'in the new Germany as in the old.' 61
Despite the commitment to co-operation, the relationship between the 
Gewerkverein and the Alter Verband was often strained, and occasionally conflict 
broke out. For example, the language used during the 1922 strike was reminiscent of 
pre-war inter-union relations. While the Alter Verband supported the strike, the 
Gewerkverein rejected it. The Bergknappe carried the headline 'we are opponents of 
the revolutionary class struggle' and reprinted a speech given by the Gewerkverein 
youth leader, Wiedfeld, at a conference in Bochum.
The social-democratic trade union movement stands on the basis of the 
revolutionary class struggle. Their greatest gaol is the socialisation of all 
means of production. The means to that goal is the revolutionary class 
struggle. According to the principles of our brother on the left the
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antagonism between the working class and the upper classes is 
unbridgeable. In the German employer they see only their oppressor, in 
the foreign worker their class comrade...We say in contrast 'admittedly 
there exist conflicts of interest, but these antagonisms are bridgeable...We 
Germans are a great peoples' family (Volksfamilie), we all step up to the 
great table of the peoples' economy. The first effort of Germans must, 
therefore, therefore be directed to bringing many goods to this table. Then 
can the distribution of goods for the individual be bettered...The 
distribution at the table of our peoples' economy must occur according to 
the laws of Christian justice and love; then the sharing will not come to a 
hostile you or I, but to a brotherly you or I.
The Gewerkverein represented in this speech is virtually indistinguishable from it pre­ 
war guise. Although the use of the word 'brother' hinted at warmer relations between 
the two unions than prevailed before the war, the rest of the speech categorically 
rejects any similarity in principles. Class conflict is rejected in favour of a 
collaborative approach. Capitalism as an economic mode of production is implicitly 
embraced and contrasted with the socialisation proposed by the Alter Verband. The 
fruits of the economy were, however, to be shared and the best way to ensure the most 
equable distribution of goods was by the application of Christianity. Moreover, just as 
in pre-war Gewerkverein, conflict was not ruled out. The speaker did admit that 
sometimes the elite did not act in fairness and kept an unjustifiably large amount for 
themselves. Under these circumstances the strike was legitimate once all peaceful 
means had been exhausted. But, in contrast to the Alter Verband, Gewerkverein 
'struggles [were] free from the spirit of the revolutionary class struggle.' 62
Unsurprisingly, the Gewerkverein was even more critical of the Unionists and 
KPD. Syndicalists and Communists were the 'dangerous opponents of the trade union 
policy.' The Gewerkverein contended that the Union, unlike itself, was political and 
aimed to overthrow democracy. Therefore, the Union was not an economic 
organisation, 'but a revolutionary fighting troop.' 63 For the Gewerkverein the left- 
radical leaders operated under a 'mask of being friends of the workers' (Maske der 
Arbeiterfreundlichkeit} for their own political purposes. Yet despite this rejection of 
materialist discourses, both in social-democratic and communist form, the 
Gewerkverein also had its own version of socialisation. Like Hue, Imbusch saw 
socialisation as putting the industry in the service of the community. He argued that 
socialisation did not necessarily mean State Socialism or Communism. Instead he saw 
it as introducing a moral dimension to capitalism. Private property should not be 
abolished; rather it should be made subservient to the needs of the community. The
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'economic egoism of the individual and the nation' had to be overcome. Such egoism 
involved the exploitation of one individual by another and led to imperialism at a 
national level. Socialisation, therefore, represented not merely a change in ownership, 
but also an ethical transformation. 'The technical socialisation of the enterprise alone 
is not adequate; it does not tailor the economy to the service of human beings. There 
must also be a change in spirit. Socialisation is only possible through a corresponding 
spirit and ethical attitude.' 64
Since coal production impacted on all other aspects of life it should be at the 
service of the community. Unfortunately, the industry had for years been in the hands 
of 'profit-hungry capital'. However, Imbusch rejected state ownership. He believed 
this form of socialisation did not create the social spirit required and pointed to the 
existing state mines to prove it.65 Instead, the consumers and workers had to be given 
more rights to balance the power of the employers. 66 One method of increasing the 
rights of the workers was to introduce small share ownership among the workforce. 
For Imbusch this meant that the miners would have a direct interest in the health of 
the industry and would literally share its fortunes. Moreover, it would not result in the 
loss of initiative he feared would occur under state ownership. 67
It is clear that the Gewerkverein saw itself as steering a middle course between 
'extreme capitalism and revolutionary socialism'. Its policy remained 'struggle for a 
christian-social community ideal.' 68 Its leaders welcomed the proposals of the 
Socialisation Committee and they defended the ZAG as a vehicle for improving co­ 
operation between capital and labour,69 although they, like the Alter Verband, 
maintained that these organs needed to be backed by strong trade unions. 70 However, 
a change in the Gewerkverein's attitude towards the employers is identifiable after 
1923. The Gewerkverein undoubtedly regarded the French Occupation as a chance for 
the owners and miners to show solidarity. At a protest meeting in January 1923 
Imbusch admitted that the unions and employers had had their differences, but that 
they also had things in common. 'We have in common with them the interest of our 
economy. We have in common with them our German language and culture.' The 
MICUM agreement and the subsequent employer's offensive on hours and wages had 
an effect on Gewerkverein discourse. Hopes of a new morality in industrial relations 
dashed, the union became more aggressive in its attitude towards employers from late 
1923. Articles in the Bergknappe began to complain that the owners had not changed 
and that they held true to their 'Herr-im-Haus' philosophy.72 The 1924 lockout was
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portrayed as an act of capriciousness, an attempt to repress the workers. 73 By 1925 
even the Gewerkverein had to admit that the conflict between labour and capital had 
taken on ever-sharper forms. 'Capital, the economy, is everything for the employers, 
labour only a ware.' Yet despite this more critical attitude the Gewerkverein still saw 
itself as balanced between proletarian and capitalist dictatorships. 74
As might be suspected the Alter Verband maintained a consistently more critical 
attitude towards the employers than the Gewerkverein. But a difference of opinion 
existed within the social-democratic movement as a whole. The SPD politician, 
Rudolf Hilferding, for example, struck a more aggressive tone than Hue in his address 
to the first works' council congress in October 1920. Like Hue he rejected the notion 
that nationalisation would simply mean bureaucratisation of the industry. Instead he 
envisaged the creation of industrial parliaments in which the workers, technicians and 
consumers would be represented. 75 His exclusion of the owners was more forthright. 
He claimed 'socialism cannot mean a co-operation with the capitalists in any common 
organisational forms, but can only mean the elimination of the capitalists from 
production, the elimination of capitalists as owners.' 76 Hilferding portrayed the 
majority proposal of the Socialisation Commission as Vollsozialisierung, full or 
complete socialisation. 'It demands that the capitalist as such disappears from the coal 
industry and that leadership of the industry be transferred to a coal parliament, in 
which the director of the works, the workers, the officials, the consumers and the 
representatives of the public are present.' 77
Unsurprisingly, Hilferding approved of this plan, but regarded it as a minimal 
demand (Mindestforderung). Like Hodges, Hilferding saw the nationalisation of the 
coal industry as the first step in a wider programme of collectivisation. The German 
miners, or at least the SPD/Alter Verband section, were to be pioneers of 
nationalisation, setting an example to other industries. In a passage that illustrates the 
continuing importance of a working-class identity to the SPD and Alter Verband, 
Hilferding claimed
We want to lead the struggle for nationalisation of the coal industry, 
because through it we can hope to once again unite the whole proletariat 
in a great, united action. This slogan is uniting and this struggle will be 
decisive. First, because it must and will be a true, completely undisguised 
class struggle: on the one side the proletariat, on the other the bourgeoisie. 
We know that the bourgeoisie will employ every force so as not to be 
defeated; [nationalisation] will therefore be treated as a genuine measure 
of power between the two classes. As such we can only be armed when
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we enter the struggle united. The struggle is also decisive because we 
know that, when it is successfully fought, it places us in a position of 
power, which no one can snatch from us, and from which we can more 
easily win other positions. Do not think that we will be content with the 
nationalisation of an individual industrial branch, for we would not be 
socialists! But when we have fought the struggle in the most important 
area, then the further battles will be made easier, not least because the 
fighting proletariat have seen what it is capable of when it is united. 78
Hilferding repeatedly emphasised in the published speech that nationalisation was a 
question of power (Machtfrage). His discourse reveals how the Social Democrats 
continued to regard the relationship between employers and employed as one based 
on conflict rather than co-operation. Just as before the war, the complexities of class 
formation were simplified down to the proletariat and bourgeoisie, while 
nationalisation of coal is presented as an issue capable of rallying the working class.
In emphasising the opposition of the forces of labour and the forces of 
capitalism, the Alter Verband and SPD ideologues had to tread a fine line. On the one 
hand, the activists wished to hold on to their identity as opponents of capitalism. Thus 
Hilferding's pamphlet refers to class struggle between the proletariat and the 
bourgeoisie. On the other, they needed clearly to differentiate their ideological ground 
from the Communists. This was especially important given the numerous 
interpretations of socialisation/nationalisation. Therefore, Hue's assertion that 
nationalisation meant the transfer of industry to the community was not merely aimed 
at creating a wider body of support outside the union, but was also a conscious 
attempt to marginalise the Communists and Syndicalists. For example, the 
Commission of Nine was described as trying to introduce a dictatorship, which would 
rob the miners of what freedoms they had, including the right to strike. 79 Moreover, 
the left-radicals were accused of weakening the trade union movement. In an article 
entitled 'against the association destroyers', the Bergarbeiterzeitung rather 
optimistically claimed that, had the Communists not countered the efforts of the Alter 
Verband, its membership would now have numbered half a million. The paper 
believed that Communists 'struggle has directed itself not against the employers, but 
against our association, which has certainly shown in its thirty year existence that it 
understands how to protect the interests of the miners.' Through its barren agitation 
the Unionists had succeeded only driving many away from the unions. Meanwhile, 
syndicalism was also presented as a sectional doctrine. 'The socialisation of the coal 
industry is no special workers' question. Whoever labels it so maliciously confuses
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the situation and works consciously or unconsciously into the hands of syndicalism, 
which wants to transfer 'the mines to the miners." 81
The SPD politician Dr. Franz Lutgenau, the former deputy for the Dortmund 
seat, also sought to marginalise the Syndicalists by presenting them, not wholly 
unfairly, as a mass of incoherent, competing groups. The Syndicalists in their 
numerous splinter groups do not know what they want. One group is for participation 
in the election, the other fights most vehemently every parliamentary activity. The 
opinions inside the syndicalist movement are so confusing, that a thinking man does 
not know where to begin with them.' 82 Aside from the implication that thinking men 
were not involved in syndicalism, Lutgenau also believed that it meant a 'new 
splintering of strength and a great danger' for the working class. 83 Lutgenau's attack 
on the Syndicalists was aimed at establishing a discursive dichotomy based on the 
sectional interests of one side and the national interests of the other. Overt or implicit, 
a common feature in Alter Verband discourse is the portrayal of the left-wing 
opposition as un-national. In some respects the social-democratic trade unions had 
adopted a national discourse.
The discourses of nationalisation and socialisation in South Wales and the 
Ruhr provide an illustrative example of how identities were differently constructed in 
the two regions. Nationalisation, as suggested in the previous chapter, provided a 
focal point for the miners' movement in South Wales. It was mixed into the more 
inclusive, 'community-fixated' identities that the SWMF and Labour sought to create. 
Before the Great War there was a trend within SWMF discourse which regarded the 
employers as opponents rather than partners. The very idea of nationalisation, resisted 
by the employers, promised by the Government, but then snatched away, fitted 
perfectly within a discourse predicated on a labour vs. capital dichotomy. The issue 
was continually presented in this manner and stretched so that the miners' struggle 
became symbolic of the fight against capitalism in general. In this manner, even those 
who preached socialisation could see nationalisation as the important first step. 
Finally, the experience of the industrial disputes of 1921 and 1926 seemed to dovetail 
well with the exclusion of the employers from the concept of the community evident 
in Labour's discourse prior to 1914. This was especially so since trade union and 
Labour activists were often one and the same. The lock-outs and wage cuts made it 
easy to portray the employers and the Government as determined to destroy the 
mining communities. Nationalisation, it was implied, was their salvation. As notions
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of community and nationalisation became intricately bound together, Labour was thus 
able to project itself as the guardian of the former.
In the Ruhr socialisation did not enjoy this wide appeal. The term itself was 
contested. In different versions it envisaged no role for capital, a limited role for 
capital or co-operation between labour and capital. Due to these competing visions it 
could not be constructed into a discourse that claimed to represent the hopes of an 
entire community. Instead each version was linked to a particular political view point. 
As Imbusch himself noted it became a Schlagwort, used not to unite but to mobilise a 
certain group of miners, often against another. As a result the very concept reinforced 
the divided nature of the miners' movement in the Ruhr.
National Identity and Class
As noted above, the SPD and Alter Verband sought to characterise the 
Syndicalists as un-national. This patriotic element had been evident in SPD discourse 
in the 1900s, but during the Republic it became more pronounced and fully displayed 
during elections. Whereas before the war the SPD had presented itself as a working- 
class party, it now increasingly used the more inclusive term Volkspartei. The EAZ 
and RWAZ, for example, rhetorically asked which party was the people's party. 
Discounting the other parties on the grounds of religion or class, the paper presented 
the SPD as the only true Volkspartei. In fact, during 1919 the SPD attempted to create 
a Volkssozialismus (people's socialism)84 . The claim was linked to the founding of the 
Republic and the extension of the vote. 85 The SPD made efforts to attract the newly 
enfranchised female electorate, play down any anti-religious tendencies and broaden 
its appeal to white-collar occupations. Numerous pieces appeared in the social- 
democratic press stressing the importance of the female vote. Rather chauvinistically 
Husemann suggested women needed educating in the democratic process and called 
on his female comrades to help. 86 It was stressed that the franchise for women was 
'the work of the social-democratic party.' 87 Similarly, many of the leaflets produced
oo
by the party appealed not solely to the workers but also to the officials (Beamten). 
The Volhsblatt claimed rather optimistically that the state officials were now praising 
the SPD.89 The trade union pamphlets on nationalisation noted the important role the 
technical staff would continue to play. Hilferding noted the need for co-operation 
between the brain and manual worker. 90 A priest from Cologne even spoke at a SPD 
meeting in Essen as part of their 1920 campaign. In a speech that would have perhaps
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been familiar to voters in South Wales, but was a rarity in the Ruhr, the links between 
socialism and Christianity were stressed. 91
This identification with the Volk was perhaps natural since much of the SPD 
pre-war class discourse had been occupied by the USPD and KPD. Before the war the 
SPD had largely enjoyed a hegemonic position in its claim to represent the 'worker'. 
Admittedly, the Centre had also had a strong working-class element to its discourse, 
but more often than not this was qualified by an explicit adherence to Christianity. 
The construction of the SPD as the guardian of the German community and its rights 
forged during the Revolution also left the party in a position to attack Communist 
policies perceived as damaging to the Volk. In the early years of the Republic this was 
often expressed as a fear of civil war. Later the focus was on their lack of respect for 
human rights. Events in Russia provided the SPD with ample propaganda material. In 
May 1922, for example, the RWAZ reported the expulsion of Mjasnikov from the 
Central Committee for daring to express his own opinion. The piece concluded that 
'in European countries [they] preach the united front - although not for the purpose of 
common action, but in order to infiltrate other camps - demand wide-ranging 
freedoms, but in Russia [they] repress everything which is not sworn to the party 
dictatorship of a few lunatics.' 92
In presenting itself as a Volkspartei the SPD was impinging on the discourse 
used by the other parties, including the Centre. In the 1920s the Centre continued to 
present itself as the true people's party. This, alongside its Catholicism, remained a 
characteristic feature of the Centre. In fact, religiosity remained the defining feature of 
Centre Party discourse so much so that some historians have charged the Centre Party 
with retreating to a narrow clericalism during the Weimar Republic. In fact, many of 
the party's pre-war concerns disappeared in the 1920s. 94 An examination of the pro- 
Centre newspapers in the Ruhr seems to bear out this charge. Repeatedly, the editors 
of Tremonia, Essener Volkszeitung and Westfdlische Volkszeitung produced articles 
that propagated the Christian identity of the party. A favourite concern was the issue 
of education. This was given impetus in 1919 when the SPD culture minister, Adolf 
Hoffmann, pursued a policy of interdenominational schools and abolition of state aid 
for Churches. One contributor described this policy as stripping ethics from the young 
(Entsittlichung). 95 Another called for an alliance between the Catholics and 
Protestants to ensure the victory of a 'Christian idea of the state 1 , rather than a 
'socialist German Republic.' 96 Two years later at a meeting of the Volksverein in
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Bochum it was argued that religion was the basis of the cultural life of the country and 
should be the basis on which electors voted. 97 Representatives of the Westfalen 
Centre Party stressed that the party had been founded as a 'Christian people's party', 
which sought to base policy on 'principles of Christianity.' It refuted accusations that 
the party had abandoned religion, claiming 'we are and remain the old Centre.' 98
However, although both the SPD and Centre claimed to be Volksparteien there 
was no blurring of their ideological differences. Indeed there was an intrinsic tension 
between their attempts to appear as Volksparteien and the 'milieu-fixated' nature of 
their discourse. Both the SPD and the Centre had very precise ideas of what the 
concept of the Volk encompassed and this tended to hold back their attempts to widen 
their appeal. For example, for the Centre Christianity and the Volk were inseparable. 
The Volkspartei label was more often than not preceded by the delimiting adjective 
Christian. Meanwhile SPD attempts to extend the party's appeal beyond the 
traditional working class did not mean that concerns with issues of class lost their 
vibrancy. For example, the emphasis on the expansion of the franchise was intimately 
linked to the overarching theme of defence of the Republic. From the beginning the 
SPD defined this Republic in socialist terms and the defence of the Revolution was 
placed within the context of long-term social-democratic aims. It was claimed that 
'the social-democratic party was always revolutionary in the sense that it strove for 
the complete transformation of the state to democracy, the economy to 
socialisation...We want to give the German people the freest republican constitution 
of any people in the world. The people as the masters of their own fate. That is our 
solution.' 99
Since the Republic was essentially seen as a socialist creation by the SPD, they 
were still able to utilise the older class elements of their discourse. Thus, during the 
Nationalversammlung election in 1919 the Volksblatt carried the slogan 'not a 
capitalist, but a socialist Republic.' 100 Similarly, in 1921 the main question during 
Prussian Landtag elections was 'for or against socialism.' In differing forms this 
choice between capitalism and socialism was repeatedly offered to the voters. Even 
six years after the founding of the Republic EAZ still called the 1925 presidential 
election a struggle between Republic and monarchy. 101 The paper called on 
'republicans' to rally around the SPD candidate Otto Braun and defend Ebert's 
legacy. 102 Their opponents on the right were still referred to as the biirgerliche 
Parteien (middle-class parties). These parties, it was claimed, included everybody's
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wishes within their programme, but 'which wishes and promises were fulfilled? Only 
those of the capitalists.' 103 The biirgerliche parties were also depicted as representing 
sectional capitalistic interests. In SPD propaganda the Centre was becoming more and 
more under the influence of heavy industry, while the DVP was the party of the 
managers. 104
A sense of the difficulty the SPD faced in navigating between these two 
imperatives is given in an article in the Volksblatt on the nature of the Klassenkampf 
(Class Struggle). It noted that, on the one hand, the middle-class parties accused the 
party and trade unions of preaching class conflict, on the other, the Communists 
claimed they had abandoned it. 'While the first condemn our class conflict activity 
and describe it as a disaster for the German people, the other credits it a crime and a 
betrayal of the German proletariat that we have shed our character of class struggle.' 
In trying to clarify the situation the article produced a systematic analysis of class 
struggle that was indistinguishable from pre-war discourse. At a bird's-eye level, it 
was claimed, the German people appeared united. Beneath the surface, however, there 
were many divisions, not only in terms of wealth, but also in terms of legal rights and 
intellectual resources. The knowledge of this inequality ultimately led to the creation 
of a class consciousness. Class consciousness led to the class will to improve the 
situation. Improvement was resisted by the owning classes. This inevitably led to 
conflict because:
when two opposing wills run one against another, a conflict is 
unavoidable. Class conflict is therefore also a necessity, a harsh, bitter 
necessity. It is not some artistic evocation generated by agitation, it is the 
product of class antagonism and will only end when this opposition is 
[removed] form the world or when the under classes are lulled or addled 
to such an extent that class consciousness and class will is dead in them.
This quote illustrates the continued relevance of class and the struggle between 
classes. Despite its attempts to recruit among the lower middle classes the SPD clearly 
still identified with those of no or little property. The party might have tried to present 
itself as a Volkspartei, but this Volk was placed in a similar juxtaposition to the 
capitalists, domestic and international, that working class had been before the war. It 
would be wrong to claim that conceptions of the Volk and the working class were 
elided. In their references to Beamten and Angestellte the SPD was self-consciously 
extending its electoral embrace. Yet within the discourse the 'Other' clearly remained
202
those who owned the means of production. The issue of nationalisation therefore 
became a totemic demand, proving the SPD's continued opposition to capitalism.
But how did the SPD deal with that new, alternate 'Other' - the KPD? The 
SPD answer to the KPD accusation of treachery was to claim that the Communists 
misunderstood the nature of class conflict.
Like every struggle the class struggle can also be fought in different ways: 
it is an economic and a social, a legal and a political, an intellectual and a 
cultural struggle, it is also, under certain circumstances a violent struggle. 
It is unfortunately the ominous error of the left-radicals, that they see the 
class struggle as merely a conflict with violent methods, while in reality 
the violent struggle may only be applied when all other means of struggle 
have failed.
Under the Republic, it was argued, the proletariat was in a totally different position 
than under the Kaiser. 105 The abolition of the three-class electoral system, the 
extended franchise and freedoms of speech and association meant that violence was 
no longer necessary. Class could be motivated and expressed through the ballot rather 
than the bullet. In fact, as noted, the KPD was seen as endangering those rights by 
their advocacy of violence. Thus the SPD did not deny class conflict but sought to 
contain it within the political structures of the Republic. Armed actions would break 
these structures. Similarly, wild socialisation could only serve to destabilise the 
country. The Republic was thus poised between the twin threats of capitalism and 
communism, the SPD its sole guarantor.
In the context of the mining industry this dual threat was coherently expressed 
in an Alter Verband pamphlet published in reaction to the 1924 dispute. In the first 
section the employers were regarded as the aggressors in the dispute. Their demand 
for longer hours and lower wages and the lockout they initiated to enforce these 
demands enabled the Alter Verband to portray them as out to destroy unionism. Such 
was the employers' desire to remove the unions that they were willing to co-operate 
with the French occupying authorities. As soon as the common front propped up by 
passive resistance was ended the employers had negotiated the Micum agreement 
without involving the unions. 106 The wage award granted after the four-week lockout 
was regarded as a victory for the united front of the miners. 107 However, the struggle 
was not over as some mines had tried to prevent the re-election of works councils by 
arguing the lockout counted as an interruption in the six months continuous work
1 OX
clause of the works council law, thereby making those locked out ineligible to vote.
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The picture then is of unscrupulous employers, prepared to use any means to break 
the ZAG and the unions.
The Communists, considered in the second part of the pamphlet, were also 
caricatured as out to destroy unionism. It alleged that the Communists, having failed 
to realise their general strike strategy, had attempted to present the lockout as just 
such a strike. This was a 'great danger' since it influenced the press perception of the 
dispute and alienated the public. In recognition of the weak position of the unions, the 
Alter Verband stressed the importance of gaining public sympathy in any dispute. The 
combative language of the Union and KPD actually weakened the miners. The 
constant denunciations of Alter Verband leaders are shown as destructive. 'The 
"struggle to the bitter end" (Kampf bis aufs Messer) reaches its recognisable high 
point against the leaders of the miners' union.' 109 The Communists are even accused 
of inciting followers to murder. 110 In fact, the whole ideological basis of their 
discourse is thrown into doubt by the authors, who claim that it has nothing to do with 
Karl Marx and everything to do with the anarchist Bakunin. A distinction is drawn 
between the 'historical-materialism' of Marx and the 'anarchist-bakunist sect.' 111 
Having 'uncovered' the 'emptiness' and 'confused nature' of their discourse, the Alter 
Verband does distinguish between the ordinary members, who join the Union and the 
KPD out of the 'most noble motives', and the 'power hungry clique' which leads 
them. 112 The employers represented the enemy without, the Communists the enemy 
within the miners' movement.
Returning to South Wales, although the particular conception of nationalisation 
outlined by Hodges was the most widely accepted by the SWMF, and the MFGB as a 
whole, there existed dissenting voices. Sometimes these voices came from outside the 
coalfield. For example, John Maclean, the revolutionary Glasgow workers' leader, 
spoke at Pontypridd to condemn nationalisation and, echoing contemporaneous 
debates in the Ruhr, support socialisation. 113 In South Wales itself support for 
socialisation came from some that had been involved in the URC and the drafting of 
The Miners' Next Step. Often this opposition was centred on the belief that the plans 
for nationalisation did not go far enough. Continuing to follow the themes of 
industrial unionism and syndicalism that had circulated before, these activists, much 
like the FAUD and Commission of Nine in the Ruhr, sought to exclude both the 
influence of capitalism and the state from the industry and establish workers' control.
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The most cogent exposition of this argument was put forward by a pamphlet 
entitled Industrial Democracy for the Miners: A Plan for the Democratic Control of 
the Mining Industry u * The boundless confidence of the activists was again expressed 
in the pamphlet's foreword written by William Ferris Hay, then President of the South 
Wales Socialist Society, the successor organisation to the URC. 'Nationalisation', he 
claimed, 'of the mining and other basic and key industries is obviously bound to come 
almost immediately.' However, for Hay this did not represent the final step in the 
miners' struggle against capitalism. Rather it was the penultimate one,
because as scientific Socialists we know that nationalisation or State 
Capitalism, the last permutation of which Capitalism is capable, is
bound to be short lived. It is therefore all the more important that we 
should force our demand for democratic control upon the Capitalist State 
when nationalising any industry. We need under Nationalisation to work 
out and become thoroughly acquainted with the administrative 
mechanism, which will ultimately function under Socialisation. 115
For Hay, then nationalisation was not the end of capitalism in the coalfield, but 
merely its last stage. Undoubtedly, this stage represented a more acceptable one than 
unrestrained capitalism, if only in that it allowed the miners the opportunity to learn 
how to run the industry. Nationalisation, therefore, represented an interim or 
transitional phase. Once the miners were acquainted with the administration any last 
vestiges of state control could be removed leaving the industry solely in the hand of 
the miners. In a plan again reminiscent of the Commission of Nine, the pamphlet 
proposed a hierarchy of committees. The Coal Controller, responsible for the sale of 
coal at home and abroad, stood at the top. Authority then devolved downwards 
through the MFGB Executive, local area executives (i.e. South Wales, Scotland, 
Northumberland and Durham, etc.), colliery lodges, colliery committees and, finally, 
pit committees. 116
The supporters of socialisation shared much the same criticisms of capitalism 
as the 'nationalise^'. They were also as concerned that the miner should be able to 
fulfil his full potential. The main critique of nationalisation centred on the issue of 
'officialisation'. While Hodges believed that disputes would disappear in the industry 
once the profit motive was removed, Hay believed that control would still remain a 
contentious issue. 'It would afford no consolation to the miner to know that he was 
exploited to relieve national taxation instead of for private profit.' 117 Only when the 
miner had the greatest possible control over his work would that cease to cause
205
i i o
disputes. The solution to this problem was to turn control over to the MFGB, with 
whom the Government-appointed Coal Controller would place production orders. Hay 
was critical of the MFGB, believing it to be a crude instrument for the exercise of 
democratic control. However, Hay thought that the MFGB provided a 'skeleton 
structure' which could provide the basis of democratic control. 'It is co-extensive with 
industry; it has the forms and machinery - albeit imperfect - for democratic control, 
and with the alterations and improvements we suggest, could well become the steward 
to administer the nation's coal resources.'" 9
Although the plan for socialisation of the British industry bore many similarities 
to proposals in the Ruhr there were three fundamental and interrelated differences 
between the Welsh and German 'socialisers'. First, just as the URC members saw no 
need to establish a union to rival the SWMF before the war, so too did the 'advanced' 
men of the post-war period see reform of the MFGB from the inside as their best 
option. This was in sharp contrast to the Syndicalists in the pre- and post-war Ruhr, 
who saw counter-organisations as the only way to advance their cause. A more 
flexible attitude from both the advocates of nationalisation, on the one hand, and 
supporters of socialisation, on the other, contributed to the containment of tense 
relations and points of disagreement and helped ensure that they did not turn into 
organisational rivalry in South Wales. Just as before the war, both sides were willing 
to tolerate a plurality of approaches within the same organisation, rather than seeking 
to impose harmony by excluding rivals. Both sides were equally seen as trying to 
represent the miners as a whole rather than a particular section.
Second, the similarities in their discursive identity conditioned the containment 
of disputes and the flexible attitude of activists. This is not to suggest that 
disagreements between SWMF activists were without acrimony. This was especially 
evident during the 'Datum Line' strike of 1920. 120 Radical leaders, such as S. O. 
Davies, A. J. Cook, Ablett and George Barker supported a stronger stance by the 
MFGB, while Brace, Tom Richards and Hartshorn sought a more conciliatory line. 121 
Brace was critical of the 'direct actionists', stating:
when they attempt to adopt the airs of the superior person, and to act as if 
their higher mental equipment conferred upon them the right and authority 
to order masses of their fellow-workers to cease work without their having 
been consulted as to their views and wishes upon the question, I feel 
bound to call attention to the danger involved in the adoption of any such 
policy. A strike or lock-out is war, and a civil war at that. It should, 
therefore not be undertaken, unless as a last desperate resort.'
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Such was Hartshorn's anger at the extremists he resigned his post on the SWMF 
Executive after the strike, claiming 'an atmosphere of hostility and suspicion [had 
been] created against leaders who believe in steady revolutionary reform.' This 
atmosphere was, according to Hartshorn, the work of 'dangerous revolutionaries.' 123 
In fact, despite his early attendance at URC meetings Hartshorn had grown 
increasingly critical of the Committee's radicalism. This is illustrated in his response 
to the URC's planned down-tools policy in 1918. He disparagingly termed the 
Committee 'self-elected and self-appointed' and argued that few had stood in ballot 
against SWMF officials and where they had they had been defeated. Hartshorn 
believed the URC to be a danger to democracy. 'It is fortunate that the secret 
scheming and the base slanders of the Unofficial Reform Committee have made it 
necessary for the elected leaders of the Federation to have to defend themselves 
against men, who instead of winning the right to speak in the name of the rank and 
file, proceed by methods which are the negation of democratic control.' 124 He also 
raised the fear of extremist elements in his election campaigns. He complained that 
during the 1918 election the Labour party had been damaged by the accusations of 
Bolshevik control. This was 'a charge so sweeping as that brings within its effects not 
only the few men who are preaching revolution, but the far greater number of sober 
Labour leaders.' 125 Bitter recriminations were also made after the 1921 lockout. 
Hodges was critical of what he termed the 'Ablett type', who were 'responsible for 
prolonging the stoppage.' Ablett's response was to portray Hodges as a man 
'pitchforked into a position of responsibility before experience had prepared him for 
it.' 126 Moreover, these struggles over the issue of tactics stretched down to the lower 
levels of the miners' organisation. The minutes of the Ferndale lodge, for example, 
bear testimony to the struggle between Noah Tromans and Charlie Gibbons on the 
issue of political as opposed to industrial action.
However, these disputes were often representative of personal rivalries and were 
generally of short duration. Hartshorn, for example, eventually returned to the SWMF 
Executive in 1922. Ultimately, both the leading supporters of nationalisation and 
socialisation in the SWMF propagated an identity based on the dichotomy of miners 
versus employers. This common opposition to capitalism provided an effective 
rallying cry in a way it could not in the Ruhr, since the Gewerkverein was firmly 
committed to private property. A pamphlet written by the miners' agent John Thomas
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following the 1921 dispute ended with just such a call. Even in defeat Thomas found 
hope. 'The rank and file must set their minds, more steadfastly than ever, on these 
ideals, which they attempted to have incorporated in the Coal Mining Industry, as a 
result of their magnificent example of solidarity, during the Lock-out.' He admitted 
that it would be hard to hold the organisation together, but
parallel with this overhauling process there must proceed forthwith a 
steady, rousing propaganda amongst themselves and amongst their 
leaders, to an understanding of what they are up against as wage earners, 
and what war on Capitalism means. The propaganda must be extensive 
and intensive. Lodge meetings must be turned into lecture rooms and 
classes, centres of discussion and planning, about the next phases of the 
struggle, to win the control of their Industry for the workers.
To facilitate this propaganda work and ensure the widest possible dissemination of the 
union's discourse, Thomas advocated the production of a newspaper. 'The rank and 
file must aim at making their members in the lodges class conscious, fully alive to the 
defects of the Coal Mining Industry under Capitalism, and fully aware of their ability 
and power, as organised workers, to take the place of Capitalism and substitute
1 ?Rworkers' control.'
Undoubtedly Thomas would have been pleased with the production of The 
Colliery Workers' Magazine in 1923. Its pages consistently reinforced the basic 
miners versus employers' dichotomy of SWMF discourse. It would be repetitive to 
examine every permutation of this discursive practice, but perhaps Oliver Harris can 
be regarded as typical of the general view of the miner when he described the industry 
as being 'in the claws of Capitalism, with its wasteful, inefficient and unscientific 
administration.' 129 The immutable nature of the conflict was also constantly stressed. 
Ironically, W. H. Mainwaring's argument, while rejecting the idea that class itself was 
a formation of ideas, was also strengthened the class nature of the union's discourse. 
Rather class was formed by economics, by the sale of one man's productive labour to 
another. 'They [the workers] stand on one side as sellers of their capacity to labour. 
Opposed to them are the would-be buyers of this labour power.'
Yet while the Colliery Workers' Magazine was unequivocal in its opposition 
to private ownership, in other respects the paper provided a surprisingly open forum 
for debate. In fact the magazine was a prime example of how the SWMF allowed 
pluralist debate to be expressed within its organisation. All shades of the 
nationalisation/socialisation debate were represented in its pages. Seemingly the only
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proviso was that the contributors were opposed to private enterprise. This openness 
also extended to other areas. One example was the open debate on affiliation to the 
Red International of Labour Unions. 131 Characteristically, the Colliery Workers' 
Magazine presented both sides of the debate on a single issue. John Thomas, miners' 
agent for the Anthracite District, presented the case for affiliation. He described the 
International Federation of Trade Unions as a bulwark of capitalism, but the SWMF 
by joining the RILU would be moving a step closer towards its goal of abolishing 
capitalism as well as living up to its 'pioneer' role. Arthur Jenkins, miners' agent for 
the Eastern Valleys District, presented the counter argument. The crux of his 
argument centred on the split that affiliation would create. This could only weaken the 
labour movement. 132 The contours of the debate are here perhaps less important than 
their presentation. Printed side-by-side the two pieces demonstrated the magazine's 
commitment to providing an opportunity for all to voice their opinion. Thus the 
magazine acted as an important safety valve. Ideological differences between 
'nationalises' and 'socialisers' were aired rather than suppressed, preventing 
discontents from festering and helping maintain the organisational unity of the 
SWMF.
In the Ruhr, on the other hand, the issue was far more charged. In contrast to 
the SWMF, the more pillared civil society in the Ruhr precluded such wide-ranging 
debate on the issue. Instead, affiliation or non-affiliation to the RILU was used to 
distinguish one union from another. For the communist-syndicalist unions 
membership of the RILU symbolised the truly revolutionary nature of their 
organisations. At the founding congress of the Union der Hand und Kopfarbeiter 
affiliation was seen as part and parcel of struggle against the 'dictatorship of 
bureaucracy' which dominated the social-democratic unions. 133 In October 1922 the 
Union published a letter asking the Alter Verband to join it in common action. The 
Alter Verband rejected the request. One reason it cited for this was Union 
membership of the RILU, because, as far as the Alter Verband was concerned, the 
RILU was dedicated to its destruction. 134 Thus, rather than being a tactical question, 
affiliation or non-affiliation was seen as affecting the very existence of miners' 
unions. Under these circumstances the 'fair' debate style of discourse that 
characterised the contributions to the Colliery Workers' Magazine, was a rarity rather 
than the norm in the trade union press of the Ruhr.
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A similarly more open attitude was taken by the Magazine on the issue of 
Russia. Although committed Communists were a tiny minority within the SWMF and 
Labour Party supporters such as Hartshorn were very wary and critical of any 
Bolshevik tendencies, Soviet enthusiast S. O. Davies was still permitted to write 
gushing articles about the workers' paradise that had been created in Russia. Davies 
contrasted the 'cherished ideal' of Russia with the 'sordid conditions' in Britain. The 
Russian workers could 'stand confidently and exultantly facing the future', while the 
British worker was 'ground down in penury at his uninspiring toil.' 135 In contrast, the 
pieces published in the Bergarbeiterzeitung were highly critical of Bolshevism and 
paralleled SPD anti-Communist propaganda. In 1922 a series of articles reported on 
the conditions of the Russian miners. Despite the heavy nature of their work the 
miners suffered from food shortages and lack of clothes and shoes. Production was 
correspondingly low, sometimes barely enough to cover the requirement of the mines 
themselves. 136 A later article focused on the terrible living conditions, alleging 
wooden barracks were being built and wagons turned into homes. Worse, however, 
was the fact that, despite these squalid conditions the miners were not allowed to 
strike and 'their complaints are mostly unsuccessful.' 137
The Bergknappe also sought to undermine the idea of the Soviet Union as a 
worker's Utopia. In keeping with its religious-based ideology the Gewerkverein 
focused on the danger that communism posed for the family unit. The communist 
Ruhr Echo printed an article in which it deplored the decline in female work due to 
unemployment. The Gewerkverein organ considered this as an attack on the family 
and pointed out to the miners' wives that, 'for revolutionary reasons it is necessary for 
them [the Communists] to destroy the family and for the wives to go to the factory, 
workshop and mine next to the man. That is how the Communist paradise looks! 
Indeed, the Communists and revolutionary Socialists are the fiercest opponents of an 
orderly family life. In the socialist social order the working class family would be 
ruthlessly drawn into drudgery (Fronarbeit).' m For the Gewerkverein Russia did not 
represent a freeing of human potential but a destruction of traditional, religious 
institutions and the reduction of men and women to working machines.
While rivals within the SWMF might castigate each other as foolish or naive, 
and use derogatory terms such as the Ablett-type or 'Hodgean Mind', 139 in general 
neither side sought to label their opponents as the deliberate enemies of trade 
unionism or of the working class itself. It is noticeable, for example, that, despite his
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criticisms of the 'direct actionists', Brace did not reject the idea of the strike as a 
weapon, merely its timing. Similarly, although he believed The Plan for the 
Democratic Control of the Mining Industry misguided and an 'intellectual conceit', he 
admired the enthusiasm of its authors. He was in no doubt that this enthusiasm was of 
use to the movement as long as it was 'controlled, organised and founded on loyalty 
to the movement.' 140 This respect for the effort underlying these ideas, but rejection of 
their plans is perhaps best illustrated by Hodges's pamphlet Workers' Control in the 
Coal Mining Industry. While the pamphlet contains much of the same material 
present in Hodges's book, the pamphlet also touches on Hay's plan for democratic 
control. Hodges commented,
Recently a very remarkable scheme was propounded by some South 
Wales miners for the future control of the industry. It was the work of 
extremely thoughtful men, and one could perceive in it a spirit of 
bitterness, because of the complete detachment from the control of the 
industry by the men engaged in it. I studied that scheme, but could not 
accept it. At the same time, however, it was an expression in a more or 
less concrete form of the desires of men who have quite a distinct 
ambition for an effective control in the industry itself. 141
Although Hodges rejected Hay's plans, and later went on to describe the 'futility' of 
syndicalism and its 'anti-social' characteristics, he accepts the psychological 
background of antagonism that lies behind this plan as the defining characteristic of 
the industry. Hodges then, while disagreeing with the blueprint for control, validates 
the Syndicalists' concerns and even pays them a compliment. It is implied that the 
syndicalist plan is one among many, but, given due consideration, is not the best one. 
Its authors are, therefore, not identified as enemies, but are included within those 
trying to work for the betterment of the miner's position (even if they had got it 
wrong). Nowhere in the document is there the hyperbole that, more often than not, 
characterises dialogue between the unions in the Ruhr. Even in his criticism of the 
'Ablett-type', Hodges does not claim that the strike was unjustified or blame it on 
those individuals. He restrains his criticism to their role in prolonging the conflict, 
which he believed would weaken the SWMF by draining its funds. The whole 
disagreement has the feeling of a disagreement between activists over tactics, rather 
than fundamentals.
In the Ruhr, on the other hand, supporters of differing conceptions of 
socialisation were construed as opponents or, as in the case of the Alter Verband, 
betrayers of the working class as a whole. Admittedly individuals in SWMF were
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labelled dangerous or extremist, but they were not systematically pilloried as 
conscious enemies. Opponents were not regarded as constructing an alternate identity 
of the miner in their rhetoric. Indeed, they did not create alternatives to place in 
juxtaposition to the prevailing labour vs. capital model. More often than not rivals 
were seen as merely misguided, while the sense of frustration and dislike of 
capitalism underlying their work was met with understanding.
The shared opposition to capitalism of the 'Ablett-types' and 'Hodgean Minds' 
fed into the third difference between trade unionism in South Wales and the Ruhr. For 
although they differed over whether nationalisation represented an end goal or a 
stepping stone to socialisation, Welsh trade union activists were, in the final analysis, 
agreed on the desirability of its immediate introduction. In the Ruhr the various plans 
for nationalisation and socialisation were mutually exclusive. As the AAU pamphlet 
laid out it was a question of either-or; either workers' control or nationalisation; either 
small share-ownership or socialisation. In South Wales, on the other hand, the 
different plans were not mutually exclusive. The more pragmatic culture of the 
SWMF meant that rather than a question of either-or, it was a question of 
nationalisation now and (for some) socialisation later. In light of the employers' 
determination to retain the industry in private hands and the Government's perceived 
betrayal of the miners in relinquishing control in 1921, the issue of nationalisation 
gave both the 'nationalises' and the 'socialisers' a common platform on which to 
fight.
The unequivocal rejection of nationalisation by the employers and by 
Government after Lloyd George's speech in the Commons in August 1919 also meant 
that the SWMF activists could indulge in a clear, unambiguous 'othering' of their 
opponents. 143 In other words, the battle lines between those opposed to nationalisation 
(the Government and the employers) and those in favour (the miners) could be clearly 
drawn in the discourse of both sides. The TUC decision not to pursue nationalisation 
through a general strike, but through a publicity campaign, and the flood of pro- and 
contra- literature that was subsequently produced by both camps, heightened this 
employer/Government - miners dichotomy. The MFGB, for example, produced a 
series of twelve leaflets to support their case. Many of these pamphlets, drawing on 
evidence submitted to the Sankey Commission, focused on the supposed wastefulness 
of capitalism. Others struck a humanitarian and moral note, carrying headings such as 
'Every day four Miners are killed!' and 'Nationalise the mines and save the lives of
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men!' 144 Others, in keeping with the The Mines for the Nation' slogan, sought to 
underline the benefits of nationalisation to the wider community. Pamphlet ten argued 
that nationalisation would remove the middlemen resulting in lower prices for 
consumers, while number nine appealed directly to the middle class by stressing how 
the official would also benefit. 145 A similar line was adopted by the pamphlets Facts 
from the Coal Commission and Further Facts from the Coal Commission. The latter 
especially made emotive use of notions of betrayal. Robin Page Arnot, its editor, cited 
Hartshorn's reaction to sum up this feeling. 'Was it a huge game of bluff? Was it 
never intended that if the reports favoured nationalisation we were to get it? [The 
miners] will say "we have been deceived, betrayed, duped.'" 146
Militaristic Discourse and 'Enemies'
Perhaps the most emotive claim used by the unions was that of profiteering. In a 
reworking of Government recruitment propaganda, pamphlet two carried the heading 
'what did you do in the Great War Mr. Coalowner?' It claimed that the owners' 
profits had risen by 270 percent. 147 Naturally, nationalisation meant an end to this 
profiteering. Instead, the industry would be put at the service of the nation, just as it 
had been during the war. As Sankey had pointed out, it was the war that had shown 
that State ownership was a practical possibility. In this context, the constant reminders 
of the dangerous nature of minework can, therefore, be linked to notions of sacrifice 
and selflessness that arose from the war. Hartshorn drew a direct comparison between 
the conflict and the industry in his evidence before the Sankey Commission. 'In the 
mining industry the casualties are more like those of the battlefield than anything else. 
The only difference between the soldier and the miner is that the miner can never ask 
for an armistice. He cannot even treat for terms of surrender. The casualties go on 
every day.' 149 Meanwhile A. J. Cook claimed at a meeting in Gwaun-cae-Gurwen that 
the 1921 lockout was:
a war of attrition and starvation that the Government were waging to 
conquer...Our battle is the battle of the workers of the world ...If the 
mines cannot pay under the present system, then we must sooner or later 
lock-out the capitalist. The root of all evil was with capitalism. Make up 
your minds to destroy it. Unless you do, the struggle will go on until 
freedom and justice reign supreme. He wanted peace, but the right peace. 
The writing is on the wall. 150
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Notions of war appeared again during the 1926 dispute. Cook described the conflict as 
an 'industrial war' and claimed the MFGB 'executive is now a council of war.' 151 On 
one level such war imagery was used to construct feelings of solidarity among the 
men. However, it also accentuated the notion that industrial relations were essentially 
based on conflict and helped further bury more collaborationist trends.
Another problem for collaborationist thinking was the attempt to depict the 
industrial disputes of 1920, 1921 and 1926 as not merely an issue affecting the 
miners, but as symptomatic of the essential conflict between labour and capital. It was 
in this vein that S.O. Davies claimed in 1921 that,
he could not comprehend how any worker, whatever the industry he found 
employment in, being able to circumscribe the crisis as being merely a 
conflict between the mineowners and the miners of this country...The 
organised forces of capital were momentarily confronting the organised 
ranks of the miners, but the defeat of the miners, if it could be 
consummated, would never satisfy organised capital. The other workers 
were asked to come into the fight not because the mining forces were 
disintegrated, but because the fight was one of organised Capital versus 
the whole of organised Labour. 15
Such monolithic characterisation of labour and capital made it difficult to find a 
common basis for negotiation. Conflict was seen as the existential core of the 
relationship between the two sides. Within this discourse centred on the idea of 
'capital versus labour' any agreement would ultimately seem more like a temporary 
truce in an inevitable conflict than a step toward lasting co-operation.
The miners' leaders in South Wales were not the only ones to feed this 
discursive construct in speeches and publication. The employers too drew analogies 
between the industrial disputes and the Great War. For example, in 1919 the Colliery 
Guardian commented, in an article provocatively entitled 'Take the Gloves Off!' that,
the question has long since ceased to be a coalowners' question; they 
merely occupied the front trench. It is now for all the interests, small and 
great, to rally to the standard in the fight against unprincipled disorder, 
which will surely, if this picket is overrun, spread to every branch of the 
national life. Every tradesman and householder must be brought to see 
that the portent of these preliminary skirmishes is that England will 
change hands, not merely the land but everything on it and under it, and 
that the ultimate possession, after a brief and disastrous hegemony, will be 
an oligarchy embracing many of those whose earnest endeavour has been 
to surrender the country to its enemies. 153
Ross McKibbin has argued that the war militarised the mentality of much of the 
middle class, 154 thereby making the imagery of trench warfare and heroic defence of
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the nation highly evocative. Like the union activists the employers were intent on 
widening the terms of the conflict beyond the industry. The miners, or more often 
their leaders, were placed beyond the pale, described as un-national and equated 
implicitly with Britain's wartime enemies. This language was evident both in the 
external and internal organisational discourse of the employers' organisations. Evan 
Williams, head of the MSWCOA, also believed that nationalisation threatened the 
nation. He told other Welsh owners that it is 'in the interests of the Country [that] 
Nationalisation should be opposed most strongly as it would be disastrous to the 
Country's export trade and ultimate existence...There would be nothing to give in 
exchange for the food on which the people live with the probable result of anarchy 
and revolution.' 155 Thus, it was not simply in the interest of the employers to resist 
nationalisation, but also of the country at large. In this way the employers became 
protectors of the nation. This portrayal of the miners fed on fears of Bolshevism and 
Syndicalism. At the annual general meetings of the Powell Duffryn Steam Coal 
Company, the Chairman, John Shaw, repeatedly extorted the shareholders to canvas 
their MPs to reject nationalisation. 156 Following the 1921 dispute he warned the 
shareholders not to become complacent. 'Do not think for a moment, ladies and 
gentlemen, that we are out of the wood yet. The Communists and Bolshevists are just 
as lively as they ever were.' To emphasis the ever-present nature of this threat he 
pointed to the engineering strike and the Irish troubles. He could only hope that the 
men had begun to realise 'that their leaders have not been leading them aright.' 157 
Hugh Bramwell, director of the Great Western Collieries Co., also believed that 
'unrest in South Wales was mainly due to the fact the extremists had got possession of 
the lodges.' 158 Meanwhile, the Colliery Guardian conflated syndicalism and 
communism. 'Syndicalism does not welcome nationalisation except as a means to an 
end, and it is quite unscrupulous in the attainment of its selfish aims. After all, 
Bolshevism is nought else but Syndicalism under another of its many names.' 159 Like 
the SWMF, the MSWCOA and other employers' organisations also represented the 
conflict as having wider implications for the nation.
The coal owners of South Wales also had an outlet for their discourse in the 
form of the employer-friendly Western Mail. In the course of 1919 the paper 
reproduced the proceedings of meetings of various coal companies which all 
ultimately ended with resolutions against nationalisation. 160 It also expressed the view 
that the strike wave that afflicted Britain was due to the influence of Central Labour
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College classes, which spread Bolshevik and syndicalist ideas. 161 A recent suggestion 
that the miners generally disliked the Western Mail has been countered by the 
assertion that it was available in all miners' libraries. 162 Whatever the miners' attitude 
to the paper generally, trade union activists at least regarded it as an employers' paper, 
so much so that it was used to reinforce their own arguments. Cook, as part of the 
RILU campaign stated, 'take note, Welsh miners, the coalowners' paper the Western 
Mail, warns you against the Red International - that should be sufficient for you to 
decide.' 163 Meanwhile, the Labour Voice was certain that the Western Mail had been 
invaluable in securing the election of George Barker at the 1921 Abertillery bye- 
election. 'An invaluable aid to Mr Barker was the opposition of the Western Mail. 
The miners saw a journal, which is avowedly and openly conducted in the interests of 
the coalowners vigorously attacking their leader, and they felt it their moral duty to 
come to his aid.' The paper went on to claim that the miners may criticise their own 
leaders, but like a family quarrel they don't want anyone from outside to interfere. 164 
This attitude seems characteristic of the South Wales miners' movement in the early 
1920s.
War imagery was even more widespread in the Weimar Republic and was given 
special resonance by the high degree of political violence. Benjamin Ziemann has 
noted how the experience of the Front destabilised Germany's political culture, 
whereas in France it strengthened the republican synthesis. 165 Battles between the 
Ruhr Red Army, Free Corps and police provided martyrs and legends for both 
sides. 166 Generally, the Communists made most use of images of war and martyrdom. 
The memories of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, for example, were 
transformed into alternative, communist celebrations. 167 A Hamborn Communist 
constructed an altar to Liebknecht and Luxemburg. 168 More locally, disasters such as 
the Minister Stein explosion, which killed 136 miners, provided material for 
propaganda attacking both the employers and the other unions. Much like the SWMF 
activists, the Ruhr Communists sought to widen the struggle to encompass the whole 
of the working class. 169 The Alter Verband, however, was critical of using these 
tragedies for such purposes, although it also took the opportunity to attack the profit 
interest in the mines. 170 Eric Weitz has noted the KPD's need for enemies. He argues 
that in the vitriolic attacks the Communists made on their enemies the party was 
tapping into real working-class experiences of humiliation by officials or harassment 
by the police. 171 Furthermore, Weitz has highlighted the militaristic ethos, which
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pervaded communist literature. For example, cartoons and photographs depicted 
identifiably working-class men bearing arms in defence of the Soviet Union. 172
However, although SWMF activists may have largely accepted internal 
disagreement and closed ranks when faced with criticism from outside the 
organisation, this toleration was not extended to those who broke away from the 
union. Although, in the years immediately after the war, the SWMF had been 
successful in absorbing some of the smaller craft unions, after the defeat in 1921 some 
broke away to form their own organisations. 173 Opprobrium was heaped on the South 
Wales and Monmouthshire Mechanical and Surface Workers' Union and a vigorous 
campaign waged against it. The clearest example of the abuse meted out the 
Mechanical Union appears in a leaflet produced regarding its use of Mardy Hall for 
meetings. The leaflet began by castigating the Mechanical Union as a 'parasite 
organisation', before listing the disadvantages of craft unions.
This Meeting of Subscribers is normally called to decide whether the new 
Organisation is to be granted the use of a Room in Mardy Hall. But really, 
from a Federationist point of view, the issue is whether we are going to 
assist any section of the workers to revert back to petty Craft Unionism... 
Craft Unionism breeds disloyalty, disunity, disorganisation, and chaos, 
and we mean to obstruct and sabotage all attempts to steer for such a 
cause.
The leaflet continued by arguing that while craft unionism may have been appropriate 
when employers were smaller now they were inadequate. 'To Face the solidly 
organised Employing Class of to-day, the Craft Union is about as evenly matched as 
the 'Bow and Arrow' would be against the modern 'Machine Gun'. It ended with a 
threat for the Mechanical Union and a rallying cry for the SWMF.
Let us point out to them that the fact [that] their belonging to a 'Scab 
Organisation' will make no difference in our Strike Policy... Whatever 
any combination of Blacklegs may decide to do in the interests of their 
masters, the Federation will have something to say on the question as to 
whether those men shall be allowed to work to not. Let them not build for 
themselves a 'Fool Paradise'... Let the Mineworkers of Mardy realise that 
the Federation is not dead. It was only temporarily stunned by the blows 
of its enemies. The Assassin Knife of Craft Unionism, now being used in 
the attempt to finish off the Giant, will also fail to accomplish the deed. 
Staggered though it was by the blow, and the reverse of the late Lock-out, 
the Federation still lives, and its power and vigour is returning. Before 
long, by loyal service from all workers in the Industry, we shall yet attain 
one Union for the Mining Industry, and thus build up the Machinery 
which will make for the emancipation of our Class. 174
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The use of the terms 'scab' and 'blackleg' to 'other' the splinter union had roots 
stretching back into the pre-war period. Furthermore, the idea of dealing a deathblow 
to sectional unions had been raised soon after the formation of the SWMF. However, 
the discourse employed in the pre-war period was certainly not so vitriolic. Evident in 
the criticisms of craft unions and reference to one union are the echoes of 
syndicalism. Rather new was also the implicit accusation of betrayal in the notion of 
the assassin's knife. It may be argued that such language was unsurprising in Mardy, 
that 'Little Moscow' of the coalfield. But criticisms and even the interruption of 
Mechanical Union meetings also occurred elsewhere. 175 The Mardy leaflet may 
represent an extreme form of SWMF discourse regarding the Mechanical Union, but 
it also demonstrates both the more aggressive tone the organisation had adopted since 
the war and the odium that any attempt to form, or reform, alternative union structures 
would attract.
The Labour Party in Wales also maintained a flexible and broad-based 
discourse. McKibbin has argued that politics during the 1920s bore a strong 
resemblance to Edwardian politics. The most significance change in the immediate 
post-war era was the breakdown of the progressive alliance between the Labour and 
Liberal parties. 176 The example of the South Wales coalfield seems to bear out 
McKibbin's assertion. Certainly, the increasing emphasis on the working class 
identified in the immediate pre-war discourse was accentuated in the 1920s. 
Paralleling the weakening of the class collaborative trend in the SWMF discourse, so 
the Labour Party's juxtaposition of the working class against the employers became 
even more pronounced in South Wales. Unlike the SPD, which had adopted and 
adapted the idea of the Volk to its identification with the Republic, the Labour Party 
in South Wales increasingly moved away from the gwerin, supplanting it instead with 
the Welsh working class. 177
Elements of that older discourse did survive however. An article in the liberal 
journal, The Welsh Outlook, in 1919 seemed to commit the Labour Party to greater 
autonomy for Wales. Comments from prominent Labour leaders from across Wales 
reinforced the point. 178 Election material and political speeches also contained traces 
of old Liberal concerns. One such example was T.I. Mardy Jones. In the 1922 election 
he defended his Pontypridd seat against Sir Rhys Williams. Williams was castigated 
not only as 'a brewer, [but also] a landlord, and a coalowner.' Here Labour sought to 
combine the older concerns of temperance and agricultural grievances with the
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problems of the modern proletariat. More typical of Labour's discourse at the time 
was the elision of the Liberal and the Conservative parties. Both were represented as 
the political representatives of capitalism. 179 Similarly, in Ammanford James Griffiths 
accused the Liberal Coalitionists of betraying 'those principles of Free Trade and 
Welsh Disestablishment which they had hitherto championed.' 180 A week later it was 
claimed 'the Liberal Party and the Tories had united together, and they were opposing 
Labour, and there was now a fight between Capital and Labour.' 181
This juxtaposition of Labour, as the party of the workers, and of the Liberals 
and Conservatives, as the parties of capitalism, was also evident at the other end of 
the coalfield at Pontypool. Tom Griffiths's election declaration elided political and 
industrial issues.
To be a Trade Unionist and fight your fellow during a strike, and to be a 
Tory or a Liberal and fight against your fellows at an Election is folly. 
During a strike there are no Tories or Liberals amongst the strikers; they 
are all workers. At Election time many of the workers forget they are 
Trade Unionists; others even forget they are members of the Co-operative 
Society, and are only Liberals of Tories. During an Election there are Tory 
and Liberal employers, and all of them are friends of the workers. During 
a strike there are no Tories or Liberals amongst the employers; they are all 
Capitalists and enemies of the workers. A Trade Unionist voting the Boss 
to Parliament! Is there any logic, or common-sense in such action?
A potted biography of Griffiths stressed his working-class origins. Unlike, the Lib- 
Labs, Griffiths was clear on the merits of the capital levy contained in the Labour 
Party platform. 'The Capital Levy would not affect [the workers] in any way, but it 
would affect the millionaires and the profiteers who made four thousand millions of 
wealth during the period of the war, and also the two knights who were opposing him, 
who also amassed fabulous fortunes during the war.' 182 At a later election the 
sentiment was even less ambivalent. 'Let a Labour majority dictate to the 
mineowners.' 183 There is little sense of a co-operative relationship in these statements. 
Interestingly, however, the latter was attributed to one Rev David Richards. Another 
preacher, James Griffin, also supported Griffiths' candidature. The mixed reaction of 
Nonconformity towards the labour movement still characterised the political culture 
of South Wales and undoubtedly contributed to Labour's hegemony despite the 
increasing secularised culture of the Valleys. Indeed, Morgan has noted the high 
proportion of lay preachers and deacons among Labour's Welsh MPs, and suggests
1 8J.
that Nonconformity had now become more of an asset for Labour than Liberalism.
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Unsurprisingly, the CPGB shared this elision of Liberalism and Conservatism. 
Significantly, unlike the KPD in Germany, the CPGB more often than not supported 
Labour candidates rather than challenged them. Relations between Labour and the 
CPGB could be tense. The Cymmer Searchlight complained,
how can the National B.C. of the Labour Party instruct Local Labour 
Parties to expel Communist[s] with the threat that they will expel them 
from the Labour Party if they will not carry in to effect their decision, 
when at the same time prominent members of the B.C. are feasting, 
drinking and holiday making with the Boss Class. Comrades we ask you 
who are the workers friends? The Communist now arrested or these so 
called Labour leaders? 185
Yet despite these criticisms the pit paper encouraged its readers to vote for David 
Thomas, the Labour candidate for the Cymmer ward in the local election. It identified 
a class bias in the local elections, the Conservatives and the Liberals having sunk their 
differences, just as at parliamentary level, to vote against Labour.
Part of Labour's replacement of the gwerin with the Welsh working class 
involved claiming the Liberal's mantle of progressivism. In fact, one criticism 
focused on the idea that Liberal policies had become out-dated. In 1924 the Liberals 
produced a pamphlet entitled Coal and Power which set out its policies regarding the 
coal industry. The review of the pamphlet by D. J. Williams in the Colliery Workers' 
Magazine can be regarded as characteristic of the general view of the Liberal 
discourse by South Wales Labour activists. The pamphlet itself argued that industry 
and commerce were the basis of prosperity. Royalties, however, were the chief evil as 
this represented unearned wealth and made the industry less competitive on the world 
market. Williams rightly saw this pamphlet as an attempt to revive enthusiasm for the 
old Liberal shibboleth of anti-'landlordism'. He believed the historical platform of 
Liberalism, based on Free Trade and land reform was largely irrelevant to 
contemporary politics. Liberals were guilty of blaming the landowners alone for the 
troubles of the industry, while ignoring the pernicious effects of private enterprise 
itself. The miner will be consulted, but not trusted. There is, of course, the usual 
platitudinous wail about miserable housing conditions in the mining villages, and the 
blames for this is placed everywhere but at the door of private enterprise.' 186
The notion that Liberal discourse largely remained based upon the same ideas 
that it had been before the war is also borne out once the electoral language of the 
candidates is examined. For example, Griffiths' opponent for Pontypool, Major
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Beaumont Thomas, followed the well-established 'friend of the workers' track. 
Admitting he was an employer, he added 'he happened to count among his best 
friends wage-earners and he said that no employer was worth his salt if he could not 
say he could also represent his employees.' 187 Others, like Captain R.T. Evans at 
Llanelli, emphasised their working-class origins. In 1923 he claimed that 'his father 
was a collier, and he was one of six kids, so that he knew something of the 
atmosphere of a collier's home.' 188 In a more direct allusion to the tradition of Lib- 
Labism, David Rees supported the labourism of Mabon. 'I am not here to fight 
Labour as such...When Mabon stood for the Rhondda I voted for him. Therefore, I 
am not unfriendly to Labour. Why do I fight Mardy Jones? Because he is for 
Socialism, and I am against it.' 189 Liberals were not the only ones to claim working- 
class credentials. David Evans, the Unionist candidate for Pontypridd, 'claimed he 
had a greater right than his opponent to describe himself as a working man candidate. 
On the night of his adoption he changed into his working clothes and was at work that 
night. If he were defeated in the fight, he would not be afraid to return to the collieries 
again.' 190
The 'people' and Welsh identity also remained important aspects of Liberal 
discourse. Many Liberals lamented the passing of the progressive alliance. Clark 
Williams, Captain Evans' predecessor as Liberal candidate for Llanelli, explicitly 
tried to rally Liberals around 'the Old Flag.' 'He referred to the struggle between the 
Liberal and the Labour Party. He wondered how it had come about, for time was that 
Liberalism stood for no class, but for the welfare of the people as a whole.' 191 
McKenna, who stood as a non-Coalition Liberal for Pontypool in 1918, also stressed 
the idea that Liberalism could encompass all classes. When asked why he did not join 
the Labour Party, since he refused to be part of the Coalition, he replied 'the Labour 
Party...was sectional but the Liberal Party represented all, and were out to secure 
equal rights for all.' In an odd attempt, reminiscent of the way labels such as Tory had 
been suffused with derogatory meaning by pre-war Liberals, McKenna tried to 
undermine Labour by describing it as the 'left wing of Conservatism.' 192 In the more 
rural constituencies 'Welshness' remained important. Sir Ellis J. Griffiths at 
Carmarthenshire, for example, admitted that he was 'not a Carmarthenshire boy, but 
he was a thorough Welshman who loved the language and ideals of Wales and he had 
yet to learn that a Welshman was a foreigner in the county of Carmarthenshire.' 
Yet national identity was also evident in Liberal discourse in the more industrial,
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western constituencies. At Caerphilly S. R. Jenkins 'emphasised that he was a son of 
Wales, was one of the people, for the people, and had striven through life for 
Liberalism as a creed for the advancement of human happiness.' 194 David Rees was 
even more impassioned. His election address stated:
He is a Welsh-speaking Welshman, and his feelings are strongly 
nationalistic. He even hopes to live to see the day when there will be a 
Welsh Parliament at Cardiff that will deal with distinctly Welsh questions. 
He is a strong supporter of the Welsh language, and the 'language of 
Paradise 1 is the language he uses in this own home. He believes that 
Liberalism will give to the worker all and more than Socialism would give 
him, and that personal incentive would remain, whereas under Socialism it 
would vanish. 195
The continuities between the features of this discourse and pre-war Liberalism are 
plain to see. Yet despite their claim to represent the 'people' it is clear that Liberal 
discourse had lost much of its ability to encompass the widest-cross section of the 
community possible. The erosion of the gwerin ideal that was already evident in the 
1900s was accelerated after the war. Several interrelated factors contributed to this 
decline. In one respect the Liberals can be regarded as a victim of their own success. 
The disestablishment of the Church, for example, robbed religious motifs of their 
immediacy. It is noticeable that in all the examples given above the pre-war 
Nonconformity/Welsh-Anglican/English discursive dichotomy does not appear. 
Moreover, as shown, Labour had successfully adopted much of Liberalism's 
progressive rhetoric. Finally, a discourse based on the co-operation of labour and 
capital seemed hardly to correspond with the reality of bitter, months-long industrial 
disputes.
If Liberalism was a stagnating force in the mining valleys of South Wales 
during the early to mid-1920s, there was another alternative discourse to the Labour- 
SWMF hegemony. This discourse had its roots in Conservatism. Like pre-war 
Conservatism, much of its appeal focused on a distinctly British identity. During the 
1918 'Coupon' election there was some overlap with Coalition Liberals, as the 
Government sought to capitalise on its success in conducting the war. Much of 
Coalition electioneering in 1918 was shot through with an anti-German, 'Hang the 
Kaiser' mentality. Captain Seaton, the Conservative candidate for Pontypridd, began 
his campaign on this basis. He believed 'there were some who wanted them to treat 
the Germans kindly and give them a fresh start. He was strongly opposed to anything 
of the kind. Germany should be made to pay for the mischief she had done.' ' Later
222
Seaton withdrew and threw his support behind the Coalition Liberal T. Arthur Lewis, 
who also campaigned on the basis of victory over Germany. He contrasted the 
victorious Coalition to the ILPers, implying that the latter would have led the country 
to defeat. 'The Coalition Government destroyed Prussian Militarism which would 
have been victorious if the ILPers and conscientious objectors had had their way and 
it is the Coalition Government that should have the carrying out of the peace 
settlement.' 197 Leonard Llewelyn the Coalition candidate for Pontypool also stressed 
the need to punish Germany. 198 C. B. Stanton at Aberdare also laid heavy emphasis on 
Britishness. For him the war had apparently represented an epiphany as 'he 
discovered for the first time that he was British.' He pledged to conduct himself in 
Parliament 'by the memory of a million dead and a million maimed and carry on as a 
Britisher.' 199 But while such a discourse had helped him to victory in 1918, by 1922 
much of the 'transitory war mood' that underpinned his earlier victories (and those of 
Coalition candidates) had evaporated. Instead, the class identity expounded by Labour 
and the SWMF ultimately proved stronger than appeals based on national duty.
Within the industrial sphere there also existed a minority trend, which proved 
more resilient than political Liberalism and Conservatism. Since much of the press 
was either pro-liberal or pro-labour, the specific contours of this discourse are 
difficult to access. References to the existence of a Labour-Unionist movement 
appeared in the pages of the Glamorgan County Times. Meetings focused on the issue 
of'sane trade unionism.' Moreover, an Economic Study Club aimed at countering the 
Marxist economic teaching disseminated by the CLC classes. Here a discursive 
dichotomy was drawn between extremism and constitutionalism, which was 
understood as respect for the existing social order. Gwilym Rowlands, Conservative 
councillor, believed that 'you either have to be a Constitutionalist or an extremist. 
Politically, Liberalism was dead.' 200
This conservative trend also had links within the SWMF. As already noted, 
several lodges initially rejected nationalisation. Moreover, Mike Lieven has used the 
example of the Ynysybwl lodge to highlight the plurality of political beliefs in the 
mining valleys. Here the local Tories were able briefly to gain control of the lodge 
committee. 201 D. B. Jones and his Mechanical Workers had been, however briefly, 
members of the SWMF. Undoubtedly, the shattering effects of the 1926 dispute 
weakened the SWMF position, sapping its financial and human resources, but the 
activists who formed the breakaway industrial union in 1926 did not emerge from the
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ranks of the unorganised. George Spencer had been an official in the Nottinghamshire 
Miners' Association.202 In South Wales, it was former SWMF members led by 
William Gregory who broke away to form the organisation that eventually became the 
SWMIU.203 The SWMIU rejection of politics and industrial action can be regarded as 
a reassertion of a more collaborative and conservative strain of discourse that had 
existed within the SWMF. From 1926, however, this discourse was being used against 
the SWMF. SWMF discourse, hegemonic for so long by virtue of its flexibility, had 
lost its ability by the end of 1926 to flatten out the differences between the miners. It 
remained dominant, but, temporarily at least, the process of homogenisation that 
characterised its discourse from 1898 was broken. However, as a corollary the loss of 
industrial strength caused a shift to the political, reinforcing the mining valleys as a 
Labour stronghold.
Summary
In the early 1920s both continuities and changes are identifiable in the 
discursive practices of the miners' trade unions and the parties. For the SWMF the 
war had been a confidence building experience and passed the initiative to the more 
combative discourse that existed before the war. The more collaborative discourse 
within the SWMF was submerged, but not banished, by a more aggressive tone that 
saw the differences between capital and labour as irrevocable. The solution to the 
conflict could be found in nationalisation, which entailed the abolition of capitalism. 
In fact nationalisation provided the perfect platform for this language. The employers' 
strong resistance to state control meant that it could be easily held up as an example of 
the essential conflict of interest between labour and capital. Leaders and activist made 
the issue symbolic of this wider struggle. Admittedly, some individuals sought a more 
radical solution in socialisation, but even they believed that nationalisation was a 
necessary first step. Nationalisation, therefore, provided a common basis around 
which to rally the miners. Moreover, despite the more aggressive discourse of the 
SWMF, it remained pragmatic. Its toleration of different ideas was represented by the 
editorial policy of the CWM. Issues such as nationalisation, socialisation and 
affiliation to the RILU were freely debated in its organ. However, the debilitating 
effects of the 1921 and 1926 lockout ultimately sapped this confidence and the more 
collaborative trend was eventually able to reassert itself in the form of the SWMIU.
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The Labour Party's commitment to nationalisation provided a political parallel 
to the industrial sphere. Labour was not totally successful in 1918, but by the mid- 
1920s had gained control of the mining constituencies. But support for nationalisation 
was not Labour's only prerequisite for success in South Wales. The party benefited by 
taking on some features of Liberal discourse. Moreover, just as the collaborative 
strain in SWMF discourse declined in the 1920s, so too the co-operation between 
labour and capital advocated by the Liberals seemed equally unconvincing in the light 
of the bitter industrial disputes of the 1920s. On the other hand, Labour's political 
language, which excluded the industrialists from the community in the same way that 
Liberalism had excluded the landowners, fitted well with the atmosphere of industrial 
conflict. The idea of the community and the working class were increasingly elided. 
While Liberalism could only offer a modified version of its gwerzrc-landowner 
dichotomy through the abolition of royalties, Labour's support for nationalisation 
allowed it to use this elision of community and class to project itself as the guardian 
of the community and the proletariat. By combining this with the acceptance of some 
Liberal concerns, Labour was able to usurp the mantle of the progressive party. 
Finally, although the Communists remained among Labour's fiercest critics, they 
regarded themselves more as a watchdog than a rival organisation and usually threw 
what influence they had behind Labour. In another example of the greater 'fluidity' of 
civil society in South Wales Communists and Labour generally regarded themselves 
as members of the same 'family' for much of this period and dual membership of the 
CPGB and other Labour organisations was tolerated. Thus, unlike the Ruhr, where 
divisions between Communists and Social Democrats were sharply drawn, relations 
between Communists and Labour activists in South Wales were highly fluid before 
1927. Although the process of homogenisation had faltered in the industrial sphere, it 
continued in politics.
In the Ruhr the fragmentation identified during the Kaiserreich was 
accentuated by the war. Unlike Labour, the SPD was unable to contain the tensions 
generated by the war. This split in the social-democratic milieux was to prove crucial. 
Whereas Labour was able to largely monopolise a working-class discourse in South 
Wales, in the Ruhr, the SPD found itself challenged by the USPD and later the KPD. 
The fluid relations evident in South Wales were impossible between the KPD and 
SPD as each simply rejected the others claim to represent the working class as 
illegitimate. Similarly, although the Alter Verband had grown closer to the
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Gewerkverein, it had also splintered on the left and now had to deal with the various 
syndicalist and communist unions. In some respects the KPD and Syndicalists 
represented an assertion, or reassertion, of a discourse that already existed in the 
labour movement. The Commission of Nine, for example, was aware of its social- 
democratic roots, while the Syndicalists drew on the even older tradition of pit-head 
meetings. The SPD found that to some extent its claim to be the workers' party had 
been hijacked. It sought to adapt to this challenge and the changed political 
environment by embracing a more inclusive discourse represented by the Volk. 
However, the Volk used by the SPD was intimately linked to the socialist Republic. 
This differentiated it from the Centre, which clung to a political language based on 
Christian belief. For both parties there were tensions between their attempts to reach 
out to a broader electorate and their older 'milieux-fixated' discourses. The discourses 
of both the Centre and the SPD underwent modification, which saw new force given 
to some older elements (e.g. patriotism for the SPD) or the introduction of new ideas 
(e.g. republicanism for the Centre). But essentially both remained predicated on the 
overarching themes which had dominated their pre-war identities: class and religion.
Finally, while nationalisation was a broadly understood and supported concept 
in South Wales, in the Ruhr socialisation was a confused and shifting idea. Each 
group had its own version of socialisation and each was ultimately incompatible. It 
was used to mobilise a certain constituency, not the miners as a whole. The 
organisations' intolerance of dissent meant that they were unable to integrate their 
different versions of socialisation. To do so risked losing their existing support among 
the miners. The RILU provides an example of how dual membership was often not 
tolerated. Affiliation or non-affiliation to the RILU was not subject to debate, but 
became a defining characteristic that distinguished one trade union from another. The 
doctrinaire understanding of such issues precluded any enduring attempt at co­ 
operation and perpetuated the fragmented nature of the labour movement.
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Conclusion
This study of trade unionism and political development ends following the 
defeat of the MFGB at the end of 1926. This is admittedly a somewhat arbitrary point 
at which to conclude. Civil society continued to function and the trade unions and 
political parties examined here continued to reproduce the identities they had created 
through newspapers, magazines and speeches beyond this point. Perhaps a more 
obvious finishing point would be 1933 and the Nazi Gleichschaltung (Co-ordination) 
which set about destroying civil society and suppressing other identities. This, 
however, would ignore the SWMF and Labour Party's continued efforts to create an 
identity in the South Wales mining valleys. In fact, any endpoint seems 
unsatisfactory. Rather than being marked by sharp breaks, the construction of identity 
in both regions was an ongoing process.
This study concludes in 1926 because the hypothesis that drove it no longer 
seems wholly applicable after this point. From 1890 up until the mid-1920s the 
development of the miners' movements in the two regions had demonstrated 
divergent tendencies. In the Ruhr, the miners' movement was generally characterised 
by fragmentation, in South Wales by homogenisation. The Verband zur Wahrung und 
Forderung der bergmannischen Interessen im Rheinland und Westfalen initially 
united the miners of the Ruhr, but over the next two decades the union movement 
fractured on lines of religion and ethnicity. By 1914 the Alter Verband, as the old 
union became known, competed with the Gewerkverein and Polish ZZP. The Great 
War encouraged greater co-operation between the two largest unions, but the 
revolutionary period saw further fragmentation as various syndicalist and communist 
unions emerged. In South Wales, miners' trade unionism began from a more 
fragmented base. Under the Sliding Scale various local associations were in existence, 
but following the 1898 strike a united union in the form of the SWMF was 
established. Unlike, the Gewerkverein and the Alter Verband, the SWMF was also 
able to bolster its position during the First World War and become almost an 
industrial union.
Similarly, in political terms this characterisation of homogenisation in South 
Wales and fragmentation in the Ruhr is generally applicable. In the 1890s, the two- 
party system prevalent in the Ruhr became a three-party one as the SPD emerged 
from the restrictions imposed on it by the Anti-Socialist Law. During the war, the
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socialist movement split, laying the foundations for the struggle between the 
Communists and Social Democrats under Weimar. Before the war the Liberals largely 
dominated the South Wales mining valleys. However, cracks in the control were 
becoming evident at local level in the 1900s, while the concern with 'labour' and 
'class' as an independent political entity was also growing at parliamentary level. The 
war boosted the political labour movement both organisationally and psychologically. 
It revitalised institutions such as the TLCs, while demonstrating that those from 
working-class origins were competent administrators. This provided the basis for the 
Labour breakthrough in the 1920s, when it superseded the Liberals as the party of the 
mining valleys.
After 1926, however, the process of homogenisation in industrial terms broke 
down. The SWMIU was formed and until late in the 1930s the SWMF struggled to 
remove its rival. On the other hand, Labour consolidated its hold on the mining 
valleys. Thus homogenisation on both political and industrial levels no longer 
paralleled each other. In the Ruhr the picture was more complicated. The disbanding 
of the Union in the Ruhr appeared to mark an end to the progressive fragmentation in 
miners' trade unionism there. But in reality the disappearance of the Union did not 
mean the acceptance of the Alter Verband. The dissolution of the Union coincided 
with the Communists' decision to infiltrate social-democratic bodies, a practice that 
had been pursued in an unsystematic way before 1924. The picture of a relatively 
more united movement was therefore deceptive. The adoption of the 'Third phase' 
policy towards the Social Democrats exposed the enduring nature of the divisions in 
the socialist labour movement. This division found organisational expression in the 
appearance of the Revolutiondre Gewerkschafts-Opposition (RGO, Revolutionary 
Trade Union Opposition). By 1931 the RGO succeeded in winning 29 percent of the 
vote in the works' council elections. 1 Meanwhile, in the political sphere, 
fragmentation continued, especially as the National Socialist began to make their first 
inroads into the region.
However, it is not the purpose of this thesis to examine why these processes 
broke down after by 1926. Instead it sought to answer why they existed at all and why 
they differed. This study has tried to account for these differences between the South 
Wales and Ruhr coalfields by using a three-fold framework. First, it has argued that 
the lifeworld of the Welsh miners was more synchronous than that of the Ruhr 
miners. In doing so it has sought to integrate some of the conceptual theories used to
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explain solidarity and strike propensity among miners with the concept of milieux 
widely applied in German historiography. The comparison of South Wales and the 
Ruhr reveals that the former conforms more closely to the Bulmer's 'ideal-type 
traditional mining community'. This difference is apparent on several levels. First, 
although one must be cautious not to overestimate the physical isolation of the mining 
communities, it is clear that the Ruhr as the premier industrial district in Germany, 
was in a different position to South Wales, which was one of several significant 
coalfields. The Ruhr also contained several important cities, while in South Wales the 
largest conurbation lay outside the coalfield at the point of export. Secondly, mining 
was economically predominant in South Wales, while the industrial base in the Ruhr 
was more varied. In the latter region, steel, iron and armaments factories represented 
alternative sources of employment. For example, Essen, despite its many mines, was 
known as the Kannonenstadt (Cannon City), due to the dominance of the Krupp 
armaments factory. Thirdly, mining in both areas was dangerous, but the memory of 
their previous privileged position under state control reinforced perceptions among 
the Ruhr miners that mining as an occupation had been downgraded since the 
liberalisation of the industry. In South Wales, on the other hand, it appears the 
occupation was regarded more positively as many miners refused promotion to deputy 
level even when they had gain the necessary qualifications. Fourthly, the dominance 
of mining made the occupational structure of South Wales more uniform than in the 
Ruhr. It also appears that the Ruhr miners had somewhat less autonomy at work and 
were greatly affected by mechanisation and rationalisation in the 1920s. By contrast, 
in South Wales there was a greater continuity to the experience of work pre- and post­ 
war. Fifth, the communal activities of the miners differed. The Welsh miners did 
engage in activities that were community focused such as rugby and choral singing. 
The Ruhr miners also had a rich club life, but rather than represent the community it 
was often intimately linked to a certain milieux or subculture. Sixth, both coalfields 
shared a sharp gender segregation/division of work, but the 'hereditary' nature of 
mining as an occupation was greater in South Wales. Bulmer's seventh point, an 
economic/political conflict of interest between owners and miners applies to both 
regions, but it is evident that the SWMF was more successful in achieving its aims 
than either the Alter Verband or Gewerkverein were. Finally, taking these points 
together it is clear that South Wales conforms more closely to the 'ideal-type'. 
Undoubtedly, this will displease many practitioners of micro-history, but this thesis is
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ostensibly aimed at comparing two regions and for that a broader, regional view is a 
prerequisite.
The idea of milieu further illustrates the fragmented nature of the Ruhr miners 
lifeworld. German historiography has made much use of this concept to differentiate 
between different sections of the mining workforce and it would seem possible to 
integrate this with Bulmer's model, especially points five and seven. Social- 
democratic, Catholic and Polish milieux have been described. Each was made up of a 
network of associations that variously included churches, political parties, trade 
unions, educational societies, sporting teams, co-operatives and drinking clubs. 
Apolitical or neutral associations (i.e. not integral to a particular subculture) did exist, 
but during this period these milieux fractured the lifeworld of the Ruhr miners. Of 
course, various competing or antagonistic associations existed in South Wales, but 
they did not equal the almost all-embracing nature of the milieux in the Ruhr. Indeed, 
the SPD set out to create a subculture that could serve its members' needs from 
'cradle to grave'.
In fact, the concept of milieux as applied to German history seems 
inappropriate for South Wales during this period. The theoretical literature is clear on 
the pivotal role state pressure played in consolidating milieux. The Kulturkampf, the 
Anti-Socialist Law and the 'Germanisation' policy represent prime examples of this 
process as they served to make certain groups (Catholic, Social Democrat, Pole) more 
conscious of their interests and encouraged them to establish bodies dedicated to 
protecting them. Any clear distinction between the milieux and the parties would be a 
false dichotomy. The parties were integral parts of the milieu; they were its political 
expression. The Centre party, for example, emerged to counter the effects of the 
Kulturkampf. As already noted, the Centre represented the 'classic' milieu party. The 
SPD was less successful in its attempts to create its own milieu, but it did establish a 
sub-culture made up of former Protestant cottage miners and some sections of the 
immigrants. 2 Despite this SPD was able to challenge the Centre and National Liberals 
to form a three-party political system in the 1890s. In the 1920s the political 
landscape became even more fragmented by the emergence of the KPD. Like the SPD 
in the 1890s, the KPD also sought to build its own network of ancillary organisations 
(or to usurp them from the SPD).
Such 'top-down' pressures were not evident in South Wales during the same 
period. Political, ethnic and religious divisions were not unknown in South Wales.
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The mining valleys were not free from ethnic tensions, as illustrated by anti-Irish and 
anti-Jewish riots. There were also physical confrontations between English and 
Welsh. Ethnic and religious associations were also established. Significantly, these 
rivalries did not lead to organisational rivalry. Admittedly, the Irish formed their own 
societies But by the late 1890s the Irish community was more integrated into the 
Welsh communities. In any case, the mining workforce in South Wales was less 
ethnically diverse than in the Ruhr. Miners were generally Welsh or English. English 
in-migrants were easier to assimilate than non-German speaking Poles. The large 
number of English in-migrants also adapted the existing communities to their needs. 
While Poles in the Ruhr found it difficult to find Polish-speaking priests to administer 
services, many chapels switched from using Welsh to English. The acceptance of 
English as the lingua franca in much of the Welsh coalfield is illustrative of the 
comparative ease with which migrants were accepted into (and changed) the mining 
communities. That it occurred without laws purposively designed to 'anglicise' the 
Welsh was probably its strength. Official attempts to 'germanise' the Poles backfired 
and merely reinforced their milieu. Furthermore, unlike the Ruhr, where the 
population was roughly equally divided between Protestantism and Catholicism, in 
South Wales the people were overwhelmingly Nonconformist. Thus divisions on 
religious lines also lacked the same force they had in the Ruhr.
The issue of milieux (or the lack of them) relates to the second explanation 
used to explain the differences between the two coalfields, civil society. It is clear that 
civil society in the Ruhr conforms to the rigid, segmented societies described by 
Rosenblum and Post. There are numerous examples of how dual membership of 
organisations was not tolerated. For example, membership of the Gewerkverein was 
dependent on an acceptance of Christianity and the open rejection of social 
democracy. Indeed, many in the Catholic Church saw the Christian trade union 
movement as an antidote to social democracy. Naturally, Polish organisations 
expected their members to be Poles. The Alter Verband claimed to be neutral on 
political and religious issues, but it is questionable how seriously the miners would 
have taken such protestations since one of the trade union's leading lights, Hue, stood 
as an SPD deputy for Bochum. Similarly, Heinrich Imbusch stood for the Centre after 
the war. The organs of the two largest trade unions, Der Bergknappe and Die 
Bergarbeiterzeitung, printed articles that clearly favoured the political positions of 
Christian-socialism and social democracy respectively. Finally, after the war and the
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Revolution dual membership of the SPD and the KPD was incompatible. Both parties 
were locked in a struggle that fatally undermined the labour movement in the Weimar 
Republic.
By contrast, in South Wales dual group membership was generally accepted 
and tolerated. Individual members of the SWMF could, for example, support 
whichever political party they desired, despite the affiliation to Labour. Although 
many ministers were hostile to socialism, opposition from the religious establishment 
was not monolithic. A significant (and vocal) minority of ministers was supportive of 
Labour or even socialism. It is significant that Nonconformist journals and even 
Labour press itself debated the pros and cons of socialism. Even employers were 
allowed to put their viewpoint forward, as did D. A. Thomas in the South Wales 
Worker. Finally, after the war, plural membership of the CPGB and Labour was also 
accepted during this period. Communists like Arthur Horner did not regard the CPGB 
as rival to Labour, but as a watchdog, dedicated to ensuring that the party did not 
became complacent or co-opted into the establishment. In the Colliery Workers' 
Magazine articles praising the Russian experiment stood alongside appeals to 
strengthen the organisation of Labour.
This summary of civil society naturally leads to the third and final part of the 
framework: discursively constructed identities. The foregoing account may seem an 
adequate explanation for the differences in trade union and political development. The 
various trade unions and parties could be explained away as expressions of the 
various milieux and sub-cultures, or in South Wales the lack of a milieu. 
Undoubtedly, this represents part of the answer. The lifeworld and civil societies 
provided the background against which the trade unions and political parties 
examined here worked. But if these organisations were merely the expression of 
different social structures, how can incidences of co-operation in the Ruhr be 
explained? Strikes like those that occurred in 1889 and 1905 demonstrated the 
capacity for the Ruhr miners to show solidarity. Moreover, in South Wales the lack of 
milieux did not automatically mean a united labour movement. Indeed, the early 
1890s were characterised by local unions and conflict between the supporters of the 
Sliding Scale and the MFGB. Even after the formation of the SWMF tensions centred 
on older leaders, who advocated collaboration with employers, and a younger 
generation of leaders, or 'advanced' men, who believed that the union and the owners 
were inevitably locked in conflict. Why were the Alter Verband and the
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Gewerkverein unable to sustain co-operation, while the SWMF was able to contain 
potential divisions?
The SWMF sought to base its identity on the miners as a whole. Its identity 
was 'community-fixated' in that it focused on the miner as a working man rather than 
on a particular ideal. Therefore, its activists, whatever, their differences sought 
continually to emphasise solidarity within their discourse, even when there was bitter 
division among leaders over policy. It was policy (i.e. what was best for the union and 
the miners) that was at the crux of conflict, rather than what the miners should be. 
During times of industrial conflict this identity would be placed in juxtaposition to the 
employers, not to other miners, unless blacklegs. During times of industrial peace the 
union focused on contrasting the dignity and honest of those who were members with 
the 'feckless' nature of those who were not. Since this discursive practice was 
essentially focused on a miner/employers or organised/unorganised dichotomy it 
could incorporate a wide range of elements, provided they maintained the central 
paradigm. This coupled with a more fluid civil society that accepted plurality meant a 
more inclusive identity could be constructed. The identity of the miner constructed by 
the SWMF was, therefore, comparatively unproblematic.
Conversely, the Alter Verband, Gewerkverein and ZZP based their identities 
on specific conceptions of the miner. The 'milieux-fixated' identities created by the 
unions, based on Christian-socialism, Marxism and Polish ethnicity respectively, were 
comparatively doctrinaire. By joining these unions a miner was declaring he was a 
certain kind of man. Even the names of the Gewerkverein and ZZP demonstrated that 
they sought not to represent the miner, but a type of miner. The unions also based 
their organisational discourse on demonstrating what they were not. As already noted, 
the Gewerkverein explicitly saw part of its function as the combating of social 
democracy. This separation and juxtaposition of the identities of Christian and social- 
democratic miners was crucial. To abandon it would seem to represent an end to the 
union. This fear determined the Gewerkvereins reaction after any period of co­ 
operation and it vigorously rejected any suggestion of amalgamation. Thus discursive 
identities could condition the trade unions' actions. The discursive practices of the 
trade unions therefore not only drew upon pre-existing social divisions, but also 
served to reinforce them. Thus, although the unions sought to broaden their appeal to 
embrace as much of the workforce as possible, their ability to recruit was intrinsically 
limited by their inflexible identities.
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The political parties differed slightly from the unions. Their identities were 
even more explicitly drawn as each sought to distinguish itself from its rivals. The 
Liberals based their appeal on an emotive mixture of nationalism, Nonconformism 
and community identity. The Liberals combined these elements to form a 
'community-fixated' discourse that contrasted their idealised notion of the gwerin 
with the anglicised, Anglican landowners. Within Liberal political language the 
landlords were excluded from the community. On the other hand, by voting Liberal 
the miners could demonstrated that they belonged to particular Liberal vision of the 
community.
Generally, the Liberals did not use the concept of 'class' in the early 1890s. 
When it was used it was done so in a pejorative sense. When employed it was usually 
meant to imply sectionalism and vested interests and contrasted to the more 
encompassing idea of the 'people'. The Lib-Labs, however, introduced a positive idea 
of class, one that referred to the workers. As the example of Alfred Thomas 
demonstrates Liberal discourse was also able, up to a point, to accommodate the 
growing concerns with the representation of 'labour' and 'class' in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century.
Unfortunately for the Liberal party, the discourse of class became increasingly 
focused on its independent representation. Liberal discourse emphasised co-operation 
between labour and capital and its vision of the community encompassed both the 
miners and the coalowners. Within Labour discourse, on the other hand, concepts of 
community and the working class were increasingly elided. This was especially 
evident in Keir Hardie's rhetoric. He used many elements of Liberal political 
language to great effect, but for him it was mainly the workers who made up the 
community. Capital was excluded and portrayed as a threat. This trend was reinforced 
by the First World War, which also demonstrated that Labour was a competent 
administrator. The industrial disputes of the 1920s strengthened this tendency and the 
issue of nationalisation allowed a particularly apt expression of this labour/capital 
dichotomy. Yet, part of Labour's success in the inter-war period was down to its 
adoption of elements of Liberal discourse. In the elections immediately after the war 
older radical issues such as Disestablishment remained prominent. By accepting these 
ideas into its own political language Labour was able, not merely to emerge as a 
potential challenger to Liberalism, but to adopt the mantle of 'progressivism' and 
eventually dominant the mining valleys.
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In the Ruhr, the National Liberals and Centre parties, like the Liberal party in 
Wales, also combined nationalism and religion within their discourse. They sought to 
portray themselves as Volkspartei, representing the community as a whole. Both 
adopted a 'friend-of-the-workers' approach. However, like the trade unions in the 
Ruhr, their discourse was 'milieu-fixated'. The extent of their appeal was limited by 
their concentration on a specific religious group. Furthermore, like the British 
Liberals, both the Centre and the National Liberals were reluctant to adopt candidates 
from working-class backgrounds. The struggle between the worker Gerhard Stotzel 
and a middle-class member of the Centre party in 1877 mirrored the electoral contest 
that Mabon faced against a Liberal mineowner in 1885. But class for the Centre was 
bound up with issues of confession. Since the party had been formed to protect 
Catholic interests it could not move away from its essentially Catholic image either 
during the Kaiserreich or during the early years of the Republic. Just like the 
Gewerkverein the Centre party in the Ruhr predicated its discourse on the idea of the 
Christian, specifically Catholic, miner. This necessarily undermined its attempt to 
appear as a broad people's party.
The SPD self-consciously adopted a different approach. It did not predicate its 
identity on a specific religious community. Indeed, it was castigated by both the 
Centre and the National Liberals as being both irreligious and a party of Reichsfeinde 
(enemies of the state). Unlike their opponents, the SPD adopted an identity that was 
explicitly predicated on the working class. On this basis they accused the Centre and 
National Liberals of being employers' parties. This identity was partially successful in 
drawing support from Protestant, Kotterbergleute (cottage miners), disaffected with 
the effects of economic liberalisation, and some of the immigrants to the region. But it 
was undermined by its very attitude towards religion. Hue, for example, constantly 
maintained that religion was a private matter, not a political one. But for the Centre 
and many Catholics the issue was anything but private. It was a public matter and 
issues such as denominational schools repeatedly surface. The irreligious element in 
the SPD's political language hampered its appeal, just as Catholicism limited that of 
the Centre. Also its heavy emphasis on class meant the SPD was largely unsuccessful 
in reaching out to other groups in Wilhelmine society. In the 1900s the party struck a 
more patriotic note, but its primary identity remained based on class. This was evident 
in the way in which it constantly rejected the idea that the Centre could do anything of 
note for the workers. In its own language the SPD was the only workers' party. Using
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this identity SPD was able to win several electoral contests in the Dortmund and 
Bochum seats, but was unable to dominate the region due to the entrenched nature of 
Centre and National Liberal support.
Ultimately, the SPD made its breakthrough in 1919 under a very different 
electoral system. Unfortunately, for the SPD this triumph proved short-lived. While 
the Great War had strengthened the Labour party, it had accentuated divisions within 
the SPD, which split into the USPD and MSPD. In 1919 the USPD attracted little 
electoral support, but in 1920 their share of the vote increased at the expense of the 
SPD. Later, following the re-unification of the MSPD and part of the USPD, the KPD 
inherited much of this support. Moreover, the KPD usurped much of the class 
discourse that had been the sole preserve of the SPD before 1914. In effect it was 
drawing on older, more radical notions of class that the SPD had abandoned for a 
more reformist path in the 1900s. The KPD discourse was also 'milieu-fixated' in that 
it drew the majority of its membership from the unemployed. Excluded from the 
workplace, the KPD increasingly focused on violent confrontation and the struggle to 
protect Soviet Russia.
The SPD meanwhile found itself in the unfamiliar position of facing a serious 
challenger on the left. It also had to contend, on the one hand, with the dictates of 
power and, on the other, with the expectations of its followers. The disillusionment 
that many felt in the 1920s benefited the KPD, who capitalised on notions of betrayal 
of the revolution. Thus, the idea of the Arbeiterpartei that had been the SPD's 
mainstay before the war became contested. Yet the SPD could not abandon class as a 
defining feature of its discursive identity. Its very idea of the Republic was a socialist 
one. Its attempt to build upon the patriotic element evident before the war was not 
wholly successful for the same reason that the Centre was unable to convincingly 
claim that it was a Volkspartei. Class was too ingrained in its identity to be easily 
ejected. To do so risked losing more of the party's core constituency to the 
Communists.
In summary, an understanding of the discursive practices of the trade unions 
and political parties in both coalfields is crucial for explaining the differences between 
the two regions. Within a context of a comparatively more synchronous lifeworld and 
a fluid civil society, the SWMF, Liberal party and later Labour developed more 
inclusive identities. It was the inclusiveness of these identities that allowed these 
organisations to achieve the dominant positions they did. Indeed, Liberalism began to
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falter when it reached the limit of its ability to encompass different discourses. Its 
ability to accommodate 'labour' and 'class' did not extend to independent 
representation and the increasing emphasis laid on these terms undermined the 
Liberals' position. This trend was paralleled by changes in what the community was 
perceived to include. Coalowners, who had been seen by Liberalism as an integral 
part of the community, were firmly excluded in Labour's political language. Thus 
although Labour focused on class, class by now meant much the same as the 
community.
In the Ruhr, the 'milieu-fixated' nature of discursive identities meant that they 
were exclusive. A fragmented lifeworld and segmented civil society made it difficult 
for a community discourse to be formed. Instead each identity, forged through 
discourse, claimed to represent a certain group. The trade unions and the parties 
placed each other's identities in juxtaposition. This contrasting of one identity to 
another became necessary for the very survival of the organisations involved. 
Although modifications were made, large changes were difficult as they risked 
undermining the core constituency. These discursive practices limited co-operation 
and negated amalgamation. It was the trauma of National Socialism and war that 
eventually broke these barriers down.
1 Jager, Bergarbeitermilieus, p. 49.
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